Derek T. Muller

Law professor details 'legal safeguards' to protect your vote from local election officials

Some local election officials have refused to certify election results in the past few years. Georgia has new administrative rules that invite election officials to investigate results before certifying. And worries abound that election officials might subvert the results of the 2024 presidential election by refusing to certify the results.

While states may have different names or processes, certifying an election typically looks something like this: On election night, the local precincts close, and local election workers tabulate the vote; they affirm or attest that the precinct results are the proper tabulation and send those results to the county.

In a matter of days, the county election board assembles the results across all the county’s precincts, tabulates them and certifies the county’s result. Those results are sent to the state election board, which adds up the results from all the counties and certifies the state’s winners. The governor then signs certificates of elections for the winning candidates.

There isn’t one weird trick to steal a presidential election. And there are ample safeguards to ensure ballots are tabulated accurately and election results are certified in a timely manner.

It’s just arithmetic

Certifying an election is a rather mundane task. In law, it is often called a “ministerial” obligation, which means it does not involve individual discretion. It is little more than making sure all precincts have reported and the arithmetic is correct. But it is an important task, because it is the formal process that determines who won the most votes.

Election officials typically carry out this obligation with little fanfare. But in recent years, some election officials have questioned the election results. Some officials have wondered whether the voting machines that tabulate votes were functioning correctly, or they wanted to investigate other aspects of the election. At the certification stage, however, election officials do not have that power.

If there are major questions about the election, the power to investigate them lies elsewhere. Other election officials verify absentee ballot signatures or calibrate ballot tabulation machines well before the election, a task typically open to public viewing.

A losing candidate might file an election contest in court to challenge the results of the election, and a court can take evidence and hear the legal dispute. Certification, in contrast, is a simple and ministerial task.

Courts can step in

If an election official or board refuses to certify an election, that refusal does not last long. After some refusals in recent years, election officials learned of the legal consequences for failing to perform their obligations, including being removed from office and facing criminal prosecution. Most officials quickly relented and ended up certifying. And none of the delays in certification ever lasted long enough to miss deadlines set by state law for certification.

If election officials still refuse to do their job, they can be sued in court. The secretary of state might sue to ensure officials complete the tasks required for election administration. Or a winning candidate might sue to ensure that he or she receives a certification of election.

In 2022, for instance, after an election board refused to certify the results in Otero County, New Mexico, the secretary of state filed a lawsuit in the New Mexico Supreme Court. In just one day, the court ordered the board to certify the election. The board did.

But these elections were not presidential elections, and the stakes are high as 2024’s election approaches. What if election officials refuse to certify results – and, worse still, defy courts that order them to certify results?

The law is prepared for that, too.

If a party refuses to comply with a court order, the court can order someone else to perform it, and it is given the same legal effect. A court can quickly and easily ensure election results are certified in a timely fashion.

For those worrying about the 2024 presidential election, there are even more safeguards. Congress enacted the Electoral Count Reform Act of 2022. The act clarifies the rules surrounding the certifying of results in presidential elections and the counting of electoral votes in Congress.

For instance, the act requires state officials to finish the certification of election results by “the second Wednesday of December,” which is Dec. 11 this year. Courts can ensure that election officials who may be dragging their feet will comply with this federally mandated deadline.

And if officials miss that deadline, the act anticipates that a court may be asked to step in. The act instructs Congress to give full effect to any certification of election results issued by a court, even if it’s after the Dec. 11 deadline.

Good faith and respect

In short, the legal system is built to handle election officials who delay certification or refuse to certify results. No single election official or group of them can stymie an election.

Of course, the refusal to certify an election can still have consequences. It can sow confusion and discord among the public. It can undermine people’s faith in elections and call into question the results when there are no reasonable grounds to dispute the outcome.

Those political and practical concerns are serious, and it is important for the public and election officials to act in good faith and to respect the legal process as it plays out.

But such rhetoric will not prevent the election of a winning candidate.The Conversation

Derek T. Muller, Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Why 'fake elector' schemes will be harder to try in 2024 – but not impossible: law professor

Electors will gather across the United States in December 2024, just weeks after the election, and formally cast votes for president and vice president. They will send their votes to Congress, which will count them and determine who received the most votes. Typically, the casting of electoral votes is little more than a ceremonial process.

But the last time this process happened – in 2020 – it was anything but typical.

In seven states, in addition to the official electors, others calling themselves electors met and purported to cast votes for Republican Donald Trump on Dec. 14. They did this even though Democrat Joe Biden had carried their states in the November election. They sent their votes to Congress just like the official electors. When the electoral votes were counted on Jan. 6, 2021, some in Congress argued these purported alternative electoral votes meant the outcome of the election was still in doubt.

Many of those purported electors now face criminal prosecution. Some may be convicted. And the odds of purported electors trying again in 2024 are less likely – but still possible.

‘Contingent’ or just fake?

A text message about fake electors.

A text message about fake electors shown at a June 2022 hearing by the House select committee investigating the Jan. 6 attack on the Capitol.

House Select Committee via AP

These other electors labeled themselves “contingent” electors, arguing they could be the “true” electors if lawsuits Trump’s campaign filed to dispute the results ultimately went Trump’s way. Some of these other electors drew an analogy to Hawaii’s disputed presidential election in 1960. While Republicans carried Hawaii, a recount was underway when the electors met, and both Republican and Democratic electors sent their votes to Congress. The recount ultimately went Democrats’ way, and Congress counted the votes cast by Democrats.

In 2020, Republican electors in two states, New Mexico and Pennsylvania, sent certificates that expressly included contingency language. The certificates said their votes would be cast only in the event a legal proceeding declared those electors the true electors. This language appears to have saved them from prosecution.

Opponents and detractors have labeled them “fake” electors, because they lacked any state authority to act while presenting themselves as something genuine. These opponents note that Hawaii’s 1960 election had a real recount underway, and there was no serious litigation in any state in 2020 when the electors met. Almost all cases had been dismissed by Dec. 14, and a few pending appeals had no realistic chance of success. The sole purpose of these electors’ actions, opponents argue, was to sow distrust and confusion.

‘No authority’

Regardless of the adjective, these would-be electors had no authority. In Arizona, Georgia, Michigan and Nevada, most of those electors face criminal prosecution on charges such as forgery and fraud. The charges could result in sentences as high as 20 years’ imprisonment.

One major challenge in these prosecutions will be showing that the electors had the requisite intent to commit a crime.

On the one hand, it was quite obvious they were not the lawful electors at the time they purported to cast their votes, and they completed paperwork purporting to exercise lawful authority.

On the other hand, if they can argue they were relying on the advice of Trump’s attorneys or other campaign officials, they might be able to show they lacked the intent to commit a crime. Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel, for instance, claimed that these electors were “brainwashed.”

But each trial will have its own set of arguments and defenses, and it remains unclear what a jury might find in each case.

Removing ambiguities

Could there be a repeat of 2020 in 2024? The odds are lower but not impossible.

To start, Congress enacted the Electoral Count Reform Act of 2022. The new law now requires each state to certify its election results six days before the electors meet.

That means there cannot be pending litigation to sow confusion on the day the electors meet. It creates finality before the electors gather.

The new law also removes from the old law an ambiguous provision that allowed a state’s legislature to appoint electors after Election Day if the state failed to make a choice on Election Day. Some Trump supporters cited this provision to say that the legislature could name the Republican electors as the true winners sometime after Election Day.

But the provision was misunderstood – “failed to make a choice” did not mean that the legislature simply disagreed with the choice made by voters on Election Day. That provision has been removed, eliminating one more potential ambiguity in 2024.

The new law also changes the way Congress counts electoral votes. To start, it makes clear that the president of the Senate – typically, the vice president – has no unilateral authority to make any decisions when Congress counts votes. Additionally, the law makes it harder for members of Congress to object to counting votes.

In previous years, one senator and one representative could object, which would force Congress to debate for up to two hours. It happened once in 2005 and twice in 2021.

Instead, the new law raises the threshold for objections to require support from 20% of the members in each chamber. That makes objections much less likely. Additionally, the new law expressly instructs Congress that final certification from the states “shall be treated as conclusive.”

Of course, electors could still try to stir up public discord in a state if their preferred candidate loses the election. Members of Congress can still try to object. No law can completely stop the risk of subversion after an election. These modest changes in law, however, will help reduce the likelihood that the aftermath of the 2024 presidential election looks like what happened after the election in 2020.The Conversation

Derek T. Muller, Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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