Mollie Simon

Busted: 'We Buy Ugly Houses' franchise owner to plead guilty in $40 million fraud scheme

The former operator of one of the largest HomeVestors of America franchises has agreed to plead guilty to federal wire fraud in connection with a sprawling Ponzi scheme targeting people who believed they were investing in his real estate empire.

Federal prosecutors in Texas identified 80 victims defrauded of nearly $40 million by Charles Carrier since 2018. Though Carrier agreed to plead guilty to only one count of felony wire fraud involving one $200,000 transfer, he admitted to the broader scheme as part of the deal and agreed to pay restitution — the amount of which has yet to be determined.

The charge also carries a maximum 20-year prison sentence and the possibility of millions of dollars in fines. A federal judge will decide the sentence.

Carrier owned Dallas-based C&C Residential Properties, one of the most successful franchises in the HomeVestors chain, which is known for its “We Buy Ugly Houses” slogan. HomeVestors terminated Carrier’s franchise in October 2024, after receiving a tip that he had been defrauding investors. It has since sued him for infringing on the company’s assiduously protected trademark. Carrier has not yet responded to the lawsuit.

In a story published this month, ProPublica detailed how Carrier bilked millions of dollars from scores of investors across Texas, including both wealthy businesspeople and older adults of more modest means who depended on the investment income for daily expenses. According to new court documents, losses to individual investors range from $35,000 to $11.6 million. The plea agreement was filed in court two weeks after the article was published.

Carrier took loans from investors to finance his house-flipping business, initially using the money to buy and renovate older houses to sell for a profit. Carrier promised each loan would be secured by an ownership interest in a house and that he would pay 8%-10% interest in monthly installments over the course of the loan.

For many years, investors received reliable monthly payments. In 2018, however, Carrier started taking out multiple loans on individual properties, sometimes providing investors with deeds he never recorded and racking up debt far beyond the value of the houses, according to court documents. Carrier also admitted to forging signatures and notary stamps so he could sell properties without notifying the investors or paying off their notes, according to court documents. Carrier admitted to using investor money to “pay personal credit card balances, business operating expenses and interest obligations to earlier investors,” according to court documents.

Series Timeline

April 18, 2023

We sent HomeVestors of America questions about the findings of our reporting. Soon after, the CEO praised the reporting in a meeting with franchise owners but added that the company would “bury” the story once it was published.

May 11, 2023

Despite HomeVestors’ promise to hold its franchises to the highest ethical standards, we found some used deception and targeted the elderly, infirm and financially vulnerable while offering to buy their homes for far below market prices.

May 15, 2023

Five families discussed their experiences doing business with HomeVestors franchises, including a man who later died while waiting to be kicked out of his home. Some franchises had sued homeowners after they tried to unwind their deals.

June 13, 2023

The head of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau cited ProPublica’s reporting before a U.S. Senate committee and called for more oversight of HomeVestors’ practices.

July 1, 2023

Despite HomeVestors’ efforts to “bury” ProPublica’s reporting, millions read the investigation and more than 40 media outlets featured our work, including The Washington Post, The Dallas Morning News and Apple News Today.

Aug. 1, 2023

Shortly after ProPublica asked for comment on reporting that showed a top HomeVestors franchise owner had stayed involved in operating the business despite a felony conviction, HomeVestors CEO David Hicks stepped down.

Jan. 24, 2024

HomeVestors continued to reform business practices in response to ProPublica’s reporting, including requiring franchises to provide homeowners considering selling to them with a disclosure that allows deals to be terminated within three days.

The fact that Carrier’s plea deal contains only a single charge left some victims even more angry.

“That’s ridiculous,” said Ron Carver, who lost $300,000 and whose father lost $200,000 before he died. “They will let him plead out and he might get a slap on the wrist.”

A spokesperson for the U.S. attorney’s office said they can’t comment on a pending case.

Carrier’s lawyer, Tom Pappas, said it wasn’t Carrier’s “intention to defraud anybody of their money.”

“Pretty much all of his money was put into his business to try and make it successful so investors would be successful,” Pappas said, adding that Carrier didn’t fund a lavish lifestyle. Without providing details, Pappas said changes in the real estate market “overtook” Carrier and “the thing just got away from him.”

Although Carrier agreed to plead to only one count, the entirety of the fraud identified by prosecutors will be considered by the judge during sentencing.

Pappas said Carrier is “committed to repaying every investor every dollar he can to make them whole.” Pappas said he expects the restitution will likely be “much lower” than the $40 million in losses identified by prosecutors, as the lawyers are wrangling over the value of the investors’ losses. In February, Carrier signed an asset liquidation agreement allowing prosecutors to oversee the sale of his remaining properties, with the proceeds going toward restitution.

Pappas said he expects Carrier will serve time in prison.

“Depending on the amount of the loss, there’s a strong possibility he may go to jail,” he said. “But again, we are doing everything we can to make everybody as whole as we can.”

How a 'We Buy Ugly Houses' franchise left a trail of financial wreckage across this red state

Reporting Highlights

  • Lost Investments: People who invested with a Dallas HomeVestors franchise, once touted as the largest, accuse the owner of operating a scheme that cost them tens of millions of dollars.
  • Red Flags: HomeVestors says its franchises follow best business practices. But investors say lax oversight allowed the “We Buy Ugly Houses” brand to be used to further the scheme.
  • Company Responds: HomeVestors has denied responsibility for the franchisee’s actions, saying its franchises are independently operated. It has sued the franchise owner.

These highlights were written by the reporters and editors who worked on this story.

Ronald Carver was skeptical when his investment adviser first tried to sell him on an “ugly houses” investment opportunity eight years ago. But once the Texas retiree heard the details, it seemed like a no-lose situation.

Carver would lend money to Charles Carrier, owner of Dallas-based C&C Residential Properties, a high-producing franchise in the HomeVestors of America house-flipping chain known for its ubiquitous “We Buy Ugly Houses” advertisements. The business would then use the dollars to purchase properties in which Carver would receive an ownership stake securing his investment and an annual return of 9%, paid in monthly installments.

“Worst case, I would end up with a property worth more than what the loan was,” Carver said of the pitch.

Carver started with a $115,000 loan in 2017. And sure enough, the interest payments arrived each month.

He had worked three decades at a nuclear power plant, and retired without a pension and before he could collect Social Security. He and his wife lived off the investment income.

The deal seemed so good, Carver talked his elderly father into investing, starting with $50,000. As the monthly checks arrived as promised, both men increased their investments. By 2024, Carver estimates they had about $700,000 invested with Carrier.

Then, last fall, the checks stopped. The money Carver and his father had invested was gone.

Carrier is accused of orchestrating a yearslong Ponzi scheme, bilking tens of millions of dollars from scores of investors, according to multiple lawsuits and interviews with people who said they lost money. The financial wreckage is strewn across Texas, having swept up both wealthy investors and older people with modest incomes who dug into retirement savings on the advice of the same investment advisor used by Carver.

As early as 2020, Carrier had begun taking out multiple loans on individual properties — some of which he never owned. In cases reviewed by ProPublica, as many as five notes were recorded against a single property, far exceeding the property’s value. Carrier also failed to properly record many deeds that were supposed to secure the loans, accumulating more debt than he could ever repay while investors remained unaware they had no collateral for their investments.

“It’s incalculable the amount of damage this guy did,” said one investor who lost about $1 million and asked not to be named to avoid embarrassment and not to interfere with a criminal investigation into Carrier’s scheme. “He’s ruined some lives.”

Carrier, who declined an interview request, said in a brief phone conversation that he’s not trying to avoid responsibility for the harm he caused. “When this thing finally stopped, it was completely driven by me saying ‘enough’ and going to the people and saying, ‘Here’s the mess I’ve created,’” he said. “This is a mess created by me.”

Series Timeline

April 18, 2023

We sent HomeVestors of America questions about the findings of our reporting. Soon after, the CEO praised the reporting in a meeting with franchise owners but added that the company would “bury” the story once it was published.

May 11, 2023

Despite HomeVestors’ promise to hold its franchises to the highest ethical standards, we found some used deception and targeted the elderly, infirm and financially vulnerable while offering to buy their homes for far below market prices.

May 15, 2023

Five families discussed their experiences doing business with HomeVestors franchises, including a man who later died while waiting to be kicked out of his home. Some franchises had sued homeowners after they tried to unwind their deals.

June 13, 2023

The head of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau cited ProPublica’s reporting before a U.S. Senate committee and called for more oversight of HomeVestors’ practices.

July 1, 2023

Despite HomeVestors’ efforts to “bury” ProPublica’s reporting, millions read the investigation and more than 40 media outlets featured our work, including The Washington Post, The Dallas Morning News and Apple News Today.

Aug. 1, 2023

Shortly after ProPublica asked for comment on reporting that showed a top HomeVestors franchise owner had stayed involved in operating the business despite a felony conviction, HomeVestors CEO David Hicks stepped down.

Jan. 24, 2024

HomeVestors continued to reform business practices in response to ProPublica’s reporting, including requiring franchises to provide homeowners considering selling to them with a disclosure that allows deals to be terminated within three days.

Investors also blame HomeVestors. For nearly two decades, Carrier used the company’s carefully cultivated brand as the “largest homebuyer in the United States” to gain investors’ trust. They accuse HomeVestors of failing to provide oversight that could have prevented the fraud, despite claiming to hold its franchises accountable for best business practices. In itsanswers to their lawsuits, HomeVestors has denied responsibility for Carrier’s actions, claiming its franchises are independently operated, despite earning hundreds of thousands of dollars from Carrier’s business.

HomeVestors revoked Carrier’s franchise on Oct. 24, about the time interest payments stopped arriving in investors’ accounts. The company said it had received a tip on its ethics hotline — created in 2023, after ProPublica detailed predatory buying practices by multiple franchises. When confronted by HomeVestors, Carrier admitted that “he and his business had entered into debts that they could not pay,” a HomeVestors spokesperson said. The company reported him to the FBI. In May, HomeVestors filed suit against Carrier for trademark infringement and for not indemnifying it against these lawsuits.

“We take all allegations of misconduct incredibly seriously as demonstrated by our decisive action,” the spokesperson said. “It is truly disheartening for us that anyone who lent Mr. Carrier money was misled or harmed by his alleged fraudulent activity.”

Now, Carrier is under investigation by the Department of Justice, according to a recording of an April call between the lead prosecutor and potential victims. (The FBI and DOJ declined to comment.) A judge in one of the many lawsuits against Carrier has deemed allegations of fraudulent loans to be true because Carrier never answered the complaint. And the investors are in a race with one another to recoup even a small amount of what they lost, by either waiting for the DOJ to pay restitution, suing Carrier or trying to foreclose on properties still left in his portfolio.

Just months after learning they had lost all of their investments, and before any restitution could be paid, Carver’s father died.

A Top-Performing Franchise

In 2005, Carrier opened a HomeVestors franchise in Dallas, where HomeVestors is headquartered. In the early days, records show, he relied on a handful of institutional lenders to finance his house purchases. Soon, the Wharton School of Business MBA who had come to house-flipping following a career at Pepsi and a food service equipment company, started cultivating his wealthy friends for loans.

Carrier didn’t fit any stereotype of a glad-handing huckster with a bad loan to sell. Those who knew him describe him as a serious person, “cordial but very direct.” He always had files in front of him, constantly focusing on his business. It made him seem trustworthy, one investor said.

At HomeVestors, he was held up as a model franchise operator. C&C Residential Properties routinely made the top volume and top closer lists and was even named franchise of the year. Carrier led training sessions at company conferences and described his business as “the largest and most successful HomeVestors franchise in the United States” — a claim that remained on the website for Carrier’s business through early May.

“Chas Carrier, for maybe 15 years, was one of the golden boys at HomeVestors,” said Ben Ahern, who over two decades worked for a HomeVestors franchise and later owned one before leaving the company in 2021. “Internally, it was like, ‘Do whatever Chas Carrier’s doing.’”

It isn’t unusual for HomeVestors franchises to rely on private investors to finance their house-flipping. Banks aren’t typically interested in house-flipping loans, which are often short-term and riskier than a standard mortgage. Because of that risk, investors who lend to house-flippers earn a substantially higher return.

To further minimize their risk and ensure they had a legitimate ownership stake in the house, savvy investors would verify the transaction with an independent title company to research whether there were other liens against the property and then record the deed with the county recorder. But many of Carrier’s investors, after years of consistent payments led them to trust him, let Carrier handle recording the deeds and did not confirm that he’d done so.

As Carrier grew his business, he began relying more on individual investors. ProPublica identified through public records at least 124 people who have lent money to Carrier since 2009. Not all of them have lost money.

Carrier’s search for new investors was aided by Robert Welborn, an investment adviser in Granbury, Texas, southwest of Dallas. Welborn had built a network of clients in Granbury, a city of about 12,000 people on the Brazos River, through church, friendships and referrals. Many of his clients were older and had modest nest eggs, which Welborn said were “well diversified.” He said he built a relationship with Carrier in 2012, after researching his background for about two months. That Carrier was a successful franchisee lent him credibility, Welborn said.

“I never imagined the No. 1 franchisee with a fast-growing franchise company, HomeVestors,” would defraud investors, he said.

At the time, Welborn also solicited new investors with invitations to steak dinners where they would hear his pitch. An investment in Carrier’s business, according to Welborn’s sales material, which also featured the HomeVestors caveman mascot, Ug, was both lucrative and secure. “Your investment is protected,” the sales material assured potential clients.

For loans he sent Carrier’s way, Welborn earned a 2% commission, he said. Welborn had at least two dozen clients who invested with Carrier, most of whom had multiple loans to him, according to a public records search. He would not comment on how many of his clients invested with Carrier.

Many investors were happy for years — in some cases, more than a decade. The interest payments came in like clockwork. A lot of Welborns’ clients relied on the payments for retirement income.

“I was real tickled with it,” said Tom Walls, 85, who said he lost $50,000 of his retirement savings by investing with Carrier.

Some investors noticed small problems — a payment that arrived a few days late or an error on the paperwork to secure the loan. But Carrier always fixed the problems promptly, investors said.

“When you have this 10-year continuous, pleasant and mutually beneficial relationship, you build up a great deal of trust,” said John Moses, who estimates he lost more than $1 million to Carrier.

Looking back, the investors who spoke with ProPublica said they wished they had taken those warning signs more seriously.

“He Just Pencil Whipped Those Deeds”

By fall 2024, Carrier’s payments to his lenders stopped. That’s when the house of cards fell.

Carrier had spent that summer scrambling for money. Not only did Carrier have to make loan payments to scores of investors, but he also needed to keep up with the HomeVestors franchise fees and advertising payments. The company requires its franchises to make regular reports on sales and to open their books for audits, to provide financial statements when requested, and to report all assets and liabilities. Any of those reports could have called into question Carrier’s ability to stay solvent. But, according to former franchise owners and employees, HomeVestors’ audits of its franchises are mostly geared toward ensuring they’re paying all their franchise fees, which are based on sales.

Before Carrier’s tangle of fraudulent loans collapsed and was exposed in court, there were signs of trouble.

In 2016, Carrier was fined by the Texas Real Estate Commission for managing properties without a license. The HomeVestors franchise agreement requires owners to follow all laws and regulations, particularly real estate regulations. In 2020, two title insurance companies issued specialalerts on Carrier’s business, advising their title officers not to enter into transactions with him without further legal and underwriting review. Carrier hasn’t paid taxes on some of his properties since early 2023, according to court and public records, another violation of his franchise agreement. Despite the apparent violations, HomeVestors didn’t terminate Carrier’s franchise agreement.

“I don’t really think they do have much in place to prevent something like this,” Ahern, the former HomeVestors franchise owner, said of the company. “HomeVestors at the time didn’t seem to have an internal system policing how franchises finance buying properties.”

A HomeVestors spokesperson said the company focuses on its franchise customers’ experiences selling their homes and does not “dictate” how franchises raise capital. “The more than 950 franchises of HomeVestors are independent businesses with a wide variety of finance options available to them,” the spokesperson said.

Last spring, Carrier began borrowing against his future receipts in exchange for cash advances with exorbitant fees and annualized interest rates that he later claimed ranged as high as 600%. Between May and October, he did this at least seven times, racking up more than $1.2 million in debt beyond what he owed his investors, exhibits included with court filings show. By fall, he owed more than $75,000 in payments a week, according to the original terms. Seven companies filed suit over the cash-advance agreements, accusing him of default. Carrier has denied the allegations of default and has countersued four of the companies, claiming he was charged unreasonably high interest rates.

The lending scheme appears to have fallen in a gray area for state and federal securities regulations. It’s unclear whether the promissory notes Carrier issued to investors meet the definition of a security, two experts told ProPublica.

In October, Carrier’s investors began to confront him about the missing payments, including Jeff Daly and Steve Needham, two of Carrier’s largest investors who had been lending him money for years. Carrier came clean to Daly, admitting he had been running a lending scheme for “several” years, according to a lawsuit Daly and Needham filed. He told Needham he had taken out multiple loans on individual properties without disclosing them to the investors, according to the lawsuit. The two men claimed in their lawsuit, which resulted in default judgments against Carrier, that combined they had lost $13.5 million to Carrier.

The investor who spoke to ProPublica and asked not to be named said in an interview that Carrier broke down in tears when confronted about losing more than $1 million of the investor’s money. Carrier admitted the loans paid for his operating expenses, not for buying and refurbishing houses, the investor said.

“He just pencil whipped those deeds at the end,” the investor said, explaining that Carrier drew up documents but didn’t record them. Because the deeds were never recorded, the investor had no lien on the properties and therefore no collateral. Some deeds were for houses that Carrier didn’t own or never bought, the investor said. “It was a complete fabrication.”

Welborn’s clients, who typically invested much smaller amounts with Carrier, also learned of the house-flipper’s collapse in the fall, when their payments stopped. Carver said that Welborn called him a couple of days after the October payment was due and said, “Hey, I’m sorry to tell you this, but Chas has called me and admitted to fraud.”

Carver said he got in the car and drove to Welborn’s office, where he learned the nightmarish truth that all the money Carrier had taken was gone.

“A Life-Changing Hit”

Investors are deploying a variety of strategies to get their money back — some of which pit bigger investors against smaller ones and early investors against more recent ones. Those who acted quickly are recovering some money through foreclosures and lawsuit settlements. Although Carrier is denying allegations in lawsuits brought by the cash-advance companies, he’s not fighting individual investors who are suing him. Three of their lawsuits have resulted in judgments against Carrier, and he has so far not defended himself against the others.

Welborn said he’s doing his best to help his clients recover their money by providing the necessary paperwork, connecting them with buyers for the houses used as collateral and researching lien histories on the homes. When he first learned of the scheme, Welborn tried to convince his clients to sign on with his lawyer to sue Carrier. The lawyer, Anthony Cuesta, hoped a court would seize Carrier’s assets to help recover the investors’ lost funds. But he quickly learned there were too many investors and not enough equity in the properties to fund the litigation. Now, many of Welborn’s clients are waiting for the FBI and DOJ to act, while wealthier investors are foreclosing on properties and making them ineligible to be used for restitution. Welborn said some of his clients have been paid restitution through a DOJ-appointed real estate agent’s sale of Carrier’s properties, but he declined to provide details.

Carver isn’t optimistic: “We are not going to get a dime.”

At least one investor went after Welborn individually. According to a Securities and Exchange Commission disclosure, the claim was settled for $130,000. In his response to the SEC disclosure, Welborn denied breaching fiduciary duty to the client and said he “resolved the claim to avoid controversy.” Welborn told ProPublica that $120,000 of the settlement came from the sale of the house used as collateral for the family’s loan and he paid $10,000 for their attorney fees.

Welborn said he’s “devastated” by the loss of his clients’ money. “But every day I drag myself to work with God’s help and spend most of my day helping lenders with their own personal restitution battles,” he said.

Some investors said they will have to go back to work after having retired or are scrambling to find some way to replace their lost income.

Carver wishes he had paid more attention to red flags, like paperwork errors. But the monthly checks were so reliable, he didn’t listen to his gut. Or his wife.

“Every time I added money, my wife would say, ‘Don’t do it,’” Carver said. “My mother, too. She would push on my dad not to add any more. But he liked getting the monthly check.”

Carver’s dad, Larry, believed it was the best performing investment he had ever made. When the money disappeared, Carver went to work trying to recoup some of it. Maybe he could write it off on his taxes, he thought. He wanted to get at least something back for his dad. But Larry was in ill health, and in February, he died.

“My dad passed thinking he lost all of his money to this guy,” Carver said, adding he hopes Carrier “goes to jail for a very long time.”

The investor who asked not to be named said the loss was “a life-changing hit.” He had retired at 53, after sticking it out in a job he hated until his stock options vested. When he finally quit, he put the money into Carrier’s business and lived off of the monthly payments. He may have to go back to work.

“He was an arrogant son of a bitch,” the investor said. “It was gone before he told anyone there was a problem. That’s the unforgivable piece. He squandered it all away. And he had to get backed into a corner before he admitted it was all gone.”

Byard Duncan contributed reporting.

Few cops who used force on George Floyd protesters faced discipline: analysis

ProPublica is a Pulitzer Prize-winning investigative newsroom. Sign up for The Big Story newsletter to receive stories like this one in your inbox.

Last summer, ProPublica compiled 68 videos that appeared to show police officers using disproportionate force against protesters during the nationwide events following George Floyd's death in police custody.

We had culled the videos from hundreds circulating on social media in the wake of the protests and highlighted the cases that seemed to clearly show officers using disproportionate force. We then reached out to dozens of law enforcement agencies whose officers are in the videos and asked some straightforward questions: Have the officers' police departments investigated the incidents? And what consequences, if any, have the officers in the videos faced?

As time passed, we've been checking in with the departments to get their answers.

After a year, we wanted to give a final update on what we know: Departments have disclosed discipline for 10 officers.

A Seattle Police Department officer received a written reprimand for striking a protester with “six to eight punches over six seconds." In Grand Rapids, Michigan, an officer shot a man in the shoulder at close range with a long-range tear gas round. He received two days without pay. In Salt Lake City, an officer received “coaching and counseling" for using a shield to push an elderly man.

Six officers were initially fired, though two got their jobs back after a review. Criminal charges are also pending against 11 officers, including some who have already faced internal discipline.

In 17 cases that we followed, the departments have decided not to discipline the officers or could not identify them.

Investigations are still ongoing in 25 of the cases. This includes a high-profile case in Buffalo, New York, where two officers pushed a man backward, causing him to hit his head on the pavement. A grand jury dismissed felony assault charges against the officers, but a decision on departmental discipline is still pending.

Finally, in 18 instances, ProPublica could not determine the disciplinary outcome — either because the department did not respond or the department said it could not share the information.

The weaving journey of accountability has played out starkly around one of the cases in Atlanta.

In May 2020, the mayor announced the firing of two officers just a day after they were involved in the violent arrest of two college students who were pulled from a car.

But the officers quickly sued to get their jobs back, citing a lack of due process. In February, Atlanta's Civil Service Board agreed. The two officers are once again employed by the department but remain on administrative leave. The incident remains under investigation. Criminal charges have also been filed against the officers, including assault, though the district attorney who brought them has since been voted out of office.

One reason departments have declined to comment on the status of cases is that the incidents have been subject to litigation. But the back and forth on such suits can be illuminating.

Responding to a lawsuit by a protester who was hitby a Los Angeles Police Department vehicle, the city wrote that the “force used against plaintiff, if any, was caused and necessitated by the actions of plaintiff, and was reasonable and necessary for self-defense."

In about half of the cases we reviewed, including one resulting in discipline, the officer or officers involved have not been publicly identified. Sometimes, it's not even clear which law enforcement agency they worked for.

In Minneapolis, where Floyd's death occurred, sparking outrage across the world, a video captured the moment in May when officers patrolling a neighborhood fired paint rounds at a woman's home while enforcing a curfew.

A Minnesota National Guard spokesperson told ProPublica the agency was “not involved" in the incident. The Minneapolis Police Department said the incident was “not our agency." The Minnesota State Patrol said that it reviewed the video of the incident, and that “the officer who fired the marking round was not a State Patrol trooper." When asked which agency the officers who fired the paint round were from, the spokesperson said it was “unclear."

How many vaccine shots go to waste? Several states aren't even counting

ProPublica is a Pulitzer Prize-winning investigative newsroom. Sign up for The Big Story newsletter to receive stories like this one in your inbox.

As reports emerge across the country of health facilities throwing out unused and spoiled COVID-19 vaccines, some state governments are failing to track the wastage as required by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, leaving officials coordinating immunization efforts blind to exactly how many of the precious, limited doses are going into the trash and why.

In Washington, a health facility allegedly threw out some COVID-19 vaccine doses at the end of workers' shifts because staff believed state guidelines blocked them from giving unused shots to people below the top priority tier. In Maryland, workers appear to have tossed thawed doses when they ran out of time to administer them safely. How many doses, exactly, have been wasted in those states is unknown because neither state is tracking unused or wasted vaccines.

In Indiana, where hospitals have told the media about discarding some shots, the state Health Department said it requires wastage to be reported but wasn't able to tell ProPublica how many doses have been tossed statewide. Nonetheless, it asserted that “wastage has been minimal."

Experts say that waste reporting is essential during a vaccination campaign to encourage careful handling and the use of every viable dose and, more importantly, to identify potential problems in the shipping and cold storage operations. With inconsistent reporting requirements and no enforcement of a federal mandate to report wastage, vaccine providers have little incentive to acknowledge wasting vaccines, said Dr. Ashish Jha, dean of the School of Public Health at Brown University.

Jha said he thinks that the true number of wasted doses across the country is far higher than a handful. After he detailed one anecdote he heard about an ER physician forced to waste vaccine doses in a thread on Twitter, his phone quickly filled with more than a dozen messages from other medical workers, confirming what he suspected: At a time when the U.S. is desperately short on vaccines, a significant number of doses are ending up in the trash.

Clinics and hospitals have “gotten slammed" when the media has learned of them wasting even a few doses, he said. “And the signal to everybody else is, if you have waste, don't report it. Because if you do, you're gonna get into a lot of trouble. That combination means, at least in my assessment, there's a lot of waste and a lot of underreporting of that waste."

The CDC requires all organizations that administer the vaccine to report the number of vaccine doses “that were unused, spoiled, expired, or wasted as required by the relevant jurisdiction." The CDC also asked states to describe their wastage monitoring method during the distribution planning process.

Vaccine providers, such as pharmacies and hospitals, are supposed to provide data on wasted doses to their state health agencies, which then send the information to the CDC. Like many parts of the vaccine rollout, that has not gone according to plan. State by state, ProPublica found, reporting requirements vary and are not reliably communicated to vaccine providers. Even when the rules are clear, they are not regularly enforced, nor are numbers reported to the public.

Maryland's Hospital Association said wastage data “is not systematically collected," while the state's Health Department said that “unless they are reported to us, MDH does not track specific instances of accidental vaccine wastage at the local level."A Washington State Health Department spokesperson said that the state “does not systematically capture wasted dose information." The spokesperson added that providers are encouraged to use up all of the shots they receive and that “if a provider doesn't have enough qualifying employees under" the top priority group, “they can help vaccinate workers

who aren't receiving vaccine directly from their employers."

Michigan's Department of Health and Human Services said, “We have not asked that vaccine providers report this data," though it said that 10 wasted doses had been reported to it as of Jan. 13.In some cases, states said they were aware of specific instances of wastage. New Jersey said that it was “aware of 16 vials that had to be discarded because they arrived broken when the boxes were open."

While a spokesperson noted that providers are instructed to give vaccines to people on waitlists to minimize the chances of vaccine being discarded, the spokesperson didn't respond to questions about whether providers were mandated to report wasted doses.

Other states do have wastage reporting mandates. Pennsylvania, for example, said it requires providers to report any doses that are received and are not able to be used and was able to give a percentage — 0.1% of doses received for injections as of Jan. 11 — that had to be disposed of. “The majority of discarded vaccine is related to vials broken in handling and syringe issues, such as bent or broken needles or clients refusing after the vaccine dose was drawn," said Department of Health spokesman Barry Ciccocioppo.

Colorado also said that waste is being tracked. “The state is aware that Pueblo Local Public Health rendered 300 doses of the Pfizer vaccine unusable after a portable vaccine storage unit malfunction," a spokesperson from the state's Joint Information Center said. “The state's goal is to use every single available vaccine, acknowledging that emergencies may occur infrequently in the distribution process."

In every mass vaccination effort, some share of doses unavoidably goes into the trash rather than arms. However, data on wasted shots — especially in large quantities — is an essential tool for federal and state health agencies trying to spot problems in how the vaccine is being shipped, stored and given to the public.

State vaccine officials monitor wastage numbers to determine if providers are mishandling shipments or improperly maintaining the temperature of their vials, said Dr. Kelly Moore, deputy director of the Immunization Action Coalition and former head of Tennessee's immunization program. "Are they tracking things and responding appropriately, if you're seeing extremely low wastage rates and everything is always perfect?" Moore said. "When things look too good to be true, they usually are."

The two vaccines currently authorized, made by Moderna and Pfizer-BioNTech, both must be used within six hours of leaving cold storage, reaching room temperature and being opened. If there are no-shows for vaccination appointments, pharmacists have to quickly find replacements before the thawed vaccines expire.

Complicating the count is the fact that the number of doses available in a vial sometimes exceeds the amount prescribed on the label — pharmacists have commonly found that they can squeeze a sixth dose out of Pfizer's vials, even though they are labeled as containing five. That means that a vaccine site could be allocated a certain number of doses on paper, have a few extra ones left that need to be tossed and still come out net positive. In that situation, it is unclear if the discarded doses should count as waste.

Data on wasted doses is routinely monitored in childhood immunizations in large part because it is required by the federal Vaccines For Children program, which provides innoculations to millions of children not covered by private health insurance, said Dr. Sean O'Leary, a professor of pediatric infectious diseases at University of Colorado Medicine. “Practices that are participating in that program, which are the vast majority of pediatric practices and a lot of family medicine practices, are used to keeping track very carefully of their vaccine inventory."

There isn't a federal program overseeing most adult vaccinations, so any wastage reporting for adult shots, like the flu shot, would be managed state by state.

While collecting wastage data is a good business practice, O'Leary said it is most useful as a deterrent against vaccine providers mishandling or discarding doses irresponsibly.

"It's being tracked as a disincentive to letting [wastage] happen," he said, “for accountability for people who are delivering the vaccines that they are doing their best to give the vaccines and store them properly."

However, there is also a danger in stigmatizing the waste of vaccine doses, said Moore, the immunization coalition deputy director. Accidents and normal human error are going to make some vials unfit to use on patients. Doses compromised by unsafe temperatures or contamination need to be thrown out, not injected into people. “You never, ever want to have clinics feel pressured not to waste vaccine that needs to be wasted," Moore said. “If you say, 'No one should ever damage vaccine,' you're really going to be in trouble."

The CDC says vaccine providers should avoid wastage and disclose when it happens.

“If there is excess vaccine, clinic staff should do everything possible to avoid wasting the dose. If vaccine wastage occurs, it should be reported into CDC's Vaccine Tracking System (VTrckS)," said CDC spokeswoman Kristen Nordlund. “We are working to figure out how to provide this data online in the future when the data is more complete."

In the meantime, federal officials have begun to urge that priority guidelines not get in the way of using vaccines. “It's more important to get people vaccinated than to perfectly march through each prioritized group," Alex Azar, secretary of health and human services under President Donald Trump, said at a briefing on Jan. 6.

This means that a pharmacist should use a dose that's about to expire on any available person — even someone who isn't in a priority group — rather than letting it go in the trash. “There's always someone in line. The whole nation is in line," said Lori Freeman, chief executive officer of the National Association of County and City Health Officials. “There's no reason for any vaccine to go to waste."

Dr. Mysheika Roberts, health commissioner of Columbus, Ohio, said in an interview last week that her local vaccination site hasn't had to waste a single dose of vaccine so far. Initially, if there were extra doses at the end of the day, they used them on their own staff, she said. After that, the mayor allowed them to put police officers on the waitlist — even though only health care providers were technically eligible at the time — so the vaccinators could call the station if they had extra doses. Managing a waitlist is complicated, Roberts said, because you need to have people who want the vaccine and have both the transportation and flexibility to get to the vaccine clinic within about 30 minutes, but so far it has worked out. The vaccine clinic has also managed to further reduce potential waste by getting appointment confirmations and defrosting vaccine vials close to appointment times, she said.

An Ohio Department of Health spokesperson said the state requires providers to report waste, and that 165 doses of the vaccine had been recorded as wastage as of Jan. 15.

“I hope to never be in a position where I have to waste a dose," Roberts added. “I'd go on a street corner and find someone to give the vaccine to before I have to throw it away."

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