The Conversation

Historic Trump debate put a 10-million-person brain disease in the spotlight

Robin Williams, Monica Vitti, Patrick Stewart or French actress Nathalie Baye: all these famous people lost their lives to dementia with Lewy bodies.

This neurocognitive disease is only tends to get publicity when a celebrity dies from it. Yet it is a common disease (and one of the most common forms of dementia), in France alone it affects about 250,000 people, which makes it the country’s second most widespread neurodegenerative disease, after Alzheimer’s, putting on a par with Parkinson’s. It is estimated that dementia with Lewy bodies (commonly known as “DLB”) affects more than 10 million patients worldwide.

What causes the disease? What symptoms should we look out for? How is it treated? Here is what you need to know.

A long-ignored illness

Dementia with Lewy bodies owes its name to inclusions that develop inside patients’ neurons called “Lewy bodies”, after the German-born doctor Friedrich Heinrich Lewy, who first discovered their existence in 1912.

However, it was only in 1976 that the first clinical case was formally described, while the first international clinical criteria were defined much later in 1996.

In its earliest stages (the prodromal stage before full-blown dementia develops, followed by the early, milder stage), dementia with Lewy bodies is characterised by the dysfunction of certain parts of the outer layers of the brain, such as the insula and the olfactory bulbs (OB). The insula is involved in cognition, emotions, self-awareness, pain, the autonomic nervous system, taste, while the olfactory bulbs are, as their name suggests, involved in olfaction (sense of smell).

These dysfunctions occur due to the accumulation of abnormal deposits of a protein called alpha-synuclein inside neurons. In its usual state, this protein adopts a more helical conformation (also known as the “alpha helix”; it is the way the protein organises itself in space). In its toxic form, its conformation changes, and alpha-synuclein folds instead into “a mille-feuille cake” (a layered conformation called “beta sheet”).

The accumulation of these misfolded alpha-synucleins results in the development of Lewy bodies inside neurons throughout the course of the disease.

However, alpha-synuclein is important for neuronal function. It is a key element in the transmission between neurons. This transmission element is called a synapse. Alpha-synuclein regulates the synaptic vesicles which are kinds of small “bulls” filled with chemical messengers called neurotransmitters, brain hormones secreted by neurons, such as acetylcholine, noradrenaline, serotonin or dopamine.

The accumulation of the toxic form of alpha-synuclein disrupts neuronal function, as neurons are less able to secrete synaptic vesicles that allow them to communicate with each other.

This phase (called “neurofunctional”, because it affects neurotransmitters) lasts at least fifteen to twenty years. Subsequently, Lewy body disease then enters a more aggressive stage: patients’ experience not only neuronal malfunction but also neuronal cell death.

It is worth pointing out that although Lewy bodies are also found in patients with Parkinson’s disease, they differ in appearance, where they are located in the brain and the alpha-synuclein conformation that develops with Lewy body disease.

What do we know about the causes of dementia with Lewy bodies and its risk factors?

Some work suggests that dementia with Lewy bodies may be linked to our environment.

Chronic contact with certain toxic substances, such as phthalates or air pollution (in the form of ultrafine particles), as well as some infections, could promote alpha-synuclein conformational changes during aging, and trigger dementia with Lewy bodies, particularly in the olfactory bulbs, which are the only parts of the brain in contact with the outside, at the nose level.

Known risk factors for the condition include anxiety and depression. Often, patients are found to have suffered from depression for a few years prior; for this reason, it is thought that this disease constitutes a mode of entry into dementia with Lewy bodies.

Other identified risk factors are high blood pressure, diabetes, “bad” cholesterol, stroke, family history of dementia with Lewy bodies or Parkinson’s disease, or mutations in certain genes (including the GBA or ApoE4 genes, which are however not the cause of the disease).

Numerous symptoms

In France, French weathercaster and writer Catherine Laborde spoke out extensively on her illness: she was very embarrassed by her difficulty in concentrating, as well as the fluctuations in her cognitive ability and overall vigilance. She was also prone to great fears for no apparent reason, which together paints a very common clinical picture of this disease.

Cognitive difficulties are the main symptom of the condition, resulting in lower concentration, slowness as well as organisational difficulties. In addition to cognitive impairment, there are various so-called “core features”:

  1. Cognitive and alertness fluctuations that associate moments of drowsiness, long naps, staring or difficulties at certain times to focus (the cognitive and expressive difficulties experienced by Joe Biden during the televised debate with Donald Trump, which were at the root of his withdrawal from the race for the US presidency, beg us to raise questions about cognitive fluctuations).
  2. Behavioural disorders during REM sleep: the so-called “REM” phase of sleep is the dream sleep phase (with rapid eye movement); normally, during this phase, the body is naturally paralysed. This is not the case for patients with Lewy’s disorder: some of them are restless sleepers, they clearly enact their dreams by moving, screaming, while sleeping with their eyes closed.
  3. Visual hallucinations, which affect 70 to 80% of patients. In the prodromal stage (the early stage of the disease), these hallucinations consist of simple sensations of someone going by or someone being present. Then, they become real hallucinations: patients see people, animals, or scenes arise before their eyes.
  4. Parkinsonism: this is most often manifested by a body part that becomes slower or stiff. Unlike Parkinson’s disease, dementia with Lewy bodies is rarely associated with hand tremors when resting.

These symptoms result from neuronal dysfunction, and the resulting lack of neurotransmitters: a lack of acetylcholine promotes cognitive impairment, a lack of serotonin and norepinephrine promotes depression, the lack of melatonin promotes sleep disorders while the lack of dopamine favours slowing down.

It should be known that it is rare that one person may experience all four core symptoms, even though it can happen: patients generally tend to experience one or two of them.

In addition to the core features, many other symptoms can be bothersome for patients affected by the disorder. Thus, it is common for patients to experience behavioural symptoms, such as anxiety, depression, apathy (demotivation) or even delusion. Patients also often have difficulties expressing emotions or recognising other people’s emotions.

Many patients also have autonomis (neurovegetative) symptoms, such as a runny nose (rhinorrhoea), dryness, urinary problems or low blood pressure when standing up. There are also neurosensory symptoms, such as difficulty detecting smells, or light discomfort.

During the advanced stages of the disease, patients lose the ability to perform everyday activities: getting dressed, eating, washing, using the phone, television or remote control… Patients aren’t able to walk as well or lose weight, because some have difficulty swallowing.

When should I see a medical doctor?

The symptoms of dementia with Lewy bodies are highly variable from one patient to another, which explains why, despite its commonness, this condition remains rarely diagnosed, and largely undiagnosed. It is readily confused with so-called “normal aging”, or with other diseases such as Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s disease, or certain psychiatric illnesses such as depression or bipolar disorder.

Patients usually seek medical help due to cognitive disorders, such as mental slowness or difficulty concentrating. However, it is also advisable to see a medical doctor when depression develops after 60 years without an obvious reason, similarly if a patient experiences vision difficulties, even though the eye exam showed no abnormalities.

Other reasons for seeking a medical opinion: starting to sleep a lot during the day, or having such bad nightmares that you struggle in your sleep while in bed.

In general, diagnosis based on clinical symptoms is enough. However, additional tests can be performed where necessary, such as a brain scan (DAT-scan for highlighting a decline in dopamine activity, a marker of parkinsonism) or an MIBG cardiac, or sleep monitoring (which may show a loss of atony during the REM sleep phase – in other words, the loss of normal paralysis in the dream state).

More recently, it has become possible to detect alpha-synuclein (that constitute Lewy bodies) in cerebrospinal fluid (body fluid that circulates in the brain and around the spinal cord) via a sample obtained by lumbar puncture. The technique used, which is called RT-QuIC synuclein, makes it possible to detect Lewy bodies even before the onset of symptoms of the disease.

Thanks to the Swedish Biofinder study, we know that 8% of the population aged 70 years on average has Lewy bodies which are detected using this technique.

Research is now focused on the identification of an equivalent biomarker that would work via a simple blood test.

Where are we in terms of treatment?

No treatment or cure exists yet for fighting the alpha-synuclein deposits that accumulate in the brain or for the actual disease itself. That said, symptomatic treatment does improve the levels of neurotransmitters in the brain.

At present, it is thought that treating patients from the prodromal to mild stages (the earliest stages) is worthwhile for preventing neuron death. Indeed, fighting neuronal dysfunction can probably prevent some of these neurons from dying.

In this respect, it is important to treat depression and anxiety early on as they are both prodromal symptoms and risk factors for dementia with Lewy bodies.

We know that medical attention (sessions with a speech therapist, neuropsychologist, psychologist, occupational therapist, physiotherapist, psychomotor therapist) for cognitive or physical remediation is beneficial to patients.

The early association of these two approaches, both human and pharmacological, allows to optimise patients’ quality of life and that of their relatives by extension. In France, we are fortunate to have an association of dynamic patients and caregivers: the A2MCL. It also contributes to better support for patients and their relatives, thanks to the availability of a telephone hotline, the services of committed psychologists, the dissemination of advice and the sharing of experiences between caregivers. There are many other associations in the world, such as the LBDA in the U.S. and the Lewy Body Society in the United Kingdom.

Regarding the curative aspects, therapeutic trials are underway in France and worldwide to try to develop effective treatments.

A promising drug is Neflamapimod, which reduces inflammation in the brain and promotes acetylcholine-mediated neuronal connections. Our team is also evaluating the effectiveness of a neuromodulation protocol using light (transcranial photobiomodulation), with the Clinatec Foundation.

Finally, research for better understanding and treating dementia with Lewy bodies is dynamic but while it is qualitatively excellent, quantitatively it is inadequate. In recent years, there have been 30 times fewer therapeutic trials on dementia with Lewy bodies than on Alzheimer’s disease. Yet, if we collectively make progress in the fight against the condition, it will be to the great benefit of patients, their families and society as a whole.

Frédéric Blanc, Professeur de gériatrie et neurologue, chef du service de Gérontologie Mobile-Neuro-Psy-Recherche et du Centre Mémoire de Ressources et de Recherche (CMRR), chercheur au sein de l'équipe IMIS du laboratoire ICube, Université de Strasbourg, Université de Strasbourg

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

'A bad look': Trump DOJ's aggressive court blitz completely collapses

From Washington, D.C. to Anchorage, Alaska, federal courts have been busy with cases related to the Trump administration’s attempts to assert control over state elections. In almost every case, rulings have gone against the administration. But despite the fears of many Democrats, there was no mayhem launched by the Trump administration on Election Day.

One federal judge chastised administration officials for being “engaged in a campaign to intimidate, threaten and coerce state and local officials and employees who are engaged in administering the ongoing midterm 2026 election.” Another wrote with umbrage that “If the Executive can discount votes and threaten an ongoing election due to unproven allegations, then our democracy is in danger.” And the nation’s highest court, the Supreme Court, in what The New York Times called “an extraordinary rebuke,” refused to intervene in the administration’s appeal of a lower court ruling that barred federal intervention in California ballot counting.

The Conversation’s politics and legal affairs editor, Naomi Schalit, spoke on Election Day with Dickinson College President John Jones, a former federal judge, about the Trump administration’s actions – and how judges see them.

What are you seeing with all these cases?

The common stripe in every one of the cases that have been decided close to the election is that courts are reluctant to get involved after voting has started. And I think the courts’ perspectives are clearly affected by the high number of early votes cast either in person before Election Day or using mail-in voting. Without question, we’ve already been in the midst of this election – from a voting standpoint – for some time, and courts simply don’t want to get in the way of that and disrupt the process.

The court opinions haven’t been only about how they don’t want to get involved. They’re also saying to the Justice Department, “You shouldn’t be taking a role here as well.”

That’s right. And of course it harkens back to what I’ve said before, which is that Article 1, Section 4 of the Constitution gives the states the power to regulate elections. Congress has some license to legislate in matters relating to national elections, but notably absent from Section 4 is any role for the executive branch to play.

All of the cases have that perspective. But as you go case by case, even assuming that the administration could, for example, sell its allegation that there are 20,000 suspect ballots in California and that the administration has an interest in those ballots, it’s simply too close to the election. There is something called the Purcell Principle, based on a Supreme Court precedent, that federal courts as a rule should not wade into election controversies at a point in time that’s too close to when they’re being conducted.

What does the string of administration losses in these cases tell you about the leadership at the Department of Justice?

I believe that the Department of Justice has become completely unmoored from its mission. Recall that in 2016, very close to the presidential election, then-FBI Director James Comey revealed the investigation into candidate Hillary Clinton’s emails.

It was seen as a tremendous breach of protocol by the Department of Justice. And look at where we are today, where it has now become the norm for the Department of Justice to take action so close to the election.

Just today, for example, we know that target letters were sent out by the Department of Justice to numerous individuals allegedly involved in the Alaska controversy that placed a second candidate named Dan Sullivan on the ballot. There were a thousand or so election watchers dispatched to polling places by the Department of Justice – these are unprecedented numbers.

Then there were the lawsuits that were filed by the Department of Justice close to the election. This was forbidden territory for the DOJ before this election cycle, and it’s now become business as usual.

It was forbidden territory because the idea was that – unlike most of the other executive agencies – the DOJ had a kind of holy, nonpolitical status?

The central idea, I think, is that the Department of Justice would not want to put its thumb on the scale and affect an election, particularly if there’s an investigation that is announced and isn’t closed.

To reveal an investigation – or investigations, as they’ve done in several cases now – means that some will take that as meaning there has been criminal misconduct when that obviously may not be the case at all. This is a further weaponization of the Department of Justice, in my view, that I find unconscionable.

And given how clumsy its efforts have been, this is clearly the leadership of the Department of Justice acceding to the wishes of the president of the United States even when there is no sound legal basis to proceed. A lot of this has been very unprofessionally done and strains both the reputation and credibility of the Department of Justice and the lawyers that it’s sending in front of federal judges.

Given the number of judges’ rulings declaring that the administration’s positions are contrary to the Constitution, is the leadership of the DOJ susceptible – given the Democrats have gotten the majority in the House – to impeachment for not fulfilling their oath, which requires them to support and defend the Constitution of the United States?

I don’t know that this is going to ripen to the extent that impeachment is suggested as a remedy, although arguably it could be. But I can easily see that this is going to be the subject of intensive investigations as to who ordered what and when they ordered it. And people are going to be subpoenaed and asked questions under oath that may be difficult to answer.

What is it like for these judges to be dealing with this barrage of cases that are so big and so consequential?

Typically, judges can operate under pressure; I did that many times. You’re equipped to do that as a federal judge. The real drag on the system right now is the absence of the presumption of regularity judges are being faced with. Lawyers are failing to tell the truth under direct questioning by judges. This is really an astonishing development.

Government lawyers are not litigating to the professional standards that once were the hallmark of the department. A tremendous drag on the system is caused when judges hear lawyers telling them things that simply defy belief. And they are being intentionally disingenuous as well.

And then you have to do what some judges are now doing, which is connecting the dots and issuing orders where they are expressly saying what the judge’s areas of concerns are. It’s like spoon-feeding lawyers, which judges really don’t like to do. They expect a higher degree of professionalism.

When you litigate in the federal courts, you should bring your A game – all the time. You’re playing in the big leagues.

Instead, I see minor league players being elevated into government litigators, and it’s a bad look, and it is getting worse.The Conversation

John E. Jones III, President, Dickinson College

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

A wounded Trump could make foreign policy much more dangerous

Donald Trump’s Republican Party has received a stunning rebuke in the US midterm elections. Republicans went into the evening hoping that the polls might be wrong and that they could at least cling on to control of the Senate. But by midnight in Washington, the GOP was staring down what looked like its worst defeat in 50 years.

Republican losses were not just confined to the type of swing districts that parties usually worry about on election night. The scale of the losses was staggering. They lost Senate seats in deep red states such as Texas and South Carolina. They lost districts they had gerrymandered and in which they were supposed to be unbeatable. They lost seats that even the sharpest analysts thought were safe.

Why? For months, surveys have shown that voters are fed up with high prices, with the war in Iran, and with what is increasingly being talked about as the Trump administration’s corruption. A president who was narrowly elected on the promise of a steady economic hand instead spent two years pursuing an extreme ideological agenda favoured only by a minority of Americans. He ignored what voters were saying, and now they have delivered a harsh verdict.

But these results have implications beyond just the remainder of Trump’s presidency. They break some of the patterns that have defined American politics for decades. Democrats are suddenly winning in places where they have been counted out for a generation. Suddenly, the American political map looks different.

Take Texas. The last time a Democrat won election as a senator there was 1988. Democrats have not won a presidential election in Texas since Jimmy Carter in 1976. Yet last night, Democrat James Talarico powered to a convincing victory. If elections in Texas become politically competitive on a permanent basis, it will become much harder for Republicans to take the presidency in the future.

The Republican Party will now be looking nervously towards the 2028 election. For the first time since 2016, there is likely to be a serious debate within the party about whether to move on from the aggressive nationalism and bigotry of Trump’s “Make America Great Again” movement. Democrats, meanwhile, face their own questions about how to capitalise on their victories.

Foreign policy futures

But for the rest of the world, change might not come so quickly. Despite the fact that his party has suffered this electoral setback, Trump remains president until 2028. And because despite its constitutional role in declaring war and ratifying treaties, Congress tends to be less involved in foreign policy, there is still a lot that he can do with that power.

Indeed, US presidents whose parties perform badly in midterm elections often become more active in foreign policy than they had previously. With the chance of passing a significant domestic agenda mostly beyond their reach, they have a more time on their hands to think about America’s relations with the rest of the world. The same is likely to be true of Trump.

The fact that the midterms are over also means that Trump no longer has to be so careful about the political consequences of his actions. As the midterm elections got closer, the president has backed down from major military confrontation with Iran and sought a truce in his tariff wars. Now, with political constraints lifted, he could become more erratic and unpredictable.

Congress would not be completely powerless to stop him, at least in theory. But most actions it can take – such as cutting off funding for the war with Iran or seizing tariff power back from the president – require margins of control in both chambers that Democrats are unlikely to have, despite their formidable victories.

They would need to have a two-thirds majority to override an almost certain presidential veto on any attempt to pass laws to achieve these outcomes. So a key question is whether this midterm drubbing was serious enough to make some Republican members of Congress get serious about joining Democrats in restraining Trump.

Something that Democrats will definitely be able to do is launch all manner of investigations into the conduct of the Trump administration and some of its officials. Their efforts are likely to focus on the war with Iran, Trump’s personal financial dealings with foreign leaders, and the management of the Pentagon by secretary of defence Pete Hegseth.

Hegseth, indeed, could be an early casualty of these efforts – there is speculation that he will resign or be fired rather than face possible impeachment.

But ultimately a change of direction in US foreign policy depends on the decisions of Trump himself. A changing of the guard among his advisers, or in Congress, can only do so much to influence a president who has never willingly submitted to constraint.

The world should prepare itself for the possibility that a politically wounded and angry Trump could now decide to vent his frustrations abroad.The Conversation

Andrew Gawthorpe, Lecturer in History and International Studies, Leiden University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The first item on the Dems hit list for the Trump admin

Oversight is coming for the Trump administration.

That’s been the message of congressional Democrats throughout the closing days of the 2026 midterm campaign. Now that the party’s candidates have reportedly won control of the House of Representatives, that campaign promise is likely to be carried out. Democratic Rep. Jamie Raskin told The New York Times in late October that among the potential oversight targets were pardons granted by President Donald Trump, possible corruption in government contracting and the Trump family’s cryptocurrency deals.

Routine congressional oversight hearings usually don’t make headlines.

That changed during the second Trump administration.

When Attorney General Pam Bondi appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Oct. 7, 2025, what took place was a contentious, highly partisan, made-for-TV-and-social-media confrontation.

Bondi refused to answer many questions from Democrats, instead launching personal attacks against these members of the U.S. Senate.

The episode captures a basic tension in congressional oversight: Congress can demand answers, but getting them often depends on the cooperation of the branch it is investigating.

That tension is about to sharpen when Democrats control the oversight process. Their hearings will likely be anything but routine.

From our perspective as political scientists who study the U.S. Congress, congressional oversight has played an important role in American democracy. Here’s a brief history.

Inquisitory powers

In simple terms, oversight is the ability of Congress to ensure that the laws it passes are faithfully executed. This generally means asking questions, demanding information, convening hearings and holding the executive branch accountable for its actions.

Oversight isn’t specifically mentioned in the Constitution. Article 1, Section 8, which lists the powers of Congress, includes the power “to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper,” without identifying an oversight role. Once laws are enacted, Article 2, Section 3, states that the president “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”

However, the framers viewed congressional oversight as a key component of legislative authority. They wanted presidents to take Congress seriously and structured the Constitution to ensure that the executive would be accountable to the legislature.

As James Madison urged in Federalist 51, the separate branches of government should have the power to keep each other from becoming too powerful. “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition,” Madison wrote.

The framers drew from the examples of the British Parliament and Colonial legislatures. In 1621, Sir Francis Bacon was charged with corruption and impeached as Lord High Chancellor after an investigation by a committee of the British Parliament. And in 1768, the Massachusetts Assembly conducted an investigation of Gov. Francis Bernard that led to a formal request to the King of England for his removal.

At the Federal Convention in 1787 that produced the Constitution, Delegate George Mason noted that members of Congress possessed “inquisitory powers” and “must meet frequently to inspect the Conduct of public officials.” Even though this idea was never written down, it was a habit of self-government that early Congresses put into practice.

Early oversight hearings

Congressional oversight began almost as soon as the first Congress met. In 1790, Robert Morris, the superintendent of finances during the Continental Congress and a financier of the American Revolution, asked Congress to investigate his handling of the country’s finances and was exonerated of any wrongdoing.

During this period, congressional investigations were often referred to select committees – bodies created to perform special functions. These panels had the power to issue subpoenas and hold individuals in contempt. Since there was no official record of debates and proceedings, the public relied on newspaper accounts to learn about what had happened.

In March 1792, congressional oversight exposed businessman William Duer, who signed contracts with the War Department but failed to furnish the needed military supplies. This shortfall contributed to a stunning U.S. military defeat against a confederation of Native American tribes in the Northwest Territory.

Congress eventually removed the quartermaster general from his role for mismanaging the contracts.

Throughout the 19th century, Congress continued to quietly exercise this power.

Hearings from December 1861 to May 1865 on the conduct of the U.S. Civil War produced a detailed record of the war, exposed military wrongdoing and condemned slavery. In 1871, the Senate created a select committee to investigate Ku Klux Klan violence during Reconstruction.

Investigating corruption and criminal acts

Congress started to use its oversight power more aggressively in the 1920s with the Senate Committee on Public Land and Surveys’ high-profile investigations into the Teapot Dome scandal.

Hearings revealed that Interior Secretary Albert Bacon Fall had secretly leased federal oil reserves in Wyoming to two private corporations and had received personal loans and gifts from the companies in return.

The investigation found clear evidence of corruption. Fall was indicted and became the first U.S. Cabinet member to be convicted of a felony.

The U.S. Supreme Court helped to shape the legal foundation of congressional oversight. In McGrain v. Daugherty, decided in 1927, the court held that congressional committees could issue subpoenas, force witnesses to testify and hold them in contempt if they fail to appear. Two years later, in Sinclair v. United States, the court ruled that witnesses who lied to Congress could be charged with perjury.

These cases granted the judicial branch’s sanction to what had long been an implied legislative power, cementing the constitutionality of congressional oversight.

Oversight highs and lows

The modern era of congressional oversight has produced some very important reforms – and some truly regrettable spectacles.

The most important example of bipartisan congressional oversight came in response to reporting by The Washington Post’s Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward. The two journalists wrote about the 1972 burgling of Democratic National Committee offices in Washington, D.C.’s Watergate Hotel and subsequent cover-up efforts by the Nixon administration – and President Richard Nixon himself.

On Feb. 7, 1973, the U.S. Senate voted 77-0 to establish a Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, which brought together Democrats and Republicans to investigate what came to be known as the “Watergate scandal.” The committee’s work spurred action in Congress to impeach Nixon, leading to Nixon’s resignation in 1974 and to the enactment of legal reforms to provide an institutional check on presidential power.

Another high point for congressional oversight came after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001. Seeking to learn how the deadliest terrorist strike on American soil had occurred, Democratic Sen. Bob Graham and Republican Rep. Porter Goss, who chaired the Senate and House Intelligence committees, formed a joint committee to investigate intelligence failures before and after the attacks.

This inquiry produced several important recommendations that were ultimately adopted, including the creation of a director of national intelligence and a Department of Homeland Security, as well as better information sharing among law enforcement agencies.

Congress’ oversight can extend beyond the executive branch when the actions of private actors raise questions about existing laws or spur the need for new ones. Investigations into medical device safety and Enron’s 2001 collapse examined malfeasance in the private sphere that existing regulations failed to prevent.

However, the power to expose corruption can also be used as a tool to score partisan points and generate outrage, rather than holding the executive branch accountable for actual malfeasance. Notably, in the 1950s, Wisconsin Sen. Joseph McCarthy turned oversight into inquisition and used the power of media to amplify his accusations of communist influence within the federal government.

Democracy needs oversight

As we see it, the problem with allowing oversight to become political theater is that it distracts Congress from quieter and more meaningful oversight work. Slow, procedural work isn’t likely to go viral, but it helps keep government accountable. The task of a deliberate legislative body is to reconcile those very different impulses.

Congressional oversight has strengthened the democratic system at many points. But it can also be stymied by an uncooperative executive branch.

After the 2018 midterm elections put Democrats in charge of the House of Representatives, their many attempts to exercise oversight were rejected by the first Trump administration, which refused to send officials to testify at hearings, failed to turn over documents and ignored subpoenas.

Will the next two years of divided government look the same?

This is an updated version of a story originally published on Nov. 6, 2025.The Conversation

Drew Kurlowski, Associate Professor of Political Science, Coastal Carolina University and Gibbs Knotts, Professor of Political Science, Coastal Carolina University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Facebook quietly pays off the biggest political scandal in tech history

“The harm in this matter is difficult to overstate,” wrote a New Mexico judge who ordered tech giant Meta to pay one of the largest data privacy case penalties in American history. The US$25 billion fine came in a case about how Trump campaign firm Cambridge Analytica deceptively used data from Facebook users without their permission to create psychographic profiles to target voters in the lead-up to the 2016 presidential election.

But the New Mexico penalty was for statements Facebook made that deceived users about data privacy and its response to Cambridge Analytica – not for the harm caused by how the harvested data was used. Those harms are alleged to include exploiting psychological vulnerabilities, targeting people’s fears and discouraging them from voting.

I’m a political communication scholar who studies propaganda, surveillance and information warfare. My research helped expose the Cambridge Analytica scandal through U.K. newspaper The Guardian’s reporting on whistelblower accounts and the evidence I uncovered. That evidence was submitted to parliamentary and congressional investigations. I have followed the unfolding legal cases closely.

My takeaway from a decade of litigation is that Facebook has been penalized for misleading users and regulators about its data practices and its response to the Cambridge Analytica scandal. But I would contend that the company has largely escaped accountability for the underlying political exploitation of that data.

Investigative failures

The failure to bring cases around harms may be partly due to earlier failures to fully investigate the data misuse.

The Senate Intelligence Committee’s investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election encompassed Cambridge Analytica. However, the committee stated in its final report that it “was unable to obtain the corporate communications of Cambridge Analytica or its parent company SCL Group, which had already been seized by U.K. authorities.”

The relevant U.K. authorities, the Information Commissioner’s Office, which governs data protection and took possession of Cambridge Analytica’s servers, told me in response to my 2021 Freedom of Information Act request that the Senate committee staff made initial inquiries to the office but appear not to have followed up with a formal request, “so no information sharing has taken place.” Without a formal request, the Senate Intelligence Committee’s investigation lacked important data.

At the same time, the U.K. investigations of Cambridge Analytica’s use of personal data to manipulate voting behavior focused on the referendum of British voters over whether to leave the E.U., not events in the U.S.

A 2020 documentary film I advised as a researcher, “People You May Know,” raised questions about Cambridge Analytica’s work with an app marketed to American churches, called Gloo, that used Cambridge Analytica’s Facebook data-derived psychographic profiling in their communities. Evidence in the New Mexico case reinvigorates these questions about the full extent of the Cambridge Analytica scandal.

The judge in the case ruled Facebook knew that its own processes for investigating whether apps misused personal data were inadequate and that it could not enforce deletion of the data. The judge also concluded the company failed to notify users about thousands of applications associated with data misuse. Meta said it would appeal the decision.

Meta responded to a request for comment with the company’s official statement about the New Mexico ruling, arguing the case “seeks to impose a tax on speech to enforce new rules for what people can say online.” Meta did not address the issue of its own role in the data privacy violations committed by Cambridge Analytica.

Escaping further scrutiny

Meta is also trying to close the door on further claims before they are litigated.

In August 2026, on the eve of a child-safety trial in federal court in Oakland, California, Meta settled with a bipartisan coalition of state attorneys general for roughly $17 billion. The agreement includes 47 states, the District of Columbia and two U.S. territories. Folded into that deal was an allocation of $459.3 million to settle Cambridge Analytica-related claims held by participating states.

The participating attorneys general agreed, to the extent of their authority, to “fully, finally, and forever” release Meta from “any and all Claims, whether known or unknown, whether accrued or unaccrued.” By expressly encompassing “unknown” and “unaccrued” claims, the agreement reached beyond what investigators had already uncovered. Participating states accepted payment to give up claims arising from Meta’s conduct even if they did not yet know those claims existed.

A decade-old matter - Facebook’s role in the Cambridge Analytica scandal - was quietly brushed under the rug in an unrelated lawsuit about harm to teens.

From the 2019 Federal Trade Commission order to the 2022 class action settlement to August 2026’s multistate deal, settlements and releases have meant the company paid a relatively small price for its deception while not having the harms from the data exploitation adjudicated. Ultimately, the biggest privacy judgment in American history stands as a measure of the cover-up, not the alleged crime.

Other scholars and I regularly call attention to the lack of comprehensive U.S. privacy legislation, but there remain other legal pathways to pursue the harms Cambridge Analytica wrought. States like New Mexico can continue the fight, and Attorney General Raúl Torrez, who brought the case, promised, “We’re just getting started.”

Dissenting from the FTC’s 2019 settlement, then-Commissioner Rohit Chopra criticized the failure to consider “Facebook’s unjust enrichment.” He said “the company’s potential exposure is likely far greater” than the $5 billion imposed by the FTC settlement.

What price for the harm?

The question remains what exactly Facebook gained from enabling Cambridge Analytica’s abuses. Authorities could also investigate harmful data use for any other apps Facebook may have failed to fully assess, including any associated with Cambridge Analytica’s projects.

If the deception about Cambridge Analytica is worth $25 billion, I believe the public is entitled to know what the underlying harms to them are worth. New Mexico opted out of the 2026 multistate settlement and proved that a state willing to go to trial against Meta can win.

The next task, in my view, is to investigate fully and, where legal claims remain available, pursue accountability for harms resulting from the data exploitation. Otherwise, Cambridge Analytica will remain at the heart of the most consequential privacy scandal in American history, whose full harms have not been tested in court.The Conversation

Emma L. Briant, Visiting Associate Professor at the Lucy Family Institute for Data and Society, University of Notre Dame

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The stock market just tanked — and it’s the last thing Trump needs

The Democrats have an 82% chance of gaining control of the Senate in the US midterm elections this week, and remain overwhelming favourites to gain control of the House of Representatives in US analyst Nate Silver’s forecast model. In the last week, there has been clear movement to Democrats in the Senate.

We should know by Wednesday afternoon Australian Eastern Daylight Time if the Democrats have wrested control of Congress from the Republicans – but it’s far from clear exactly how things will play out.

Democrats lead Republicans by 9.4 points on the generic ballot, and President Donald Trump’s net approval is -20.4, but it has rebounded from lows below -24. If Republicans do better than expected in the polls, a drop in petrol prices since late September is likely to be responsible. However, the stock market has tanked in the last two trading sessions.

But with Democrats holding only modest leads in the polling in many Senate contests, there’s a wide range of plausible outcomes – from a narrow Republican majority to a big Democratic majority.

Trump’s ratings

In Silver’s aggregate of US national polls, Trump’s net approval is -20.4. Currently, 58.8% of Americans disapprove of his performance and 38.4% approve. Trump’s net approval had fallen to a new low of -24.3 on October 21 before rising. It’s now at its highest since mid-September.

Trump’s net approval was -23.3 in my October 26 article. It’s below any past president since Harry Truman at this point in their term, with Joe Biden the closest at -11.2.

On four issues tracked by Silver, Trump’s net approval is -12.1 on immigration, -27.0 on trade, -28.6 on the economy and -44.2 on inflation.

Since my October 26 analysis, Trump’s net approval on all issues has improved one to four points, with his net approval on inflation up five points in the last two weeks.

Trump’s ratings are worse if his approval is sorted into strong and weak approval and disapproval. Currently, 48.6% of Americans strongly disapprove of his performance, 20.5% strongly approve, 18.0% weakly approve and 10.2% weakly disapprove. That gives him a net strong approval of -28.2.

People who strongly approve or disapprove of Trump will be more motivated to vote at the midterms.

Silver also has an aggregate of US support for the Iran war. Currently, 56.5% of Americans are opposed to the Iran war, while 35.9% support it, for a net support of -20.6. This compares to -18.9 in my October 26 article.

Midterm elections on Wednesday

All 435 federal House of Representatives seats and 35 of the 100 Senate seats will be up for election in Tuesday’s midterm elections, with results coming in Tuesday night on the US east coast (late Wednesday morning AEDT).

In the 2024 elections, Republicans won the House by 220–215 over the Democrats and the Senate by 53–47. Due to Vice President JD Vance’s tie-breaking vote, Democrats need at least a net four-seat gain to win control of the Senate.

As I previously wrote, owing to Republican gerrymandering, Democrats need at least a four-point margin in the generic ballot to have a good chance to win the House majority.

The Senate is more skewed towards the Republicans as every state has two senators. Democrats need a double-digit margin in the generic ballot to win the Senate on a uniform swing.

In Silver’s midterm election forecast model, the generic ballot gives Democrats a 52.8–43.4 lead over Republicans, a 9.4-point margin. (This is slightly lower than the 9.5-point margin in my October 26 analysis).

Silver’s model gives the Democrats an 82% chance to win the Senate and a 96% chance to win the House (it was respectively 75% and 95% on October 26). This is a new high for Democrats in the Senate this cycle. Democratic chances of winning the Senate had fallen to a low of 50% on September 7, and their chances of winning the House had dropped to 81% on September 3.

While the uniform swing indicates Democrats need a double-digit margin in the generic ballot to win control of the Senate, Silver’s model has Democrats as the favourites to win with a five to six point margin in the generic ballot. In the House, Democrats are favourites if they win by two to three points.

Democrats lead Republicans by one to four points in polls of the key toss-up Senate races in Kansas, Iowa, Texas, Alaska and Ohio. Trump won all these states by double-digit margins in 2024. However, Democrats only lead by four to five points in Republican-held Maine and Democratic-held Michigan. Kamala Harris, the Democratic presidential nominee, won Maine by 6.9 points in 2024, while Trump only won Michigan by 1.4 points.

In South Carolina and Nebraska, Republicans only lead in polling for the Senate races by about one point. If the Democrats have a great election night, they will win all the Senate seats where they currently lead, as well as South Carolina. An independent (Dan Osborn) could also expect to win in Nebraska. That would give Democrats a 55–44 Senate majority, plus one for Osborn.

However, Democrats only lead by more than five points in one Republican-held Senate seat (North Carolina). If the polls are systematically overstating Democrats by four points, North Carolina could be the Democrats’ only gain, for a 52–48 Republican Senate majority.

The large majority of elections in the US use the first-past-the-post system. Usually, this has little impact as minor party candidates get under 2% of votes in US elections. But in Montana, Silver’s aggregate has Republican Kurt Alme on 41.2%, independent Seth Bodnar on 32.6% and Democrat Alani Bankhead on 17.0%. Preferential voting could give Bodnar a much better chance at victory.

Poll closing times in key Senate contests

Some states and key moments on Wednesday AEDT will be:

  • At 10am, the first polls close in the eastern time zones of Indiana and Kentucky. Early counting there will give observers an idea of how much damage Democrats are doing to Republicans in their rural strongholds
  • At 11am, polls close in South Carolina and Florida’s eastern zone. Counting in Florida will be fast. In South Carolina, Republican incumbent Senator Darline Graham leads Democrat Annie Andrews by 1.3 points in Silver’s aggregate, and in Florida, Republican incumbent Senator Ashley Moody leads Democrat Angie Nixon by 5.9 points
  • At 11:30am, polls close in Ohio, where Democrat Sherrod Brown leads Republican incumbent Senator Jon Husted by 3.0 points
  • At noon, polls close in Maine and in Texas’, Kansas’ and Michigan’s eastern zones. In the Texas Senate race, Democrat James Talarico leads Republican Ken Paxton by 3.5 points; in Kansas, Democrat Adam Hamilton leads Republican incumbent Senator Roger Marshall by 3.3 points; in Michigan, Democrat Abdul El-Sayed leads Republican Mike Rogers by 4.7 points; and in Maine, Democrat Troy Jackson leads Republican incumbent Senator Susan Collins by 4.0 points
  • At 1pm, polls close in Iowa, Nebraska and Louisiana. In Iowa’s Senate race, Democrat Josh Turek leads Republican Ashley Hinson by 0.7 points. In Nebraska, Republican incumbent Senator Pete Ricketts leads independent Dan Osborn by 0.8 points (without a Democrat in the race). In Louisiana, Republican Julia Letlow leads Democrat Jamie Davis by 3.9 points
  • At 4pm, polls close in Alaska’s eastern time zone, with polls closing in the western part of the state an hour later. Democrat Mary Peltola leads Republican incumbent Senator Dan Sullivan by 2.6 points.

Poll closing times listed here are from The Green Papers. I’ve included all Senate contests where Silver’s aggregate is within five points. Some states are split across two time zones. In this case, polls in the leading time zone usually close an hour before those in the trailing zone.

The earliest statewide races can be called is when all polls are closed.

Economic data

Americans head to the polls this week at a difficult time for the economy.

Americans are currently paying an average of US$4.17 a gallon for regular petrol – historically high but down from US$4.29 a gallon in my October 26 analysis and US$4.48 on September 25. Owing to profits and taxes, the retail price of petrol will be higher than the commodity price.

The commodity price of petrol had surged from a low of US$2.99 a gallon on August 27 to US$3.59 on September 23. The price today has crashed 8.1% to US$2.90, the lowest since early August.

I previously reported there had been similar surges in the price of oil, but that surge hasn’t yet carried over to the petrol price, but today’s oil price slump has carried over. On election day, the petrol price will be much cheaper than in late September.

In last night’s session, the benchmark US S&P stock market index dropped a further 0.5%, following a 1.8% slump last Friday, to fall to its lowest level since July 31. It’s down 3.6% from the October 6 peak, but still up 8.6% from the week before the Iran war began in late February and up 14.4% from its worst point in the Iran war in late March. Some of the gloss has come off the AI boom.

In September, personal income increased by 0.2%, but expenditures increased by 0.5%. The personal savings rate was down 0.2% since August to 3.8%, its lowest since October 2022.

In the September quarter, GDP increased 3.4% in annualised terms (0.85% in quarter on quarter terms). GDP growth was up from 2.2% annualised in the June quarter.The Conversation

Adrian Beaumont, Election Analyst (Psephologist) at The Conversation; and Honorary Associate, School of Mathematics and Statistics, The University of Melbourne

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Trump has reached his expiration date — and favorite excuse no longer works

As he has crisscrossed the US to appear at rallies in battleground states where the candidates from his Republican party look vulnerable, the US president, Donald Trump, has been telling voters to imagine he is on the ballot paper. But it’s not clear that this is what the vulnerable GOP candidates want to hear.

The US president appears to be treating the 2026 midterms as a rerun of the 2024 presidential election. From listening to him, you would hardly know that Joe Biden left the White House 21 months ago.

A Reuters review in late September found that the president had named his predecessor almost 900 times in nine months – roughly three times a day – across nearly 200 events and interviews and 190 Truth Social posts. The economy came up more than any other subject.

But, if prices are too high it must be Biden that is to blame. Trump’s strategy for claiming credit for positive achievements and blaming his predecessor for anything negative became evident early in the president’s second term. But 18 months on, Trump still insists that affordability concerns are either a “con job by the Democrats” or they were “caused by Sleepy Joe Biden and the Biden aministration”.

The question is whether anyone beyond the Republican base believes him.

It is easy to see why Trump reaches for this script. In 2024, voters consistently trusted him over Biden on the economy. An ABC News/Ipsos poll that May found 46% trusted Trump to handle the economy against 32% for Biden, and 44% to 30% on inflation. YouGov polling from mid-2024 found that on 23 of 25 national problems tested, more people approved of Trump’s record in office than of Biden’s. Voters believed prices had risen on Biden’s watch, and they blamed him.

The blame has changed hands

But two years on the blame has transferred to the current occupant of the Oval Office. This is hardly surprising and something Trump and his advisers ought to have recognised from the 2022 midterms. Then Biden’s approval on the economy had sunk to a dismal 28%. Similarly, a majority of Americans now blame Trump.

This matters. A Reuters/Ipsos poll at the end of August found that 47% of registered voters said the economy was the single most important factor in their midterm vote – and 71% of Americans disapproved of Trump’s handling of it. By late September, Reuters/Ipsos put his approval on the issue at just 17%, with more Republicans disapproving than approving for the first time.

That poll was something of an outlier, but others polls consistently show Trump’s approval on the economy in the low 30s.

The problem for the administration, and for Republican candidates whose fortunes are tied to it, is that much of the public does not think it needs a profound understanding of economics to trace inflation back to Trump’s second-term policies. As we argue in our book, Trump v Biden, in his second term, Trump’s administration has doubled down on key themes from the first, notably restricting immigration and imposing tariffs.

According to Silver Bulletin, Trump now has a net approval rating of -12 points on immigration, traditionally one of his stronger issues. On trade, more directly tied to prices, his net approval rating is -29 points.

Trump’s first term imposed a range of new tariffs, particularly on China, many of which Biden retained. Trump 2.0 has set about a significant, if haphazard, expansion of this trade protectionism. In April 2025, an executive order announced a new tariff regime on what Trump declared “Liberation Day”.

It’s hard to judge the exact impact of Trump’s second-term tariff regime, as levels have fluctuated and some tariffs have been imposed, only to be lifted again. But Republican candidates have shied away from talking about tariffs and polls throughout the year have found most Americans believe they have hurt rather than helped the economy.

Still, on tariffs Trump was at least delivering on a campaign promise. More confounding to his supporters was the war with Iran after Trump promised not to. As he famously said on the campaign trail: “They said: ‘He will start a war.’ I’m not going to start a war. I’m going to stop wars.”

Seven months of conflict with Iran sit uneasily with that pledge. And, what is worse for Republicans, many voters have drawn a direct line from the conflict to rising gasoline and diesel prices at home. In early October, the Pew Research Center found just 33% approved of Trump’s handling of the conflict, while 77% expected it to last at least six more months. The chief objection was cost. 73% of Americans were extremely or very concerned about higher fuel prices.

A referendum on Trump, not Biden

The Trump era has broken many norms of politics, but political gravity still exists. Midterms are usually a verdict on the sitting president, and this one looks no different. Pew puts Trump’s approval at 30%, the lowest of his second term and eight points below Biden’s 38% at the same stage in 2022.

Nearly two-thirds of voters (63%) say Trump is a factor in their vote, and 44% see their vote as a vote against him, well above the 36% who said the same of Biden four years ago. The latest Reuters/Ipsos poll gives Democrats a 47% to 35% lead on the generic congressional ballot.

The irony is worth noting. Trump returned to power by persuading voters that Biden was out of touch with their economic reality. Twenty-one months in, he faces the same charge. Blaming a predecessor has a shelf-life – and for most voters it appears to have expired. Whatever happens on November 3, the result will be read as a judgement on Trump’s presidency.The Conversation

Clodagh Harrington, Lecturer in American Politics, University College Cork and Alex Waddan, Associate Professor in American Politics and American Foreign Policy, University of Leicester

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The 1972 chart that explains why America hasn’t completely collapsed yet

In a politically polarized American electorate, it can be hard to find bipartisan consensus on many issues. Ahead of the US midterm elections, however, there is one thing almost everyone can agree on: concern about government corruption.

A record 89% of Americans recently said in a Gallup poll that government corruption is widespread, with Republicans, Democrats and independents all in agreement (ranging between 83-91%). This marks a significant increase from 73% in Gallup’s polling from 2024.

Out of 132 countries Gallup polled on the question since 2023, only four have recorded higher overall levels of concern: Lebanon and Peru (both 92%), and Ghana and Nigeria (both 90%).

As much as cost of living issues have defined much of the recent campaign rhetoric, a recent Fox News Poll found that concern about corruption in government (88%) ranked higher among voters than inflation (85%) or gas prices (83%).

A CNBC survey similarly found government corruption to be the most important issue facing the country, above any concerns about the economy.

And according to the ad-tracking firm AdImpact, of the US$11.6 billion that will be spent in political advertising this election cycle, more than US$275 million has gone to corruption-themed ads – around US$173 for Democrats and US$93 for Republicans.

Who do Americans blame?

As much as Democrats point to the unprecedented gifts from foreign governments to the Trump family and the massive expansion of the Trump family wealth during Donald Trump’s second presidential term, Americans are by no means exclusively blaming the Trump administration for corruption.

When the Brennan Center for Justice, a voting rights organisation, asked a representative sample of 2,000 Americans this year whether certain individuals or institutions were corrupt, respondents had negative views across the political spectrum. These included view about Congress (85%), Trump (68%), Joe Biden (63%) and the Supreme Court (62%).

And when asked whether this is a problem driven by individuals making unethical choices or a problem “deeply embedded in the institutions of the US government”, about two-thirds of respondents chose the latter. Only 7% said they were not concerned about corruption influencing elected officials.

This does not appear to be a new phenomenon. Levels of trust in American politicians, political parties, news media, government institutions and even the “American people” have been declining since Gallup began polling on the issue in the 1970s. And they’ve hit record lows in recent years. While 86% of Americans trusted the American people in 1976, today barely half do.

Adding further nuance to this issue: Gallup also highlights the significant gap between American perceptions of corruption in government (89%) versus corruption in business (71%). The survey says few countries have gaps this large.

And, interestingly, this public perception of corruption does not trickle down to local politics.

In another survey by YouGov many more respondents deemed US senators and representatives to be corrupt (75%) than mid- or low-level government workers (39%).

This gets to an important reason why such high levels of distrust in institutions have not led to more unrest: Americans still appear to have trust in their local governments.

And this has largely not changed since Gallup first polled on the topic more than 50 years ago. Today, two-thirds of Americans trust their local government, which is actually slightly higher than the 63% who did in 1972.

On the whole, Americans also retain trust in the ability of elections – like the midterms – to act as political circuit breakers.

What about the midterms?

Candidates running for office this year have taken note of the deep voter distrust in Washington elites, parties and institutions.

One need only watch a few of the many viral political ads this campaign to see a well-worn script: candidates blame Washington insiders for corruption and other issues, while touting their local bona fides.

It should come as no surprise that many candidates are eschewing party labels altogether, often going so far as to criticise their own party.

But this is not the first time politicians of all stripes have appeared keen to distance themselves from the ruling class, and from political insiders viewed as corrupt and detached from the everyday realities of most Americans.

After all, with the exceptions of Biden and George H.W. Bush (both former vice presidents who served under popular two-term presidents), every US president of the last half century has come to the Oval Office with fewer than five years of experience in Washington – if any.

Americans have largely been against Washington insiders for decades – particularly when economic anxiety is high.

Yet what’s different in this year’s midterm elections is how many are trying to fuse corruption with that economic anxiety. Not since the 2006 midterm elections has corruption been such a prominent theme in an election.

James Talarico, the Democratic hopeful for the Senate in Texas, has said on the campaign trail, “we have an affordability crisis because we have a corruption crisis”.

And in Georgia, Democratic Senator Jon Ossoff routinely tells voters “corruption is why things don’t work for ordinary people.”

These Democratic efforts follow similar efforts by Republicans to portray Democrats as the more corrupt party costing American taxpayers money.

Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency, for instance, sought to target what it called “waste, fraud and abuse”. And Republicans in Minnesota have highlighted a welfare-fraud scandal that essentially forced Democratic Governor Tim Walz to abandon his plans for a third term of office.

It’s unclear whether these sorts of accusations will inspire the political backlash that other issues – namely abortion, immigration and the economy – have in past elections.

However, Democrats do have one advantage in the midterms. They are currently seen as the preferred party (by 10 percentage points in recent polling) to fight corruption. This explains why they are spending nearly twice as much on ads about corruption than Republicans.

However, should Democrats be successful and take control of Congress, they will be expected to act on this issue, and not just become part of the ongoing problem.The Conversation

Jared Mondschein, Director of Research, US Studies Centre, University of Sydney

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

James Madison’s worst nightmare is coming true in Trump's second term

On the evening of Oct. 11, just weeks before the 2026 midterm elections, a federal judge ordered the Trump administration to stop airing taxpayer-funded television advertisements praising President Donald Trump.

Yet two of the ads continued running past the court’s deadline, including during broadcasts of “60 Minutes” and “ABC World News Tonight.”

The commercials in question aired in violation of a decades-old congressional prohibition against using federal money for unauthorized publicity and propaganda. Yet Republican congressional leaders did little to stop the president’s ad spending. That left outside organizations and a political candidate to challenge them in federal court.

The episode illustrates a larger development in Trump’s second presidency. Across disputes involving federal spending, government agencies and military operations, the administration has asserted authority that is either restricted by law or that the legislative branch has reserved for itself.

But responsibility for enforcing those limits is increasingly falling to organizations, institutions and individuals outside of the legislative branch.

As a scholar of the American presidency and deliberative democracy, I pay close attention to how the nation’s chief executive exercises power and communicates with the public.

When presidents are allowed to break rules and disregard democratic norms without consequence, I worry that citizens will grow cynical and lose faith in the idea of self-government.

As this happens, citizens may come to see the law as something that applies selectively, depending on who holds power, and lose confidence in the institutions responsible for holding their leaders accountable.

They may also begin to accept the absence of accountability as a normal feature of political life, weakening the public expectations on which democratic government depends.

Two men in dark suits, with one appearing to honor the other with a bowed head and clasped hands. Speaker Mike Johnson, left, leader of House Republicans, with President Donald Trump. Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images

Practical immunity

Congress is not the only branch of government demurring from holding the president accountable.

In July 2024, the Supreme Court provided presidents sweeping protection from criminal prosecution for actions taken in office under the “core constitutional powers” of the position.

In “Trump v. United States,” the court held that former presidents cannot be criminally prosecuted for actions taken under powers the Constitution gives exclusively to the president. Along with this “absolute immunity,” the justices also granted “at least presumptive immunity” for other official acts.

In their decision, the court’s conservative majority extended the meaning of official conduct to the “outer perimeter” of presidential responsibilities and prohibited courts from examining a president’s motives when determining whether an act was official.

The ruling only addressed criminal liability and did not curtail Congress’ constitutional authority to investigate presidential conduct, control federal spending, enact statutory restrictions and, in serious cases, pursue impeachment.

Yet the Republican majority in Congress has largely declined to exercise these powers against Trump, in areas ranging from declaring war to spending money.

Their acquiescence is helping create a new form of official protection, which I call “practical immunity.” In using this term, I am borrowing from the work of scholars who study abuse in the American penal system.

Those thinkers argue that legal obstacles, institutional hesitation and political incentives sometimes make it difficult to hold public officials accountable, even when the law suggests there has been illegal conduct.

That is what appears to be increasingly happening now with Congress, the courts and the president.

When Congress stops defending its laws

The television ads case illustrates the conundrum of practical immunity.

In opposing the temporary restraining order, the Trump administration’s attorneys did not contest the argument asserted by the plaintiffs – Common Cause and two unions – that the expenditures violated federal appropriations law. Instead, they said the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. They also argued that the case was moot because the advertising campaign was ending.

Those arguments failed in court. Yet the administration’s defense demonstrated how elusive enforcing a law can be when Congress fails to assert its constitutionally granted role, even when the underlying legal restriction is clear. To win, a plaintiff must establish a concrete injury and persuade a judge to intervene. While this happens, the disputed conduct often continues.

An ABC News story on the political ads praising President Donald Trump, who used taxpayer money to air the ads.

In this case, the president went on spending public money in violation of the law. The GOP-led Congress, meanwhile, remained silent, even though its own role was being usurped.

Another boundary that Trump has repeatedly tested is the so-called “power of the purse”, which is among the legislative branch’s most important constitutional responsibilities. Presidents may spend federal money only for purposes Congress has authorized. The Impoundment Control Act of 1974 protects lawmakers’ decisions against presidential efforts to ignore congressional appropriations.

In September 2026, Trump’s administration canceled more than US$800 million in congressionally approved spending for immigrant services, climate change and civil rights for minority groups. The cancellation was done through a maneuver known as a pocket rescission. The administration timed its action to make it difficult for Congress to consider or stop the rescission. The Government Accountability Office – an independent agency that examines how taxpayer dollars are spent – said tactics like these violate federal law.

When this happened, a few members of Congress tried to intervene and stop the rescission, but the Republican majority blocked their efforts.

The collapse of institutional rivalry

The separation of powers divides authority among the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government to prevent too much power from becoming concentrated in any one place.

The architects of the Constitution anticipated that officials in different branches would compete to preserve their authority. In Federalist No. 51, James Madison argued that maintaining the balance established by the separation of powers depended on the ambitions of public officials coming into conflict. Members of Congress could be expected to resist presidential encroachments because those encroachments diminished their own power.

Fierce partisanship has complicated this arrangement.

Legal scholars Daryl Levinson and Richard Pildes have shown how political competition mostly now happens inside and between parties, rather than among branches of government. When one party controls Congress and the presidency, legislators may become more invested in advancing their party’s agenda than they are in defending their institution’s constitutional authority.

Trump’s influence over Republican voters intensifies these incentives. Lawmakers who oppose him risk public ridicule, primary challenges and diminished political support. Defending congressional authority may therefore carry greater immediate – and personal – political costs than allowing presidential power to expand.

The result is a political system in which a president can act in ways that may violate federal law, undermine democratic norms and encroach on Congress’ constitutional authority.

Madison’s constitutional design assumed that public officials would defend the powers entrusted to them. The danger to the American constitutional system emerging in Trump’s second term is that congressional leaders have begun to regard those powers as expendable, allowing the president to exercise authority under conditions of practical immunity. He faces little fear of meaningful institutional consequences.The Conversation

Stephanie A. (Sam) Martin, Frank and Bethine Church Endowed Chair of Public Affairs, Boise State University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The Medieval loophole that lets Donald Trump say whatever he wants

During the campaign for the midterm elections, we’ve heard some seriously incendiary rhetoric from Republican leaders, including Donald Trump, against the Democratic candidate for the senate seat of Michigan, Abdul El-Sayed.

The US president has called El-Sayed a “jihadist” and a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, a designated foreign terrorist organisation under US law.

There is no evidence to support these claims. But the nature of the US president’s remarks suggests an intent to harm El-Sayed’s reputation among Michigan voters.

In many circumstances, El-Sayed would have a strong claim for defamation in relation to these statements. But it’s unlikely that a court could consider a case against the president or other members of the federal government. This is due to the US Supreme Court’s doctrine of sovereign immunity, which bars defamation claims against federal employees.

In its most basic form, immunity means exemption from legal process. In the US legal framework, sovereign immunity is based on Crown immunity. This is a relic of English common law grounded in the principle that “the king can do no wrong”. It still exists in the UK, in that the reigning monarch cannot be sued for defamation. But the Crown – meaning the government and its servants – certainly can, under the Crown Proceedings Act of 1947.

But the US Supreme Court embraced the concept as doctrine – applicable to the federal government – in the 19th century. Congress codified the doctrine in the 1940s.

Sovereign immunity, as understood by the Supreme Court and reflected in federal law, means that the federal government “may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction”. The US has waived sovereign immunity in some specific cases, but it retains this immunity for defamation claims.

The way this works under federal law is that the Department of Justice (DoJ) intervenes in a lawsuit against a federal employee sued for defamation by filing a certification that the employee was acting within the scope of their employment at the relevant time. When this happens, the case is removed to federal court, the employee is dismissed from the action, and the US is substituted in as the sole defendant.

Because the US has not waived sovereign immunity for defamation, the case is then dismissed, because courts lack the legal authority to hear the case.

To date, the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the question of whether members of Congress or the president are federal “employees” for the purposes of sovereign immunity. But the federal circuit courts that have ruled on this question hold that legislators are protected. And one federal circuit has expressly held that the president also enjoys such protection.

These courts have also adopted a broad interpretation of sovereign immunity in the context of defamatory comments made by federal legislators on social media. They have held that posting on social media is within the scope of their employment. It is judged to fit within the “wide range of legitimate ‘errands’ performed for constituents” that are “calculated to serve the interests of … constituents by informing them of Congress members’ views regarding a topical issue”.

What this means in practice is that members of Congress, and potentially the president, are above the law when it comes to defamation. And they remain so even when what they say may mislead the electorate regarding issues that impact how people vote.

This highlights the paradox of sovereign immunity. In a democracy founded on the principle that the people are the sovereign, sovereign immunity permits agents of the government – those who serve the people – to evade liability for legal wrongs committed against these very people.

So regardless of the merits of a claim, sovereign immunity bars the courts from evaluating it. This effectively shields federal employees from the laws that apply to everyone else.

Bad for American democracy

One of the most obvious problems with sovereign immunity is that it is incompatible with the primary tenet of the American constitutional framework that no one is above the law. And it’s particularly perplexing that the Supreme Court derived sovereign immunity directly from the British notion of Crown immunity, given that the US was founded on the express rejection of the English monarchy.

Criticism of sovereign immunity by judges is a common theme in this context, particularly its origins in Crown immunity. As noted by a federal judge in 1954, while the US draws much from the British on the subject of immunity, “In Britain the government – the Crown and Parliament – is the sovereign” and in the American system, “the people are the initial and also the residual sovereign”. He concluded that: “After some variations the Supreme Court has in recent years declined to gel the basic theory of sovereignty in our system.”

And as one federal judge highlighted in 2011: “Two hundred and thirty-five years after we rid ourselves of King George III and his despotic ascendancy over colonial America, we cling to a doctrine that was originally based on the Medieval notion that ‘the King can do no wrong’.”

The Supreme Court’s decision to cling to the doctrine of sovereign immunity has resulted in a bleak reality in the current political climate for Americans. “We the people” have little or no recourse against defamatory attacks by those tasked with upholding the laws of the US and the federal Constitution.The Conversation

Eliza Bechtold, Programmes Manager and Research Fellow, the Bonavero Institute of Human Rights, Faculty of Law, University of Oxford

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The booming stock market is masking a deeper American financial crisis

Polling is looking grim for Republicans ahead of the U.S. midterm elections on Nov. 3, 2026, due in large part to deep pessimism among the public about the economy.

At first glance, this might seem surprising. With the exception of inflation, many economic measures remain strong, including gross domestic product growth. But consumer sentiment continues to languish.

This has prompted a debate over whether mere “vibes” are in play, or whether these long-used metrics are no longer capturing something fundamental to Americans’ economic well-being.

This debate matters politically because voters are placing an overwhelming priority on the economy as an issue in the midterms. A Pew Research survey in early October 2026 found that 84% of registered voters said the economy was very important to their vote, and the concern is bipartisan. Among the issues in that Pew survey, for example, “the economy” was the least polarizing, with 82% of Republicans and 88% of Democrats ranking it as very important.

Meanwhile, the overall drop in voters’ economic outlook has largely been driven by growing pessimism among Republicans. While Democrats remain much gloomier about the economy than Republicans, the gap is narrowing.

These trends help explain why Democrats are expected to make significant gains in Congress: This election will likely be seen as an indictment of how well the economy is working for ordinary Americans under President Donald Trump and the Republican-controlled Congress, despite strong macroeconomic measures.

So what is going on?

As a scholar of financial markets and global inequality, I believe the relationship between how people see their own finances and their view of the broader economy is also changing on a more fundamental level. And this shift will affect how they judge the next class of lawmakers in power.

Reality versus ‘vibes’

When scholars try to understand how people judge the economy – and how they separate their own personal circumstances from the broader economy – one of their key reference points is the University of Michigan’s consumer sentiment index. It asks respondents about their personal finances, their short-term and long-term economic outlook, and whether they think it’s a good time to make major purchases.

This gauge has historically tracked key economic measures of consumer spending and inflation: The state of the broader economy usually shapes the way people think about their own financial well-being.

But in recent years, these have diverged. By many measures, the economy is doing well, but people feel they’re falling behind. And this has only become more pronounced ahead of the midterms.

Despite strong consumer spending, robust business investment and low unemployment, consumer sentiment keeps slipping and is now 10% below where it was a year ago, according to the Michigan index.

Some commentators point to ongoing inflation as the reason for gloom. It has remained stubbornly above the Federal Reserve’s annual 2% target rate due to drivers like tariffs, energy price hikes stemming from Middle East turmoil, and massive amounts of investment in the artificial intelligence build-out.

But what’s really happening is that consumer sentiment data and inflation data have become untethered. Inflation has actually dropped sharply from its 21st-century peak of 9.1% in June 2022 after the pandemic to 3.7% in September 2026, but consumer sentiment is lower now than it was even then.

What about wages? Here, too, the data also doesn’t fully explain this disconnect. While inflation makes consumer goods pricier, it also lifts pay. Inflation-adjusted wages actually increased between 2022 and the first half of 2026, all while consumer sentiment remained weak. What has changed in recent months is that inflation-adjusted wages are now falling – which could help explain the darkening outlook among voters.

Inequality versus growth

One possibility is that deeply entrenched inequality explains this divergence.

Compared with other eras of moderate-to-high inflation, the U.S. economy today is much more unequal. Income inequality has increased over the past 20 years, narrowing only during the 2008 and 2020 crises before quickly widening to prior levels.

This trend is important for understanding which consumers are shelling out cash. The Fed has consistently cited strong consumer spending in its economic assessments, but the richest 10% of Americans account for half of that spending today. Meanwhile, spending by the bottom 80% of earners has fallen behind inflation.

In other words, the strong total consumer spending figures reported as official data are being driven by very wealthy Americans and fail to reflect the experience of typical consumers who are the bulk of the electorate.

This trend of increasing inequality has been particularly acute in terms of wealth: The top 0.1% of American households together own five times as much wealth as the bottom 50%. Much of this reflects the uneven gains of the stock market boom and how wealth is taxed.

In short, Americans’ economic malaise might be driven by concerns over income and wealth that conventional measures don’t fully capture.

It’s not just about me

When it comes to consumer surveys like the University of Michigan index, economists generally assume that the answers reflect the personal experience of respondents.

But I agree with other scholars who argue that sometimes these answers may be based less on people’s own circumstances and more on how they view the economy as a whole. This assessment could reflect, for example, concerns like equity, equality of opportunity and economic justice.

When responses are driven by a concern for collective well-being rather than just personal material self-interest, social scientists refer to such perceptions as “sociotropic.”

This last point isn’t just theoretical. Research suggests voters tend to weight their perceptions of the economy more heavily than their personal financial circumstances when deciding whether to vote for the incumbent party.

Trade is one good example. Americans’ preferences for trade policy are driven less by how a particular measure, like tariffs, would impact them personally and more by how they think it would affect the country as a whole.

If consumer sentiment follows a similar path, that could explain the divergence between generally strong economic trends and weak consumer sentiment. People are thinking not just about their own conditions but those of the U.S. as a whole, and it’s possible that their understanding of “the economy” includes its relationship to inequality.

Understanding the disconnect between the economic data traditionally used to assess the economy’s health and Americans’ perceptions of that economy is important not just to the scholars trying to make sense of it – it could also help set an agenda for the incoming Congress. If economic insecurity punishes the governing party at the polls, the next Congress will be expected to do something about it once sworn in.

Voters generally back the incumbent party when the economy is doing well and the out-party when it’s not. But how they judge the health of the economy is not straightforward, and the past six years suggest that improving headline measures of economic health – without regard to Americans’ lived experience and their concerns about what kind of economy is being built – may not be enough to assuage voters’ concerns.The Conversation

Erin Kay Lockwood, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California, Irvine

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

A creeping crisis threatens the GOP —and it's not the polls

Next week, tens of millions of Americans will head to the polls to elect their representatives to the 120th US Congress. The race for the US president attracts the lion’s share of global media attention every four years, but the midterms crucially shape the second half of presidential terms.

This year’s elections arrive amid a political pressure cooker of lawsuits, electoral disputes and accusations of interference by all sides of politics.

After almost two years of a pliant Republican-controlled legislature, President Donald Trump is bracing for the first nationwide electoral test of his second term.

So, what are midterm elections, and how might the results on November 3 shape the United States until a new president takes the oath of office on January 20 2029?

What are the midterm elections?

Every two years, both chambers of Congress get a shakeup. All 435 members of the lower house, the House of Representatives, are up for election. Around a third of the 100 senators who sit in the upper house face voters, too. This cycle, 36 governorships will also be on the ballot, along with a smattering of state-level contests for legislators and local officials.

When they fall outside a presidential year, these elections are called “midterms,” marking the rough midpoint of a president’s four-year term.

As the US government’s chief legislative body, the make-up of Congress decides each party’s ability to pass federal legislation and scrutinise the president. Most presidents in modern American history have at some point navigated a divided Congress, where the opposition party controls one or both legislative chambers.

What can we expect?

History tells us the president’s party is almost always punished in the midterms.

In the 2006 elections, during George W Bush’s presidency, Republicans lost 30 House seats. Four years later, the Democrats suffered a whopping 63 net-loss “shellacking” in Barack Obama’s first midterm test as president.

The Republican party is unlikely to defy this trend in 2026. Top election forecaster Charlie Cook has called a Democratic sweep of the House in November a “done deal”. Pundits project the Democrats will pick up at least five and as many as 30 House seats — enough to overcome the GOP’s razor-thin majority and take control of the chamber for the second half of Trump’s term.

However, the Republican majority in the powerful US Senate may be harder to overturn and could come down to the wire. Democrats need a net gain of four seats to win back the chamber, which will likely hinge on the results of about seven hotly contested toss-up races.

Why are Republicans on the back foot?

While these midterms follow a familiar script, they might also be set to break historic patterns.

In the Senate, polling suggests Democrats may be on track for some significant pickups, including in reliably “red” (Republican) states that voted for Trump by double-digit margins in 2024.

The race in Kansas — currently a dead heat — could see the state elect its first Democratic senator in almost a century. Democrats appear to be competitive in Republican strongholds Ohio, Alaska and Iowa. Polls even suggest they could have a chance in Texas, where the party hasn’t won a single statewide office since 1994.

As the battleground map expands, Republicans are reportedly pouring millions of dollars into advertising to defend safe seats that could now be under threat.

So, why have these Republican strongholds — previously seen as unwinnable for Democrats — come into play this election cycle?

Of course, distinct, local dynamics are shaping individual races, such as the scandals plaguing Ken Paxton’s campaign in Texas and incumbent Senator Roger Marshall in Kansas. In Alaska, Republicans worry that a same-name challenger could confuse voters and siphon support away from Republican Senator Dan Sullivan in a tight race.

But the midterms are ultimately a referendum on the sitting president. And right now, Trump’s approval rating is under water in 47 of the 50 US states.

Americans don’t trust him on trade, immigration or the economy. Seven in ten think the country is headed in the wrong direction. One survey found 48% of Americans say they are financially worse off compared to when Trump returned to office in 2025.

Pollsters are also predicting that a sizeable enthusiasm gap could play into Democrats’ hands on election day. Nearly half of the voters for Democratic presidential nominee Kamala Harris in 2024 (48%) are very enthusiastic about voting in November. Less than a third of Trump supporters say the same.

Rusted-on Republicans might be unlikely to switch their political allegiance to the Democrats. But it could be just as damaging for the Republican Party if they don’t vote at all.

Is it a done deal?

While many commentators are predicting a “blue tsunami” will wipe out Republicans, others have argued there are reasons for caution when predicting the midterm result.

The Democrats remain deeply unpopular. Gerrymandering has tilted the electoral map in the Republicans’ favour.

And in what are already the most expensive midterm elections in history, Republicans continue to hold a clear financial advantage. Elon Musk alone has donated more than a quarter of a billion dollars to Republican groups, including his own voter turnout operation.

Moreover, even though polling has been accurate in recent midterm cycles, it has famously missed before.

If Trump is so powerful, do the midterms even matter?

With Trump wielding a level of executive power unmatched in modern US political history, the midterms may seem a minor distraction with little enduring impact on his presidency. In May this year, he said “I don’t care about the midterms”.

Yet, if the Democrats can flip one or both chambers, they would gain the power to launch House investigations and block nominations for top judicial and government. Congress can also pass legislation that overrides or restricts funding for presidential orders. It could even set the stage for Trump to face an unprecedented third impeachment.

The results will also offer an early — albeit imperfect — indication of “where partisan winds are blowing” as both parties eye the presidential primaries that kick off in early 2028.

Regardless of whether the president says he cares about the midterms, on November 3, millions of Americans will show they do.The Conversation

Ava Kalinauskas, Senior Research Associate, United States Studies Centre, University of Sydney

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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The 3 reasons hardcore Trump fans refuse to walk away

President Donald Trump’s approval ratings are cratering. Even his Make America Great Again, or MAGA, diehards have reservations.

This fact was evident to me when I attended MAGA rallies in three states on Oct. 24-25, 2026. One was a Turning Point USA get-out-the-vote event outside Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

Along with a few dozen America First stalwarts wearing white “America the Beautiful” caps, I sat on a wooden table under a small picnic pavilion listening to speakers such as MAGA activist Scott Presler and Trump-endorsed U.S. Rep. Dan Meuser. Meuser reeled off MAGA talking points, including the supposed threat posed by transgender athletes and bathroom use, immigrant voter fraud and the “billionaire anarchist George Soros.”

Remarkably, the speakers barely mentioned Trump. The audience clapped politely, but the energy was tepid compared to the many MAGA rallies I attended in 2024, when the Pennsylvania landscape was dotted with Trump and MAGA signs. This time I saw none.

The numbers bear out what I observed.

A mid-October 2026 poll found that only a third of U.S. adults approve of the job Trump is doing; 71% feel the country is on the wrong track. The majority of Americans are pessimistic. A growing number worry about government corruption.

The reason?

There’s the war with Iran that has resulted in U.S. soldiers being killed and wounded. The conflict is costing billions of dollars and spiked the price of gas. But most of all, Trump has lost support on the economy amid growing inflation and an affordability crisis.

Remarkably, despite the headwinds, many of Trump’s MAGA loyalists still back him. This point was underscored by the Harrisburg event I attended as well as Trump’s midterm rallies, where attendees still enthusiastically chant “U.S.A.” and are decked out in red caps and MAGA merch.

Why?

I’m an anthropologist who has been studying Trump and his MAGA movement for years. I wrote a newly updated book, “It Can Happen Here,” on Trumpism and U.S. history. I have previously written about why people voted for Trump in 2024.

Based on my research, I see three key reasons some voters still back him. Meuser stressed all three at the Harrisburg rally as he warned of “lunatic” left socialism while extolling the Trump administration’s track record, including the immigration crackdown.

President Donald Trump on June 26, 2026, warned that “godless communists” taking over the Democratic Party pose “the most serious threat” to the U.S. since its founding.

1. Socialist doomsday ‘fear porn’

While nervous about the war and inflation, many Trump supporters respond to fearmongering about “radical left” Democrats, some of whom, Trump contends, want to drive the country off a communist cliff.

If Trump has long harped on this putative radical left danger, his warnings have gained new traction with the visibility of progressive hard-liners like Michigan Senate candidate Abdul El-Sayed and the democratic socialist mayor of New York, Zohran Mamdani.

Beyond the threat of socialism, Trump claims that under Democrats the U.S. would fall back into a “dark age” of economic mayhem, curtailed rights and religious freedoms, rampant crime and imperiled national security. MAGA stalwarts echo his warning of “Doomsday” scenarios.

To underscore this point, Trump and his loyalists are connecting the massive and sometimes destructive protests in France to democratic socialists and the “radical left.”

For example, the White House posted a video on X featuring rioting and arson in France which warns, “Pay attention before it’s too late. This is the future Democrats want for America.” Other Trump supporters warn the unrest illustrates the civilizational threat of immigration and a looming “global Islamic takeover.”

MAGA pundits like Jesse Watters and Greg Gutfeld are encouraging this use of what they call “fear porn” to drive the 2026 midterm vote.

2. Border ‘invasion’ shut down

Trump won in 2024 largely due to two bread-and-butter election issues: the economy and immigration.

While those on the left focus on the abuses of Trump’s immigration agents, many Trump supporters I have spoken to credit him for clamping down on what they view as a Biden-era border “invasion.” It resulted, they claim, in the influx of millions of “illegal aliens,” some dangerous criminals, who have strained U.S. cities and taken jobs from citizens.

These Trump-supporting immigration restrictionists argue that reports of abuses by Immigration and Customs Enforcement are exaggerated and the need for mass deportations is urgent. If anything, some contend that Trump hasn’t done nearly enough in this regard.

MAGA loyalists give Trump higher marks on immigration than any other major issue, which is why the Trump administration foregrounds immigration as one of its top “promises kept.” This is why, in Harrisburg, attendees were told that when they went to knock on doors later in the day, they should mention Trump’s promises kept, including “No. 1, a closed border.” The tax cuts and drop in crime were Nos. 2 and 3.

Interviews with some of the thousands of Trump supporters gathered for a rally in Port Huron, Mich., on Oct. 25, 2026.

3. ‘America is winning … bigly!’

Trump supporters feel the economic pinch. Some are unhappy about the war. But, they contend, Trump – who wrote the book “The Art of the Deal” – always has a long-term strategy and winning hand.

The proof?

Supporters point to Trump’s long and self-described successful business career and note what they perceive as the many successes of Trump’s first term.

And they contend that Trump has already delivered. As pro-Trump radio host Dan O’Donnell recently put it, under Trump “America is winning … bigly.”

Trump’s 2025 “One Big Beautiful Bill” cut taxes and government spending while delivering on campaign promises such as “no tax on tips” or overtime. Meanwhile, crime rates have plummeted, while the stock market has reached new highs.

A White House Jan. 20, 2026, press release – “365 WINS IN 365 DAYS; President Trump’s Return Marks New Era of Success, Prosperity” – lists a win for each day of the second term’s first year, some of which fact-checkers have shown are exaggerated. They range “from negative net migration for the first time in 50 years to the largest homicide drop on record, trillions in reshored investments, peace deals ending multiple wars, record energy production and massive bureaucracy cuts.”

MAGA stalwarts, like Trump, are sharing lists of such accomplishments, including Top 25 lists, to turn out the vote.

Trump’s bad polling numbers, some suggest, are the result of an anti-Trump “fake news” psyop. The reality, they say, is that Trump has launched, as he calls it, the “golden age of America.”

A Trump midterm ‘golden wall’?

Does this hardcore base of Trump voters create a “golden wall” that will head off the major midterm gains many expect Democrats to make? This possibility emerges especially in light of polling that has historically underestimated Trump voter strength.

But from my perspective, probably not.

There are splits in MAGA that I have observed firsthand at MAGA gatherings, such as the Conservative Political Action Conference and Turning Point USA’s AmericaFest. The war in Iran has been at the center of the dispute, with some – including former U.S. Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene and commentators Tucker Carlson and Megyn Kelly – condemning what they call an “Israel First” faction for betraying MAGA’s “America First” principles.

In contrast, Democrats appear more energized.

Historically, the opposition party almost always makes gains during midterm elections – especially when there are economic troubles. And some wonder whether Trump supporters will turn out when he isn’t on the ballot.

Given the war and affordability crisis, it seems likely Trump’s “golden wall” of MAGA diehards, like those I saw at the Harrisburg rally, won’t be enough to stave off significant midterm losses, including control of the House of Representatives.

The question then will be what, if anything, Trump and his MAGA supporters will do about it.The Conversation

Alex Hinton, Distinguished Professor of Anthropology; Director, Center for the Study of Genocide and Human Rights, Rutgers University - Newark

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The irony of the GOP's election ploy has trapped Republicans into a corner

With Election Day 2026 just weeks away and control of Congress hanging in the balance, the results will almost certainly hinge on voter turnout, just as they did in 2024.

Given that genuinely undecided voters are scarce — as little as 5% to 7% of the electorate, according to major polls — both Democrats and Republicans must look to mobilize their rank-and-file supporters. To do so, the Republican Party has bet strongly this year on a strategy of convincing people that voter fraud is rampant.

As a scholar of U.S. politics, I see this as a high-risk strategy for Republican candidates and American democracy. That’s because reduced trust in election integrity can reduce motivation to vote – even if based on flawed information. But it’s not at all clear which Americans are most likely to stay home in November.

Voter fraud vs. reality

Voter fraud is not a real problem in the United States. Study after study, by public officials and think tanks, has shown that voting by noncitizens and other ineligible voters happens only at minuscule, statistically insignificant levels.

Nonetheless, rhetoric from the Trump administration about voter fraud has been pervasive. Consider the recent claim by Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin that Nevada had nearly 16,000 noncitizens on its voter rolls – a number reduced to 185 when state authorities pressed for details, and reduced to zero when the state investigated the names provided.

There is comparable behavior from Congress. My own research on political communication has shown that a substantial number of members of Congress, strongly skewing Republican, make frequent use of rhetoric that undermines democratic norms and delegitimizes political institutions.

The strategy ties readily into President Donald Trump’s persistent false claims that he won the 2020 presidential election. It also ties into his administration’s strongly anti-immigrant agenda, which spreads fear of noncitizens corrupting U.S. politics.

How does this uncertain political environment influence voters?

There is clear data showing that voter confidence in elections has fallen across party lines: Only 65% of Republicans, 64% of Democrats and 57% of independent voters are very or somewhat confident that the 2026 vote count will be reliable. Conventional wisdom suggests such discouraging numbers would depress turnout.

It’s not as simple as that, however.

What motivates voters

Extensive research confirms the axiom that a sense of civic duty is the strongest predictor of whether someone will vote. It supersedes trust, partisanship and policy preferences.

Any campaign’s quest to mobilize additional voters, therefore, must find them among citizens without a strong sense of civic duty. But among these people, diminished trust in democratic processes can play out in counterintuitive ways.

Recent research on German voters is relevant to the U.S.: It shows that among more passive voters – those following cues from political elites – reduced trust in elections can depress motivation to vote. That’s because there’s no trustworthy result that voters are seeking to affirm.

Conversely, among voters with greater skepticism about elite messaging, reduced trust can motivate increased turnout as an attempted corrective for a flawed system.

What does this mean for potential voters in the U.S.? Among Republicans, it appears that the party’s strategy carries a strong risk of backlash.

Findings from MIT’s Election Lab confirm that cues from political elites are a powerful factor in voter behavior. Specifically, cues setting expectations of a disappointing or untrustworthy result will reduce motivation. Why vote if you don’t expect it to help achieve the desired result?

The same study finds Republican voters broadly inclined to believe GOP leaders’ cues about voter fraud and to frame their expectations accordingly. And once they’ve made that shift, they cling firmly to the belief, even in the face of contrary empirical evidence or messaging from within the party.

In the current election cycle, 50% of Republicans surveyed distrust mail-in voting, and 51% fear voting by noncitizens. They expect election results to be fraudulent. This likely won’t mobilize them, as there’s no positive result they can expect to affirm. The Republican Party’s messaging has painted its voters into a corner.

Democrats, meanwhile, are less inclined to believe claims of voter fraud. But they are more inclined to be concerned about attempts to undermine the midterms by political elites making such claims. Examples include the Trump administration’s efforts to sow doubt about voting by mail and about alleged noncitizen voting.

These efforts increase motivation to vote among Democrats. Unlike GOP voters, they see the capacity to correct for the system’s vulnerabilities – the potential and urgency to overwhelm attempts at voter suppression through higher turnout.

A woman talks to a man in an office while other people work in front of computers. An election integrity officer, in red, trains poll watchers at the Orange County Registrar of Voters in Santa Ana, Calif., on Nov. 1, 2022. Television monitors display what each employee is looking at on their desk for observers to watch. Paul Bersebach/MediaNews Group/Orange County Register via Getty Images

Truth and trust

Opponents of Trump and the GOP may find these diverging effects encouraging. No matter the results this November, however, we’re left with a precarious dynamic. Increasing numbers of voters lack trust in elections and make their decisions to vote – or not – based on limited or flawed information.

Fortunately, there are signs of hope.

Although voters in general are poorly informed about how elections are conducted, they can and do respond to clear information familiarizing them with election processes.

I’ve seen this myself over the years, working with nonpartisan efforts to register young adults and train them as poll watchers. And in the current election cycle, there have already been widespread efforts to broaden public awareness about the fact that state officials, not federal ones, have authority over voter rolls and election security.

Meanwhile, fewer Americans are expected to vote by mail this year – whether due to fear of fraud or fear of the Post Office. If they instead vote in person, a silver lining is that positive personal experiences with poll workers are also associated with increased voter trust.

Looking beyond November, what Americans can hope for is a cycle in which clear election outcomes provide an opportunity to inform voters of how and why the system works. That’s the way to motivate more political engagement and voter turnout in the future.The Conversation

Christopher Miller, Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Politics, Economics, and Law (PPEL), University of Richmond

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

‘Massacre Generation’ ready to vote as another school shooting rocks America

Nearly 50 million Americans ages 18 to 29 are eligible to vote in the upcoming midterm elections, and about 60% say they plan to. If they follow through, it would break midterm turnout records for voters under 30.

Gun control is an issue these young voters care about more than the public at large does, and it’s easy to understand why: In their lifetime, mass shootings have been a recurring part of American life.

Directly experiencing a mass shooting is rare, yet some young people have survived two before turning 25. When a gunman opened fire at Brown University in December 2025, at least two students on campus had already experienced a school shooting before they got to college. The same thing happened in April 2025, when students who lived through the 2018 Parkland, Florida, shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School found themselves caught in another shooting at Florida State University. As one of them put it: “This is America.”

Researchers have called today’s young adults the “massacre generation.” They’re the first group to grow up entirely in the post-9/11, post-Columbine High School shooting era, with routine lockdown drills, heightened security in schools and nonstop media coverage of mass violence.

As criminologists who study the impacts of victimization and gun violence among young people, we wanted to know how growing up with the threat of mass shootings has shaped young adults’ views on gun legislation. In a recent study, we surveyed nearly 1,700 young adults, ages 18 to 29, across the country to find out. We found that fear of mass shootings pulls this generation apart along political and gender lines: It pushes some toward wanting stricter gun laws and others in the opposite direction.

A debate that repeats after every shooting

Mass shootings account for about 1% of gun deaths in the U.S. Still, they profoundly shape how safe millions of Americans feel. In a 2019 survey by the American Psychological Association, nearly 80% of Americans said the possibility of a mass shooting stressed them out, and a third said they avoided certain places because of it. The fear has become so common that clinicians now have screening tools to assess and treat people with anxiety over mass violence.

Young adults have also grown up watching the same heated gun debates play out after every tragedy. Gun control advocates call for stricter firearm restrictions to prevent the next mass shooting, whereas gun rights advocates push back with the “good guy with a gun” argument, a phrase made popular by the National Rifle Association. Supporters of the latter view say more armed citizens are needed to stop active shooters, so more people should be able to buy and carry guns with fewer restrictions, such as carrying in public without a permit or on college campuses.

Researchers have known for a long time that more guns don’t necessarily mean less violence. A 2021 study found that mass shootings were more common in states with higher rates of gun ownership, and gun homicides were more common in states with looser concealed carry laws. Yet even after decades of mass shootings, federal gun policy has barely budged. Even where individual states and local governments have passed assault weapons bans, including Connecticut and Cook County, Illinois, they’ve faced Second Amendment challenges that are now before the Supreme Court.

Young people have become some of the loudest voices in this debate, most notably through March for Our Lives – an organization started by Parkland survivors that focuses on ending gun violence – and other youth-led groups across the country. And because pro-gun views tend to be more common among older Americans, many political observers assume stricter gun laws will follow as young people gain voting power.

This fall, voters will choose members of Congress and state lawmakers who can shape gun laws, and in a few states they’ll weigh in on gun policy directly. In Massachusetts, voters will decide whether to keep or repeal a 2024 law that, among other things, requires gun owners to register their firearms with the state, expands safety training for people applying for a gun license and broadens the state’s ban on assault-style weapons. In Arkansas, they’ll decide whether to change the state constitution to more strongly protect gun rights, including the right to own ammunition and gun parts. If young adults turn out in record numbers, their views could help determine outcomes like these.

Young adults are split

So where do young adults stand? We’ve found that a shared fear of mass shootings does not necessarily lead to shared views on guns. Our survey asked young adults to rate on a scale from 1 to 3 – from “not at all” to “a lot” – how much they fear that they or someone they love will become a victim of a mass shooting. More than 60% reported moderate or high levels of fear, including about 17% who fell in the high-fear range.

In general, about two-thirds of young adults said people should need a permit to carry a gun in public and that guns shouldn’t be allowed on college campuses. About 6 in 10 disagreed that owning more guns makes people safer, and a similar share disagreed that gun control laws are unconstitutional.

We found that young adults who worried more about mass shootings tended to be more supportive of gun control. But this pattern didn’t hold for young men, Republicans or those who were politically conservative. For these groups, the opposite was true: The more they feared mass shootings, the less they supported gun restrictions. Young adults are divided on gun control, and those divisions are sharpest when fear runs high.

In the coming years, the massacre generation is on track to become part of the largest voting bloc in the country. Most young adults share a fear of mass shootings, but they disagree on what to do about them. And with each new mass shooting, that divide may only deepen.The Conversation

Jillian Turanovic, Professor of Sociology, Co-Director of the CU Center on Crime and Justice, University of Colorado Boulder and Kristin Lloyd, Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice, Clemson University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Showdown: Europe could trigger ‘nuclear option’ against Donald Trump

Rumors have been circulating for weeks about the United States imposing tougher sanctions on the International Criminal Court (ICC), because of what US President Donald Trump sees as unfair targeting of Americans and Israelis for prosecution.

These sanctions finally came into effect on October 9 – the same day South African jurist Navi Pillay was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for her contribution to international law.

The motivations behind these two diametrically opposing moves speak to the fragility of international law. They also highlight that ICC member states – including Australia, Japan, EU states and Canada – might need to decide between Trump’s program to dismantle the ICC “brick by brick” and their own commitments to international justice.

A long enmity

The US has never been a strong supporter of the ICC. While it took part in negotiations that created the court’s founding treaty in 1998, it did so partly to ensure the crime of aggression remained off the court’s remit for decades.

Former president Bill Clinton did sign the Rome Statute in 1998, but it was never ratified. George W. Bush removed this possibility in 2002.

Congress went further later the same year by passing the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act (ASPA) (aka “the Hague invasion act”). The concern here was to ensure no US citizen could fall under the ICC’s jurisdiction. The US has since entered into many bilateral agreements, including with ICC member states, to ensure US nationals are not handed over to The Hague.

Afghanistan accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction in 2003. In 2017, prosecutor Fatou Bensouda called for a full investigation that included allegations of CIA torture in “black sites” in Poland, Romania and Lithuania.

The appeals chamber confirmed this in March 2020. Consequently, the US imposed “smart sanctions” on two ICC officials – including Bensouda – in September 2020. It has also targeted the UN’s expert on the Palestinian territories, Francesca Albanese.

This prevented her from all financial dealings or travel to the US. In April 2021, with Joe Biden was in office, the sanctions were revoked. They were reimposed only 17 days into Trump’s second term, and they specifically targeted the new prosecutor Karim Khan. He had issued arrest warrants against Israeli PM, Benjamin Netanyahu and former defence minister, Yoah Gallant in November 2024 regarding their handling of the Gaza conflict.These allegations include war crimes and crimes against humanity, but not genocide.

Khan was removed from office earlier this year due to allegations of sexual abuse. However, there is also some suggestion it was due to his support for the Palestinian investigation.

The ICC has not publicly issued any further warrants against Israeli officials, but rumours circulate that Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich is the subject of a sealed warrant. And on hearing this rumour in May 2026, he ordered the forcible evacuation of the Bedouin village Khan Al-Ahmar in the occupied West Bank.

Trump on the attack

Later in 2025, Trump went on to sanction numerous ICC judges, three Palestinian civil society organisations along with the UN Special Rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territory, Francesca Albanese. They were specifically targeted for their work on the Palestine case, which has drawn unprecedented attention to the Court within a wider debate about Israeli conduct amounting to genocide.

While the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found in January 2024 there was a plausible case of genocide in Gaza, its full determination in the proceedings between South Africa and Israel are not expected to be delivered until after Trump’s second term in office.

To date, the most authoritative merits-based finding of genocide by Israel hails from the UN Commission of Inquiry’s September 2025 report. This was the last report delivered by Navi Pillay as the Commission’s chair and it provides in forensic detail of how Israeli conduct fulfils four elements of genocide under the 1948 Convention.

The latest sanctions

It seems that with growing consensus emerging about the extent of Israeli crimes and the (small) chance of ICC action on the Afghanistan file, that this was enough to precipitate Trump’s latest round of sanctions.

These new sanctions differ significantly from the earlier “smart sanctions” that had only targeted Palestine-related ICC officials and human rights organisations.

The October 9 package targets the ICC as a whole, freezing all property holdings and blocking services and transactions with The Hague-based institution. It will mean the transfer of funds, salaries, cloud services, insurance and travel are significantly threatened, given US dollar hegemony.

While it is unclear if these new measures will criminalise US individuals and entities that engage with the court on a pro bono basis, it blocks any formal relationship. Uncertainty tends to produce a chilling effect, and it is likely that many will choose to avoid assisting the court with its investigations for fear of sanction themselves. If the full force of the measures is implemented, the court will struggle to carry on many of its functions, especially without strong European backing.

The ban is not all stick. It contains a carrot providing the court with a 180-day grace period allowing certain activities (including IT services and ICC pension funds) to continue. Over this period, the Trump administration expects “meaningful progress” or even these softening measures will lapse. It seems the administration is calling on its allies as member states of the court to push for a radical shift within the ICC, especially relating to the Afghanistan and Palestine investigations.

Yet the court has already responded by stating firmly that its mandate is not political and that it will “not be deterred” from “safeguarding the international order grounded upon the rule of law”. The Netherlands, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Denmark, the UK and Japan have also issued a statement, reaffirming their continued and unwavering support for the independence, impartiality, and integrity of the ICC. However, as it stands, this will not go nearly far enough either to protect the court or placate a Trump administration bent on destroying it.

Two alternatives must be considered.

First, some powerful states do have sticks they can use against the US. For example, the European Union could resort to the “nuclear option” and impose its own blocking statute. This would require all individuals and entities under EU jurisdiction to not comply with the US sanctions. The ramifications are significant as parties could find themselves with opposing obligations. The US could also respond with a raft of counter measures.

While the EU did not mention this possibility in its statement affirming support for the ICC on October 10, these new US moves will embolden Spain and the Netherlands in their push to see it implemented.

A softer option is to turn to the example of Navi Pillay. In receiving the Nobel (instead of Trump himself), she embodied the values and institutions Trump is seeking to destroy.

Her stellar career in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa, in developing the field of international criminal justice, as UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and finally in bravely issuing her finding on Israel’s genocide proves that the international legal order is indeed under attack, but it still has some powerful and persuasive advocates.The Conversation

Michelle Burgis-Kasthala, Professor of International Law, La Trobe University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

'It’s déjà vu all over again' — and Trump is likely to pay the price

For the White House, the midterm elections are always agony. They are always a referendum on the president.

On October 12 2010, I was serving on the Democratic staff of the US House of Representatives. It was just two years after Barack Obama’s historic presidential election victory. His majority in the House was 39 seats. I took a scan of the House races in the upcoming midterm elections. There were at least 86 vulnerable Democratic seats in play. My best estimate, that day, was that we would lose 54 seats, leaving the Democrats at least 15 short of a majority. It was clear all was lost.

In every Democratic office, the staff discussed with their representatives the catastrophe on the horizon. Republicans in the House are having that discussion right now.

Obama was routed with a 64-seat loss in the House that November. But the surprise was the Democrats retained control of the Senate, 53-47 seats, which is exactly what the Republicans hold today.

A replay of that scenario from 16 years ago would be but a modest catastrophe for President Donald Trump. He would still be dominant in Washington, exercising his immense executive power and keeping his hold on the Senate.

But that is not how expert political analysts are seeing the outcome of this election less than a month out from polling day. Charlie Cook, the founder of the Cook Political Report, is one of the most cautious. He projects the Democrats will take at least five to 15 seats and win control of the House. The Senate is more up in the air, where the Democrats need a net gain of at least four seats.

If Trump loses control of the Senate, it means his appointments – judges, cabinet officers, ambassadors – will not pass without Democrat support. All his legislative initiatives would have to be acceptable to Democrats.

The Democrats could also pass bill after bill on key issues such as affordability, inflation, energy prices and health care, and send them to the president’s desk, where Trump would likely veto them. There could be joint House-Senate investigations into Trump’s finances and exercise of power.

And all this activity will set the stage for the 2028 presidential campaign.

Troubled times for Trump

The political atmosphere has turned dark for Trump and Republicans across the country. Democratic Senate candidates have suddenly become fiercely competitive in solid Republican states like Iowa, Kansas, Texas, and South Carolina.

Amy Walter, publisher and editor-in-chief of the Cook Report, last week observed,

If you’re the party in the White House, there are really three options for you on election day. The election day is going to be bad; it’s going to be really bad; or it’s going to be catastrophically bad. You know that going in. Now we’re into catastrophically bad territory.

There is no mystery here. Trump has become one of the most unpopular presidents in modern American history. His approval rating is at a record low of 32% – the lowest of any president since Harry Truman in 1952.

He is under water in 39 of the 50 states, including Republican stalwarts Texas and Florida. A decisive majority of adults believe the national economy and the country as a whole are worse off in Trump’s second term.

Trump’s management of the Iran war is exceedingly unpopular. On health care, cost of living, foreign policy, the economy and AI, voters trust Democrats more than Republicans.

The president and Republicans are also losing support among Latino voters – a pivotal demographic that boosted Trump’s election victory in 2024.

In polling on a generic ballot – will you vote for a Democrat or a Republican in the midterms? – Democrats have a double-digit edge, with Democratic voters more motivated to turn out than Republican voters.Trump is effectively forced to campaign in at least five states – Texas, Iowa, Alaska, Ohio and Texas – that he won by double digits in 2024.

He is also in denial about his standing and the polls. On the stump, Trump gives himself an “A+” on inflation. Questioned by Time magazine on his low polls, Trump said, “They’re fake numbers. I would beat anybody running today by 20 points. Your numbers that you have are fake. The pollsters are corrupt.” In Ohio, Trump told the crowd, “We’re gonna win big, and we’re gonna shove it up their ass.”

Trump pleads with voters to “just pretend I am on the ballot”. The problem with that tactic is it triggers voters who disapprove of him to get out and vote.

The president is also now urging his supporters to vote by mail – something he has vociferously opposed, claiming falsely that it enables Democrats to rig elections. But this desperate instruction will make it harder for Trump to challenge Democratic victories in states with mail-in ballots.

He continues to make reckless statements about Iran. In Nebraska, he said, “They could take out a city. Let ‘em take out Los Angeles and San Diego”. Trump’s words will not win hearts and minds on the war.

2006 all over again?

With less than a month to go, Democratic campaign leaders are aiming for victory in 240 House seats. They have just expanded their target list by six seats that Republicans won by 16 points or more in 2024.

America’s most popular political figure, Obama, will continue his role as the “closer-in-chief”. He will campaign for Democratic Senate candidates such as Abdul El-Sayed, the progressive Muslim candidate in Michigan, who is seeking to prove that a major industrial state, which voted for Trump in 2016 and 2024, can support a hard-left Democrat like him.

Unlike the House of Representatives, the Senate is no slam dunk for the Democrats. They may well win in Texas and Ohio, but they could lose their seats in New Hampshire and Michigan and fail to gain a seat in Maine.

This midterm feels like 2006. An unpopular president in his second term, George W. Bush, was enmeshed in forever wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and mired in a weak economy on the brink of the Global Financial Crisis.

Democrats gained 31 seats in the House and six in the Senate, giving them control of Congress. They would battle Bush for two more years. But that midterm set the stage for Obama to bring the Democrats back to the White House in 2008.

This 2026 midterm is just as much about 2028. As legendary baseballer Yogi Berra once said, “It’s déjà vu all over again.”The Conversation

Bruce Wolpe, Non-resident Senior Fellow, United States Study Centre, University of Sydney

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The surreal reality of Trump's diplomats

Just before leaving town on Sept. 30, 2026, U.S. senators confirmed 10 new ambassadors. Among those nodded through before Congress closed for an extended midterm recess were new U.S. ambassadors for Kenya, Nicaragua, Malaysia and Kyrgyzstan.

That’s commendable – many of those countries hold geographical or strategic importance for U.S. diplomacy. But it still leaves 92 out of 196 ambassador jobs currently unfilled. In some of those cases, the White House has not sent names to Capitol Hill despite the second Trump administration being a year and a half into the job. In others, the Senate, which is controlled by the same party as the White House, hasn’t acted on the names put forward.

Regardless of the reason, as a former ambassador and an expert in the process of diplomacy, I find the current vacancies concerning. Among those embassies still without a top person in place are key partners for the U.S. – countries that Washington needs to achieve its security, economic and strategic objectives.

What makes these vacancies more worrying, in my view, is that they come amid other concerning developments in the State Department’s staffing of embassies.

Politicizing diplomacy

Chief among them are the high percentage of politically appointed ambassadors relative to positions filled by career diplomats – that is, senior foreign service officers, usually with at least 20 years of diplomatic experience.

Though many countries send politicians abroad as ambassadors, America’s diplomatic service is unique in two ways. The percentage of U.S. ambassadors who are political appointees – those who haven’t followed a career civil service path – is higher than comparative countries across the world. Second, those political appointees are often donors with little to no government experience.

The practice has existed for decades, but in recent years the number of political appointees has increased. During the Obama administration, the percentage of political appointees was around 30%. The number rose to around 40% in the first Trump administration and the subsequent Biden administration.

But in Trump’s second term, some 80% of names the White House has sent to the Senate have been political.

And many of the people Trump has put forward don’t appear to have the credentials usually associated with holding important diplomatic positions. Rather, many are friends, associates or donors to Trump, often with little overseas experience or knowledge of the country they are going to.

Lee Lipton, ambassador to a key ally in the Philippines, is owner of a restaurant in Palm Beach – Florida Benny’s on the Beach – a member of Trump’s Mar-a-Lago Club and a contributor to his political campaign. The ambassador to Greece is Kimberly Guilfoyle, a former Trump adviser and ex-fiancée of his son Donald Jr.

The system of political appointees has always had an element of handing ambassadorships to friends and supporters. But what has changed under Trump is the range of positions now available. In the past, ambassadors to key countries like Chile, Israel, Peru, the Philippines, Turkey and Egypt, for example, have almost always been career appointees. This has changed under the second Trump administration.

Appointing noncareer diplomats to small, faraway nations has the additional problem that the chosen individual may not actually spend much time there. The rule of thumb has long been that ambassadors should spend no more than one month every year back in the United States. But that is compromised if a noncareer diplomat with expansive business ties in the U.S. is selected.

The role of a deputy

A closely related problem is the State Department’s handling of an ambassador’s second in command, their deputy chiefs of missions – DCMs for short – under Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

During Trump’s first term in the White House, politically appointed ambassadors were often encouraged to swap out the DCMs they inherited from their predecessors. It meant going through a long hiring process, leaving those key jobs unfilled for months.

In 2025, the State Department went further, canceling the assignments of senior officers en route to take up embassy jobs and opening a new hiring process.

It formed part of a Trump purge of what many MAGA Republicans characterized as a “deep state” civil service. The reality is that DCMs fill a critically important role in helping political appointees navigate the bureaucracy and implement their policy ideas, as well as raising the occasional reality check.

With more politically appointed ambassadors – some of them with no relevant experience – having an experienced DCM can be the difference between success and failure.

Looking for other friends

When you put all of these personnel changes together, the result is the degradation of what was once seen as one of the most effective diplomatic services in the world.

What makes this potentially more worrying is where the vacancies are. For example, Belarus and Bulgaria, neighbors to Russia and Ukraine, are without U.S. ambassadors. And important countries in the fight against terrorism or in geopolitical hot spots, such as Kuwait, Qatar and Mauritania, are in the same camp.

Other countries still without ambassadors include Indonesia, Southeast Asia’s largest nation and the most populous Muslim-majority country in the world; key Middle East ally Egypt and nuclear power Pakistan; and nations the U.S. needs to help manage inward migration, such us Haiti and Guatemala.

The problem of absent or inexperienced ambassadors goes both ways. It means Washington may not have a capable diplomatic figurehead in these countries to contact in times of need. There are also fewer avenues for host nations to successfully convey messages back to the U.S. administration.

When faced with absent ambassadors, amateurish political appointees and deputy mission chiefs who are very junior or career appointees with short resumes, host countries may conclude that they aren’t seen as important to the U.S. and start looking elsewhere for friends.

And the U.S. has hollowed out its ambassadorial corps at a time when it is facing growing international influence by the likes of Russia, China and Iran – rival nations hoping to capitalize on a perceived diplomatic void left by Washington.

For example, as the U.S. tries to contain Beijing’s influence in the Asia-Pacific region, Fiji, Indonesia and Laos remain without U.S. ambassadors. Similarly, China’s diplomatic relations with Pakistan – a former key security partner for Washington – have grown while the ambassadorial seat in Islamabad remains empty.

And former Soviet states including Georgia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan don’t have U.S. ambassadors even as Russia President Vladimir Putin attempts to consolidate Moscow’s regional influence.

In large areas of the world, such as Africa and the Pacific region, and in important areas of policy, the lights may be on in U.S. embassies, but nobody’s home. And that is a distinct problem for national security and strategic interests.The Conversation

Donald Heflin, Executive Director of the Edward R. Murrow Center and Senior Fellow of Diplomatic Practice, The Fletcher School, Tufts University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Republican strategy cratering at the worst possible time

Four weeks before the November 3 US midterm elections, Republicans trail Democrats by 9.6 points on the generic ballot in analyst Nate Silver’s midterm forecast model.

Democrats led by 9.1 points in my September 25 article. They remain clear favourites to gain control of the Senate and overwhelming favourites in the House of Representatives.

However, Donald Trump’s net approval has recovered from a low of -23.5 last Friday to -22.5.

If disruption caused by the Iran war continues until the midterm elections, with increased petrol prices and inflation, Republicans are likely to lose control of both the House and the Senate, perhaps with huge losses.

However, if the disruption eases again and petrol prices fall back before the midterms, I believe Republicans will do better than they are polling now, and may retain control of the Senate.

I say this because Trump’s net approval and the generic ballot were better for Republicans in early September, soon after a low in petrol prices.

Trump’s ratings

In Silver’s aggregate of US national polls, Trump’s net approval is -22.5. Currently, 59.9% disapprove of his performance and 37.5% approve.

Trump’s net approval was -23.0 in my September 25 article. It had improved to -18.7 on September 4 before falling back.

Trump’s net approval is below what any past president since Harry Truman had at this point in their term, with Trump’s first term the closest at -10.5.

On four issues tracked by Silver, Trump’s net approval is -12.7 on immigration, -28.1 on trade, -32.8 on the economy and -48.5 on inflation. Since my September 25 article, Trump’s net approval on inflation has dropped two points.

Silver also has an aggregate of US support for the Iran war. Currently, 60.0% are opposed to the Iran war while 32.1% support it, for a net support of -27.9, down from -24.4 in my September 25 article. That’s the worst net support since the war began.

Midterm elections on November 3

All 435 federal House of Representatives seats and 35 of the 100 senators will be up for election at November 3 midterm elections.

In 2024 elections, Republicans won the House by 220–215 over Democrats and the Senate by 53–47. Owing to Vice President JD Vance’s potential tie-breaking vote, Democrats need at least a four-seat gain to win Senate control.

As I previously wrote, owing to Republican gerrymandering, Democrats need at least a four-point margin in the generic ballot to have a good chance to win the House majority. The Senate is more skewed to Republicans as every state has two senators. Democrats need a double-digit margin in the generic ballot to win the Senate on a uniform swing.

In Silver’s midterm election forecast model, the generic ballot gives Democrats a 51.3–41.6 lead over Republicans, a 9.6-point margin (9.1 points in my September 25 article). Democrats’ lead had dropped to 7.4 points on September 4.

Polls that screen for likely voters usually give Democrats larger leads than polls that ask registered voters. Democrats are more likely to vote at lower turnout elections like the midterms than Republicans, when Trump is not on the ballot.

Silver’s model gives Democrats a 74% chance to win the Senate and a 93% chance to win the House, respectively 69% and 91% on September 14. Democratic chances to win the Senate had fallen to a low of 50% on September 7, and their chances of winning the House had dropped to 81% on September 3.

While uniform swing indicates that Democrats need a double-digit margin in the generic ballot to win control of the Senate, Silver’s model has Democrats as the favourites to win with a 6–7 point margin in the generic ballot. In the House, Democrats are favourites if they win by 3–4 points.

Democrats lead Republicans by one to five points in Senate contests for five states Trump won by double-digit margins in 2024: Ohio, Texas, Alaska, Iowa and Kansas. This is why Democrats are the favourites to gain control of the Senate.

The two key items that could go wrong for Democrats are a markedly improved economy by November for most Americans – not just the stock market – and a systematic error in which Republicans overperform the polls.

Economic data

Americans are currently paying an average of US$4.36 a gallon for regular petrol (gasoline in the US), down from US$4.48 a gallon in my September 25 article. Owing to profits and taxes, the retail price of petrol will be higher than the commodity price.

The commodity price of petrol had surged from a low of US$2.99 a gallon on August 27 to US$3.59 on September 23, then fell to $3.13 on September 29 before rising again to its current US$3.32.

In Silver’s models, Trump and Republicans were at a high in early September, shortly after the August 27 low point in petrol prices.

The September jobs report (released last Friday) will be the last before the midterms. In the establishment survey, 29,000 jobs were added, but there were downward revisions for July and August that subtracted 60,000 jobs, causing July to be revised from 21,000 gains to 10,000 losses.

In the household survey, the unemployment rate rose 0.1% since August to 4.2%. However, this was because of an increase in participation. The employment population ratio (the percentage of eligible Americans who are employed) rose 0.1% to 59.2%, and is up 0.3% since a July low. In Australia, the employment population ratio was 63.9% in August.

In the last four trading sessions, the benchmark US S&P stock market index has surged 2.2% to be at a new record high. It’s up 12.6% from its peak in the week before the Iran war began in late February and up 18.6% from its worst point in the Iran war in late March.

In August, disposable personal income increased 0,3%, while expenditure increased 0.9%. Since February, expenditure has exceeded income except in July. The personal savings rate has fallen 1.5 points since January to 4.1%, its lowest since November 2022.

The savings rate has been upwardly revised. In my September 14 article, I reported the savings rate was 3.0% in July, but this is now 4.6%.

Flávio Bolsonaro likely to win Brazilian presidency

I covered Sunday’s first round of the Brazilian presidential election for The Poll Bludger. Flávio Bolsonaro, the son of former far-right president Jair Bolsonaro, defeated Workers’ Party incumbent Lula by 47.0–45.2. Bolsonaro is likely to win the October 25 runoff election.The Conversation

Adrian Beaumont, Election Analyst (Psephologist) at The Conversation; and Honorary Associate, School of Mathematics and Statistics, The University of Melbourne

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Not just a game: The dark reality behind the White House’s new ‘arcade’

What if someone modified the video game Snake, where the snake’s tail grows longer the more it eats, but instead, the game involved a border guard who creates a growing tail of arrested migrants?

This is actually a mini-game — a short, simplified video game — that is now available on the United States government’s website alongside other game options that focus on healthy school lunches and a “Trump savings account.” The migrant game is called “Rio Run.”

These games use simple, clear messaging to deliver political messages under the guise of light-hearted entertainment. By hiding behind the “it’s just a game” defence, they weaponize play via political satire instead of harnessing the educational potential of video games to explore complex issues.

While their mechanics are persuasively designed — embedding arguments directly into player actions — they remain overly simplistic. As a researcher and serious-games designer, I believe government platforms could go much further to truly inform and engage the public with games.

The history of political games

Video games are and have always been political. Famed studios like Molleindustria have built a variety of mini-games that take political stances, including The Best Amendment’s portrayal of gun violence in the U.S. or the McDonald’s video game critiquing corporate America’s global impact.

This is not the first time the U.S. government has used games. The now-shuttered Global Engagement Center produced educational games about disinformation and how intentionally twisted information can deceive people.

Its games “Cat Park” and “Harmony Square” were shown to have helped people recognize false information online and inspired a sub-genre of educational games, like my own about online conspiracies.

Yet these differ from the White House’s newly released mini-games in both goal and design.

Playing, not learning

The arcade.gov games focus on a singular idea. While the Global Engagement Centre’s games were meant to inform (with some political sub-objectives), the White House “arcade” clearly doesn’t intend to teach.

These titles rely on a familiar tactic used by U.S. President Donald Trump — using satire and trolling to elicit reactions and normalize political views. Through game play, the games sneak political arguments past players without inviting debate. Even games that appear policy-oriented, such as “Healthy School Lunch” or “Flappy Bill,” share the platform with overtly partisan titles like “Rio Run.”

The games may seem harmless and unlikely to steer players en masse towards a political stance, but they use a satirical design to reinforce binary arguments. Scholars refer to this as ambivalence — content that is funny to some and serious to others. Similar to internet memes, the seemingly innocent ambivalence is weaponized to make a point that will resonate with some and frustrate others.

Researchers call this “memetic warfare.” Games like “Rio Run” may seem innocent to some, but they reinforce simple arguments about immigration and border security that fail to effectively and honestly inform the public about these issues.

Games as propaganda or education

Games don’t have to work this way. In fact, some do the opposite. The growing number of information-literacy games and associated research show that games can build a healthy skepticism within players to help them deal with manipulation.

Comparatively speaking, educational games can help learners reflect on information environments, whereas the U.S. government’s mini-games make an argument without asking for critical thought. It’s a difference in design.

Here’s an example: Since 2024, I have worked with high school teachers to create The Feed, a game about social media manipulation. We designed player actions to model social media environments and tactics.

Players use tactics modelled from the four Ds of disinformation — dismiss, distort, distract, dismay. They post content within the game that, over time, recreates online harms like flame wars. The game doesn’t make a simple right or wrong argument, but lets people play with tactics, strategies and approaches that incentivize them to contemplate information so they ask: “How does online manipulation work?”

Critical thinking

Games can push a point of view, but designing them effectively can help players critically think about the material. Snake doesn’t ask players to think about the diet of a snake; Rio Run doesn’t ask them to think about the politics or personhood behind border control. Yet, games can use play to examine the nuances of some of these themes.

If the White House wanted to teach the public about savings accounts, immigration or healthy school lunches through play, it could have built games that consider the various challenges that accompany these initiatives — or at the very least, offer educational resources to go with them.

Instead, these games make memetic-style arguments without anything that digs deeper into the issues at hand. Favouring memes over instruction reinforces party politics that often polarize rather than building a meaningful public conversation on the topics behind them.

Recognizing this, it’s important for players and designers to find titles that let them play critically — and ignore the slop that simply reiterates talking points with no discussion or critical thinking.The Conversation

Scott DeJong, PhD Communication Studies, Concordia University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

End-of-life doula explains why Congress has a major letting-go problem

U.S. Sen. Ed Markey is 80 and has served in Congress for half a century. His Democratic primary challenger in Massachusetts, U.S. Rep. Seth Moulton, is 47 and made generational change a centerpiece of his campaign. Markey won the Sept. 1, 2026, primary anyway by nearly 30 percentage points.

He’s not the only octogenarian to prevail in a competitive primary in 2026. Eleven won their primaries and are on the ballot for the 2026 midterm elections. The oldest primary winner was Sen. Jim Risch of Idaho, an 83-year-old Republican.

It seems to be an issue both major political parties agree on: For many candidates, age is just a number, even when it starts with an 8 or a 9.

Letting go

My colleagues and I study succession in family-run businesses and other occupations where leadership, identity and longevity can become deeply intertwined. Whether someone is in charge of a company or is a lawmaker, their work does not only keep them busy. It provides status, an identity and a sense of mission. Letting go means giving up more than a job.

When business leaders or politicians linger for too long, it can be costly for their companies or constituents because potential successors may become frustrated by waiting and decide to move on.

When any kind of leader remains in their role for decades, underlying reasons can range from a genuine love for what they do to not knowing what they will do – or who they will be – once they leave. However, waiting too long can mean they’ll have to hand off their responsibilities in crisis mode.

In family businesses, my research team found, the people closest to their leaders – including relatives, employees and longtime supporters – may go quiet rather than press the issue.

This dynamic is not limited to the business world. It also applies to many of the older members of Congress.

A closer look at the large numbers of legislators who continue to serve during their golden years reflects two trends.

First, many are elected for the first time when they’re middle-aged. New House members were about 50 years old and new senators around 55 in 2025.

Second, although the median age of House lawmakers is now about 60, and 66 in the Senate, there’s a small group of long-serving members who remain in office into and past their 80s and keep running for reelection.

Seeing the advantages of ‘not yet’

Every lawmaker can have a reason to say “not yet.” So can their staff members, who may be loyal to them and their missions and professionally invested in the work they have built together.

Political parties value the electoral advantages of incumbents, while constituents may value the seniority, relationships and influence that come with having spent decades serving in Congress. And incumbents can sincerely believe important work remains unfinished.

However, unusually prolonged service in any position increases the possibility that illness, cognitive decline or death will lead to an unplanned and probably rocky transition.

What’s more, when politicians serve into their late 70s, 80s or beyond, they are breaking with ordinary employment patterns.

The typical American retires in their early 60s, with two-thirds of U.S. workers exiting the labor force before their 65th birthday.

Setting good and bad examples

There are examples of long-serving politicians choosing to plan their exit closer to standard retirement age.

One is Barbara Boxer. After more than three decades in Congress, the 74-year-old California Democrat announced in January 2015 that she would not seek reelection to the U.S. Senate the following year. “There is a time when you want the next generation to step in and step up,” she said.

Boxer’s early decision gave prospective successors nearly two years to organize and voters the opportunity to choose among them. Kamala Harris won the seat but stepped away to serve as President Joe Biden’s vice president.

This departure offers a striking contrast with that of Boxer’s longtime colleague, Sen. Dianne Feinstein, who remained in the Senate through a lengthy health-related absence in 2023. Feinstein, also a California Democrat, died in office that September. She was 90 years old.

She served on the influential Senate Judiciary Committee, which considers federal judicial nominations, including Supreme Court nominees. During her nearly three-month absence, the committee was deadlocked on dozens of Biden nominations after Republicans refused to let the Democrats appoint a temporary replacement for her and she refused to step down.

The tragic way Feinstein’s storied political career ended illustrated what can go wrong when lawmakers keep saying “not yet” until it’s too late.

That turned out to be the case with Biden, who reluctantly ended his presidential reelection campaign in July 2024. However, several books published since then include details about how his inner circle initially advised him to run again.

A rushed attempt at succession followed Biden’s abrupt withdrawal from the race. Harris became the Democratic nominee without participating in any of the 2024 primaries.

When change finally came, it arrived under duress rather than by design. And Harris lost the election to Donald Trump.

Fearing what might follow

U.S. Rep. Kay Granger, a Texas Republican, announced in 2023 that she would not seek reelection the following year. It soon became clear that severe health problems were preventing her from serving her constituents.

The former House Appropriations Committee chair didn’t cast a vote in her final six months in office for a good reason: She had dementia and was staying in a Texas assisted-living facility that provided memory care services to some residents. Granger died in August 2026 at 83.

U.S. Sen. Mitch McConnell, a former Senate majority and minority leader, has announced that he will step down when his current term – the Kentucky Republican’s seventh – ends in January 2027. But a fall, hospitalization and subsequent stint in a rehabilitation center in mid-2026 prompted renewed public scrutiny of the 84-year-old’s health and ability to complete his term.

U.S. Sen. Chuck Grassley of Iowa, who turned 93 on Sept. 17, 2026, and appears to be in good health, has not yet said whether he’s running for a ninth six-year term in 2028. But the Republican, who is the oldest person serving in Congress, has urged his constituents to vote for a Republican for governor.

“I don’t plan on dying in office, but if I did, I don’t want a Democratic governor choosing my successor,” Grassley said at a political event in Des Moines in late September 2026.

Learning from palliative care

My colleagues and I found an unlikely way to think differently about leadership transitions: considering lessons about letting go from palliative care.

Leaving political office or another leadership role, of course, is not the same as dying. But, as is true before someone develops a terminal medical condition, advance planning is most useful while people can still articulate what matters to them and exercise meaningful choices about what comes next.

I’ve learned that it’s a mistake to treat succession as something to discuss only when a leader must move on for health or other reasons. So, in addition to my work as a management professor, and to inform my research, as well as the workshops I hold for aging business owners and members of their inner circles, I have been trained as an end-of-life doula. I decided to do this because I lacked the vocabulary and tools that facilitated difficult conversations and decisions about their legacy and what is important to the leader as they let go.

Palliative care supports the act of letting go long before death – the same challenge confronting business leaders and the companies they run.

When voters consider whether to vote for an aging incumbent, they may wonder whether that lawmaker is already too old for their demanding job or soon will be. But that may be the wrong question. It might be better to ask whether the legislators who represent you, no matter their age, have a plan for letting go.The Conversation

Nancy Forster-Holt, Clinical Associate Professor of Innovation and Entrepreneurship, University of Rhode Island

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

An American school district actually burned this famous book in a furnace

Bruce Severy, a full-bearded, idealistic 26-year-old, moved from Southern California in 1973 to the small town of Drake, North Dakota, where he had accepted a job teaching English at the public high school. He, his small family and their menagerie of pets settled into a large, white frame house across from the school.

Severy’s progressive bent showed in the curriculum he taught. Insisting that his students should learn “how to think, not what to think,” he assigned his sophomore literature class contemporary fiction to read, including Kurt Vonnegut’s “Slaughterhouse-Five,” a strange and quirky anti-war novel published four years prior.

While Severy chose works that he believed could help his students make sense of the problems confronting society, they clashed with the conservative values of his new home. A parent eventually complained about profanity in “Slaughterhouse-Five.” In November 1976, the Drake school board voted unanimously to remove the book from school premises. School officials told students to turn in their copies, and their lockers were searched if they refused. The district went on to burn 32 copies of the novel in the school furnace.

As a Vonnegut scholar, I’m fascinated by the backlash to “Slaughterhouse-Five,” which is now widely taught in high schools and colleges across the country. Even though the U.S. Supreme Court eventually weighed in on Vonnegut’s novel, there are direct parallels between that controversy and the politics of school censorship cases today, which continue to target “Slaughterhouse-Five,” among countless other works.

Vonnegut responds

News of what happened in Drake spread quickly in the press. Those who objected to the school board’s actions made comparisons to Nazi book burnings. The school district’s cause wasn’t helped by the fact that the superintendent’s last name was Fuhrman – evoking Adolf Hitler’s formal title, Führer – and the school board chairman’s last name was McCarthy, reminding the public of Joseph McCarthy, the disgraced anti-communist senator who sought to purge and censor Americans from all walks of life.

When Kurt Vonnegut learned of the case, he was both angry and saddened.

In a letter to the Drake school board, he insisted his books were “not sexy” and did not argue “in favor of wildness of any kind.” Instead, “they beg that people be kinder and more responsible than they often are.” He informed the board that he was a decorated World War II veteran who had fought against nations that hate books and burn them. He never received a reply.

The North Dakota incident, while the most egregious attempt to censor Vonnegut, was not the only case of its kind.

As “Slaughterhouse-Five” made its way into high school and college curricula, it faced a backlash by parents and school boards who argued the novel was obscene and immoral. Its irreverent treatment of Christianity was deemed blasphemous, while its unsparing portrayal of the U.S. military’s bombing of Dresden, Germany, was condemned as anti-American.

The book has been challenged as recently as January 2026, when the ACLU filed a lawsuit on behalf of Vonnegut’s estate after Utah’s “sensitive materials law” gave school districts a mechanism to ban the novel.

The Supreme Court weighs in

Censorship cases involving “Slaughterhouse-Five” are complex because they have occurred almost entirely in high schools rather than colleges. Schools must balance their responsibility to decide what material is appropriate for younger students with students’ First Amendment rights to receive information and ideas.

One important case dealing with these issues made it all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court.

In 1976, several board members from the Island Trees School district in Long Island, New York, reacting to a list of “inappropriate” titles publicized by a conservative activist group, objected to 11 books held in the districts’ school libraries or included in the curriculum.

Seven of the books were written by authors from minority ethnic or religious groups, including titles as seemingly inoffensive as “Best Stories of Negro Writers,” edited by Langston Hughes, and the young adult novel “A Hero Ain’t Nothing but a Sandwich” by Alice Childress.

The 11th book on the list was “Slaughterhouse-Five.” At a press conference, school board member Frank Martin read excerpts from the novel out loud, focusing on a passage where one of Vonnegut’s characters, Kilgore Trout, reimagines the story of Christ’s crucifixion. Trout claims that this revised story actually offered a better moral than the original Gospel story: It teaches people to be kind to everyone, not just the well connected.

Martin, however, declared that even if the rest of the book told the best story in the world, he wouldn’t want it in the school library “with this stuff in it.”

Five high school students, led by 17-year-old Steven Pico, soon filed a lawsuit against the district, claiming the book removal was unconstitutional and that their First Amendment rights to freely receive information had been violated. The case wended its way through the lower courts for years, before it came to the Supreme Court in 1982.

Board of Education v. Pico was a tangled case. The justices wrote seven separate opinions and did not definitively settle the First Amendment issues. But a 5-4 majority did determine in favor of the students who argued that their case should have received a full trial rather than a summary judgment years ago.

As the only Supreme Court case to date involving censorship in school libraries, Pico, while a limited ruling, did set out general guidelines still used today.

The decision affirmed that school districts have the authority to supervise the education of students in their care and may remove materials that are, in the words of Justice William Brennan, “pervasively vulgar” or educationally unsuitable.

But such a decision may not be based on a school district’s objections to the ideas expressed in the books. Books may not be removed on narrowly partisan or political grounds, and removal must comply with the “transcendent imperatives of the First Amendment.”

Book banning today

Despite the fact that the justices ruled that books cannot be banned on partisan or political grounds, book banning has been on the rise in America since 2020.

The literary and free speech advocacy group PEN America documented 2,532 instances of book bans in public schools in 2021–22. That figure rose to 3,362 in 2022–23 and nearly tripled to 10,046 in 2023–24.

Since then, the numbers have dipped somewhat but are still alarmingly high.

Surprisingly, many of the school censorship cases today still focus on the same old issues affecting “Slaughterhouse-Five” over 50 years ago – profanity, sexual content and violence. John Green’s “Looking for Alaska” has been the most frequently banned book in schools since 2021, mostly because of a brief, awkward sexual encounter between two main characters.

But fiction and memoirs focusing on gender identity and LGBTQ+ issues have increasingly become targets of censorship, abetted by right-wing parental rights groups like Moms for Liberty. George M. Johnson’s memoir “All Boys Aren’t Blue” and Maia Kobabe’s autobiographical graphic novel “Gender Queer” are among the most banned books in schools in recent years.

And like the majority of the books banned in the Pico case, books by Black authors remain high on the list of school censorship cases. Nobel Prize-winning author Toni Morrison’s first novel, “The Bluest Eye,” appears among the top 10 banned books since 2021, and her Pulitzer Prize-winning “Beloved” comes in at No. 26. Ironically, “Beloved” was also named the single best work of American fiction since 1980 in a 2006 poll of writers and literary critics.

Kurt Vonnegut believed in and argued for First Amendment rights his whole career. In 1976 he told students at Connecticut College that language and literature were “holy” to him. He thought schools should make a point of exposing children to all sorts of opinions and information to make them better citizens.

But he wasn’t too hopeful. Arguing against book banning, he wearily concluded, was like “attempting to explain America at its bravest and most optimistic to orangutans.”The Conversation

Susan Farrell, Professor of English, College of Charleston

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Trump is powerless to stop the one thing killing him at the ballot box

If you think your energy costs are high now, the situation may be about to get a whole lot worse.

With traffic in the Strait of Hormuz – normally the primary route for oil leaving the Middle East – hovering below 15% of prewar levels, oil prices have increased from US$65 a barrel before the conflict in Iran began in February 2026 to more than $100 a barrel in mid-September.

When the U.S. and Israel first attacked Iran, analysts feared prices would soon reach $150 or even $200 a barrel. That hasn’t happened yet. But seven months into the conflict, with no clear end in sight, the global oil market has now largely exhausted the safety measures that exist to keep a lid on petroleum prices.

As researchers who study the relationship between energy and national security, we have been following these dynamics throughout the conflict, and the oil market is now showing signs that significant price hikes – and perhaps even shortages – may be on the way.

The squeeze tightens

Some oil has been able to make it out of the Persian Gulf despite the closure of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia increased output via its East-West pipeline, which runs from Abqaiq on the Persian Gulf overland to Yanbu on the coast of the Red Sea. At full capacity, that pipeline can carry as much as 7 million barrels per day, although only about 4 million to 5 million barrels per day are typically exported.

But attacks on the pipeline in mid-September that Saudi Arabia blames on Iran-backed militias based in Iraq forced the Saudis to temporarily halt oil shipments through that pipeline. The pipeline has now restarted operations at very low volumes, but it will likely take at least six to eight weeks to regain full capacity. Even this short cessation has tightened already constrained oil markets, and the threat of further Houthi attacks on Red Sea oil exports will only add to inflationary pressures.

Meanwhile, in Russia, Ukrainian drone attacks have damaged refineries, reducing Russian production of diesel fuel and prompting the country to ban exports of it. That has removed another 3% of the global daily supply of diesel, an important fuel for trucking and shipping. When diesel costs go up, the result is inflation in the cost of goods across the global economy.

Feeling the pinch

In the U.S., 47 states experienced record-high diesel prices on Sept. 22, with the national average reaching $6.52 per gallon.

The high prices prompted President Donald Trump to threaten to ban diesel exports, a move analysts suggest would make matters worse by accentuating global supply shortages and driving world prices upward.

Beyond diesel, motor oil prices have quadrupled, and supply shortages are starting to take hold. For instance, Costco has almost doubled its prices for motor oil and has limited the amount customers can buy.

The upshot from all this is that Americans are spending a lot more on fuel in 2026 as compared to 2025. Between March 1 and late September, Americans spent an additional $72 billion on gasoline compared to the same period a year ago, as well as $45 billion more on diesel. That’s $117 billion in additional fuel costs, above and beyond the costs of the war itself, which the Pentagon estimated at $45 billion as of early September.

These shocks are even more acute outside the United States, which is the world’s largest energy producer. South and Southeast Asian countries, which were more reliant on imports from the Persian Gulf than the United States, were hit hard soon after the war broke out. Some of them have had to ration fuel, while others enacted emergency measures like shortening the work or school week to reduce fuel use.

These challenges are now hitting Europe hard as well. On Sept. 20, some 15% of French service stations had reportedly run out of either diesel or gas.

Limited tools left

The international community has already taken most of the measures available to curb oil demand and boost its supply. Those moves have reduced the scale of oil price increases, but they did not prevent them entirely. Now, the toolbox is largely empty, leaving prices on the brink of spiking again.

In March 2026, a coordinated effort among 32 countries released more than 400 million barrels of oil into the global market from those countries’ strategic reserves. Those stockpiles are now substantially depleted, and it is not clear how much additional oil that countries will be willing or even able to release as the war continues.

Since the war began, the United States alone has released 130 million barrels, leaving its reserves at a 40-year low. The U.S. may not be able to release much more without compromising the structural integrity of the salt caverns where the Strategic Petroleum Reserve is stored.

The role of China

China has played the largest role in containing global oil prices to date by releasing official reserves as well as what now seem to be massive additional reserves not previously disclosed to the public. The country reduced its crude oil imports by nearly 50% between February and June 2026.

The increased electrification of the Chinese economy played a key role in reducing Chinese demand for oil during this period. More than 60% of new passenger car sales in China are electric vehicles or plug-in hybrids, and 30% of its heavy truck sales are now electric.

Overall, China’s electrification of its transport sector allowed it to reduce oil consumption by 1.35 million barrels per day in the first half of 2026.

Other countries are looking to China for help as well. The country’s international sales of electric vehicles, batteries and solar panels have skyrocketed, as other countries seek to insulate themselves from oil market shocks.

Less encouragingly when it comes to greenhouse gas emissions, China has used more coal to offset oil demand and as an alternative means of petrochemical production as well.

Of perhaps more immediate concern, China’s oil demand is now starting to creep up again, with crude imports rising 6.2% in August 2026 as compared with the previous month. Even if its imports don’t reach prewar levels any time soon, increased Chinese demand, coupled with a tighter oil market, may result in additional price hikes over the next few weeks.

China still has about four to six months of stockpiles, including commercial and strategic reserves, but Beijing may soon seek to gradually restock its inventories, although the Chinese may postpone these purchases if prices continue to soar.

A look ahead

Sustained conflict in Iran – itself a major oil producer – continued disruptions of oil shipments in the Strait of Hormuz, and Iran-linked militias’ disruptions to shipping in the Red Sea could mean the reemergence of the nightmare scenarios analysts envisioned when the fighting began.

It’s not clear if that would translate into simply much higher prices at the pump or turn into 1970s-style shortages, where there’s not enough fuel available at any price and lines stretch around the block at gas stations.

With the 2026 midterm elections looming, the White House will want to avoid that scenario at all costs. But the Trump administration has already released large amounts from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and has rejected policies that would have reduced oil demand, such as stricter fuel economy standards or incentives for electric vehicle adoption.

At this point, Trump has relatively few options available to blunt new price shocks, the effects of which may be visible not just at the pump but also at the ballot box.The Conversation

Joshua Busby, Professor of Public Affairs, The University of Texas at Austin and Greg Pollock, Adjunct Professor, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Trump races to stop November 10 time bomb

Look around you, and you’ll see rare earth elements at work. A phone vibrates because a magnet moves a weight. Its screen was polished with cerium powder. Its connection to the rest of the world crosses oceans on cables amplified with erbium. If you drove today, a rare earth magnet helped you steer, and a cerium compound scrubbed the exhaust.

All of these devices function because of 17 metals collectively known as rare earth elements. The scientists who gave the group that name in 1794 created a misnomer. Cerium alone is about as common in the Earth’s crust as copper.

However, separating rare earth minerals from one another and from raw ore is intensely difficult. As a result, countries that control the processing of rare earth minerals have a lot of political leverage.

China processes most of the rare earth minerals used around the world, and it isn’t just consumer electronics that depend on Chinese exports. The U.S. military’s F-35 fighter jets and Virginia-class submarines need rare earths too.

I spent years adjudicating war games for the U.S. Navy. War games force players to identify the hidden constraints that render a beautiful plan untenable. Rare earth processing is exactly such a constraint.

China showcased the power of its rare earths leverage with a series of export controls issued in 2025 that it agreed to suspend – at least until Nov. 10, 2026. Controlling the supply enables a government to slow a rival’s growth, or halt it. China’s ability to extend the suspension of its export controls or let them go into effect gives it leverage on the geopolitical stage. In the parlance of Theodore Roosevelt, it’s a very big stick.

How China took the lead

California’s Mountain Pass mine led world production of rare earths until the late 1980s. Multiple instances of radioactive wastewater spilling from the mine into the Mojave Desert made it hard to keep domestic production running.

When China expanded its own mining and sold the processed materials for less, the logic of switching rare earth suppliers was easy.

Mountain Pass’ separation plant closed in 1998, and the mine itself stopped in 2002. MP Materials restarted mining there in 2017 as concern about access to rare earth minerals rose, but the U.S. still imported more than two-thirds of the rare earth elements it used as recently as 2025.

China, which mined about 60% of the world’s rare earth elements used in magnets in 2024, handled about 91% of separation and refining.

Buyers using processing in China got material below the cost of making it themselves, and none of the cleanup bills or the bad press. But they ceded leverage to the processor in exchange. The trade was understood. It just didn’t look as threatening at first from a China that was still rising.

Why rebuilding is slow

The U.S. Government Accountability Office cited estimates in 2010 that rebuilding a domestic supply chain including mining, separation and magnet manufacturing would take as long as 15 years. Actually rebuilding that supply chain has been slow for several reasons.

China runs its plants with thousands of experienced engineers; the U.S. has far fewer experts. Today’s industrial-scale cutting-edge technologies were developed in China, and the government there has no reason to share. Beijing also banned exports of the separation technology itself in December 2023. The Pentagon bought $400 million of preferred stock in rare earth producer MP Materials in 2025, giving it 15% ownership of the company. MP Materials expects its next magnet plant to begin testing the equipment in 2028.

The Commerce Department also signed a letter of intent in 2026 to give a magnet maker, USA Rare Earth, $277 million in direct funding and a $1.3 billion loan, both aimed at developing facilities in Texas and Oklahoma.

But export roadblocks put up by China are making rebuilding that supply chain more difficult.

What happens on Nov. 10

On Oct. 9, 2025, China’s Ministry of Commerce announced six wide-ranging export control measures. One, Announcement No. 61, affects what even factories abroad can export. A factory in Germany or Japan would need a Chinese license to export a product if Chinese-origin rare earths made up 0.1% or more of its value, or if it used Chinese rare earth technology.

After President Donald Trump met Chinese leader Xi Jinping that month, Beijing suspended six export controls until Nov. 10, 2026, in exchange for Washington pausing its “affiliates rule,” which imposes restrictions on companies that are majority-owned by certain blacklisted firms, for one year.

Both controls snap back into place automatically unless both governments extend their pauses.

What stays in place

Some of the export rules were never suspended, including licensing imposed by China in April 2025 on exports of seven of the heavier rare earths.

Automaker Ford saw how the export controls can affect a company when it had to idle its Chicago assembly plant for a week in May 2025 for want of magnets – critical to speakers and electrical motors – because of the export rules. Ford CEO Jim Farley described his supply as “day to day” because he had no alternate source. Ford was able to resume production only with Beijing’s approval.

On June 22, 2026, China’s Ministry of Commerce put 10 U.S. companies on its export control list. Neither Chinese nor foreign firms can sell those companies any goods that have both civilian and military uses. Most of them build drones, radar, aerospace systems and military vehicles. Two of them – MP Materials and USA Rare Earth – are the federally backed American companies furthest along in building a mine-to-magnet chain.

Beijing said its move was a response to a similar move by the Pentagon. My interpretation is that China picked MP Materials and USA Rare Earth because they are best placed to reduce America’s need for Chinese processing.

An extension of the pause on Nov. 10 would honor the truce, but the heavy rare earth licenses and the June 22 ban on the targeted firms would still apply. The truce means both parties get to play nice. It doesn’t mean they are being nice.

Three paths

For the U.S., leaving processing in China is the fastest and cheapest solution, but that leaves it exposed to Beijing’s restrictions.

Rebuilding a U.S. rare earths supply chain would remove most U.S. dependence on China for rare earths and the political leverage it implies. But it would take longer, startup costs run to the billions of dollars and separation produces acidic, and sometimes radioactive, residues.

Building a supply chain with allies such as Australia or Japan, both of which have started to build capacity, would lower the risk of the U.S. being cut off unilaterally. Japan has run this play with some success, but the suspended Chinese rules affect any use of their technology abroad.

President Xi’s Sept. 24, 2026, meeting with Trump may help determine the status of the Nov. 10 restrictions, but the larger conflict over leverage will continue.The Conversation

Charles Edward Gehrke, Sloan Fellow, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Three Ts will dominate the Trump‑Xi summit –but don't expect much movement

When Presidents Donald Trump and Xi Jinping last sat down in May 2026, talk was centered on three Ts: trade, technology and Taiwan.

The latest summit, due to begin in the United States on Sept. 24, looks set to focus on the same set of issues again. The main difference will be that the technology element has been given added urgency by the sudden and rapid shift in developments in artificial intelligence.

What’s less clear is whether the two sides will be able to come to any sort of transformative agreement on that, or any other issue.

Tweaks to trade?

The most urgent issue, but also the simplest to solve, will be on trade.

Nearly a year ago at Busan in South Korea, Trump and Xi hammered out an agreement whereby the U.S. agreed to lift some export controls on high-end technology and to reduce the then three-figure tariffs on Chinese goods. For its part, China agreed not to restrict the flow of critical minerals and rare earths to U.S. users.

That pact is now up for renewal. Both sides are likely to want a continuation of the current arrangement, and while there may be some tweaking on the side, the new deal will probably be similar to the old one.

Each side has proposed in previous meetings that there should be a new instrument, a Board of Trade, that will assess non-sensitive U.S.-China business interests.

However, details about the institution remains vague. Some announcements are likely during the summit, but business leaders will want to know how comprehensive and lasting the arrangements for the board will be.

There is still less information on a proposed Board of Investment, which remains on the drawing board. The Chinese side has proposed bringing major Chinese CEOs to the summit to match the likes of Nvidia’s Jensen Huang and Tesla’s Elon Musk – both of whom accompanied Trump on the Beijing trip.

But the choice of business leaders is likely to turn on which aspects of trade China thinks are likely to develop most effectively in the short term.

The always thorny issue of Taiwan

Taiwan is a much harder issue to solve, but it’s unlikely that much that is discussed on Xi’s visit will determine its outcome.

Trump has been less willing than his predecessor to commit the U.S. to defending the island should Beijing invade, instead reasserting Washington’s long-held position of strategic ambiguity.

And although the U.S. is currently distracted from East Asia by the Iran conflict, China still prefers to find methods short of war to bring the island under Beijing’s control.

The island’s January 2028 presidential election is likely to be a more crucial moment for Taiwan’s future, particularly if the opposition — and more China-friendly — Kuomintang party wins the presidency, or indeed if an isolationist candidate becomes U.S. president later that year. If the next U.S. president opted to change course by taking a less active involvement in overseas issues — as has been floated by early contenders on both the left and right — that would change things all the more.

For now, Beijing will continue to build the People’s Liberation Army’s naval capacity to have the option of military action against the island. But its preference will be to take advantage of changes within Taiwan’s internal politics while combining economic incentives and coercion, squeezing Taipei’s international footprint and hoping for a slackening of U.S. interest in the western Pacific.

Other international issues are likely to gain less attention. China is expected to make clear its unhappiness about the war on Iran, and the U.S. may remind China that it has passed new legislation allowing sanctions on countries that buy Russian oil – of which, China is the largest purchaser. However, neither issue is likely to lead to any major change in practice.

Turning to tech

It’s really in the area of tech, and AI in particular, where both sides will be trying to make diplomacy catch up with reality. The May summit surprised many because the question of mutual agreement on regulation of AI came up in a way that had not been on the agenda for the first year of the Trump administration.

However, both sides agreed that talks in principle about regulation might be possible and even desirable because of the growth in the importance, but also unpredictability, of AI. And on Sept, 20, the U.S. and China mooted the idea of a “hotline” to notify the other over AI national security risks.

Between the May and September summits, fears about AI in the U.S have created an increasingly unfriendly atmosphere toward unregulated AI.

In China, public sentiment about AI is less openly hostile and some of its major benefits in areas such as healthcare have softened people’s attitudes. Yet there are still plenty of concerns expressed in private about whether China’s troubled economy will definitively benefit from the AI boom. Although many argue it has created new opportunities for consumers, others point to the relatively few jobs that have been created for a workforce that finds itself buffeted by wide-scale job elimination.

Both the U.S. and China have reasons to talk about AI regulation. The alarming prospect of rogue AI companies causing intense social disruptions through their business choices is clearly one such reason, and in the U.S., voters’ more immediate concerns about data centers are another.

There are also China-specific reasons that Beijing may seek restraint. One of the most common concerns about AI is that it may well run out of control. And “out of control” is a kryptonite phrase for the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. That’s particularly true of Xi who, as a youth, spent years in rural exile after his father fell to a purge just before the Cultural Revolution – an upheaval during which China’s politics turned to anarchy. It was a formative experience for Xi, which has no doubt influenced his tendencies as a leader toward exercising as much control as possible.

AI that undermines the unchallengeable leadership of the Communist Party would be an unwelcome guest in China’s cyberspace, and regulation that solves that problem would not be rejected out of hand.

However, this recognition of mutual concern about AI – albeit for very different reasons – is still not likely to see much progress in the short term. The competition between the U.S. and China on AI is real, and neither governments nor private sector actors in either country are willing to make concessions that could advantage the other side.

Levels of trust between Washington and Beijing remain very low on the issue. Talks about talks seem the most likely public outcome, though what happens behind the scenes may be pursued more discreetly.

It’s good to talk

The Trump-Xi summit is less important in terms of any major change in policy on either side, and more because it marks part of a commitment to maintain some form of dialogue between the leaders of the world’s two most powerful countries. The leaders may well meet twice more in the near future, at the G20 and APEC summits.

To meet four times in just over half a year is a good sign; refusal to meet would be much more worrying.

But the underlying difficulties of the three Ts, where the leaders seem to have fundamentally incompatible agendas, remain the thread beneath the ostensibly polite and occasionally amiable conversations.The Conversation

Rana Mitter, Professor of U.S.-Asia Relations, Harvard Kennedy School

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The 1977 legal precedent set to tank the White House crackdown

The president is going after the press again.

On Sept. 19, 2026, journalists from CNN, MS NOW, and Politico were denied access to the White House after President Donald Trump revoked their credentials, citing “their constant ‘reporting’ FAKE NEWS!” On social media, Trump posted, “Media Outlets shouldn’t be able to constantly write or report FICTION and LIES when they’re covering the President.”

This is not Trump’s first attempt at banning journalists from the White House. During his first term, he sought to ban CNN’s Jim Acosta by revoking his credentials following a contentious news conference about the 2018 midterm elections.

In that conflict, CNN quickly filed a lawsuit, arguing that, “If left unchallenged, the actions of the White House would create a dangerous chilling effect for any journalist who covers our elected officials.”

Journalism organizations also responded. The Committee to Protect Journalists, the Radio Television Digital News Association and even Acosta’s peers at The Daily Caller – a right-leaning news outlet – condemned the White House ban.

A federal court granted CNN a temporary injunction – reinstating Acosta’s press pass. The Trump administration later restored Acosta’s credentials, and CNN dropped its lawsuit.

Many commentators and members of the press have called Trump’s latest ban on the three news organizations a violation of the First Amendment.

White House Correspondents’ Association President Jacqui Heinrich said on X, “Today’s action revoking access for journalists from CNN, POLITICO, and MSNOW violates the First Amendment.”

Even George Washington University law professor Jonathan Turley, who staunchly supports Republicans and frequently criticizes the press, said on X that the ban “would be an assault on long-honored principles of a free press.”

As Turley and many others have argued over the weekend, Trump’s ban is almost certainly unconstitutional under the First Amendment, which states that “Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” Media law professor Frank LoMonte argued in 2018, “The First Amendment guarantees all Americans freedom to speak and publish without government interference.”

But they may be missing a crucial point. In fact, there’s more than one constitutional right involved in such a case. The judge who restored Acosta’s press pass in 2018 primarily based his ruling on the reporter’s Fifth Amendment rights to due process, not on the First Amendment.

And in my view as a constitutional law professor, it is less clear whether the press has a constitutional right of access to the White House even though past presidents have honored and respected the press’s access to the executive branch.

While several Supreme Court cases, such as Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, unequivocally provide the press with a right of access to criminal trials, there is no Supreme Court precedent that specifically provides a clear constitutional right of access to the White House.

Make that two constitutional rights

In one case from 1977, Sherrill v. Knight, Robert Sherrill, the Washington correspondent for The Nation, was – after holding press passes over several years – denied a press pass because the Secret Service advised he should not be given one. The Secret Service refused to disclose their justification.

Sherrill sued, and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the Secret Service cannot deny a White House press pass absent “narrow and specific standards by which applications are to be judged.”

The court required the White House to provide the press with “notice of the factual bases for denial, an opportunity for (them) to respond to these, and a final written statement of the reasons for denial (of a press pass).”

In the court’s view, these requirements – notice and an opportunity to rebut the bases for the denial of a press pass – are protected by two constitutional guarantees working together, the press protections in the First Amendment and the Fifth Amendment’s protections from arbitrary deprivations of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”

In other words, before the federal government can deprive an individual of their life, liberty or property, the federal government must provide that individual with due process, whose purpose is widely accepted as preventing “arbitrary governmental actions.”

Due process is key

There are a number of Supreme Court decisions that could be key in the current journalists’ lawsuit, which was filed on Sept. 21, 2026.

Among them is Mathews v. Eldridge from 1976, in which the Supreme Court stated that due process is flexible depending on the extent of the liberty or property interest at stake. But in general, the justices said, due process requires the government to provide notice to the individual and an opportunity for the individual to present their case before the deprivation occurs.

In Sherrill v. Knight from 1977, the court ruled that the denial of a press pass implicated a First Amendment liberty interest. That interest, the court wrote, “undoubtedly qualifies as liberty which may not be denied without due process of law under the fifth amendment.”

This nuance – the First and Fifth Amendment working in tandem – is what most commentators and critics are missing in their response to the recent ban of CNN, MS NOW and Politico. In fact, these outlets collectively lead with their claim that the Trump administration violated their Fifth Amendment right to due process in their lawsuit to block Trump’s ban.

“Even if attending a White House event is not a constitutionally guaranteed right, that doesn’t mean the government is free to take it away as punishment,” LoMonte argued in 2018.

Based on public reporting, it is clear that the Trump administration did not provide CNN, MS NOW or Politico with clear written notice stating the reasons for the revocation of their press passes. It certainly did not provide the outlets with an opportunity to rebut Trump’s unsupported claim that they report “FICTION and LIES.”

The same Trump-appointed judge who decided the CNN Acosta case has been assigned to the latest press ban case. So, if the CNN Acosta case is any indication, I expect the federal judge to promptly, but temporarily, reinstate the news outlets’ press passes while Trump tries to argue that his actions are constitutional, which in my view, they are not.The Conversation

Wayne Unger, Associate Professor of Law, Quinnipiac University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Whispers of the Nerd Reich: Inside Trump’s impending 'moment of reckoning'

“A moment of reckoning has arrived for the West,” reads a recent recruitment ad for Palantir, a Silicon Valley firm that increasingly provides data-driven “intelligence” for intelligence, police and military agencies – as well as blue-chip corporations and non-profits. “On the factory floor, in the operating room, across the battlefield,” the ad intones, “we build to dominate.”

How do we make sense of this convergence between advanced technologies and unapologetic violence, between “rational” AI and a primordial view of the world that seems to revert to a language of blood and soil, friends and enemies, “us” and “them”? In op-eds, talk shows, and political analyses, a single word has risen to prominence: fascism.

As a term, “fascism” is highly provocative, but seemingly untimely. It conjures up powerful images of jackbooted throngs of followers repeating chants and salutes, visions of black-lettered and blood-red banners. Yet these images are typically associated with political orders from a century ago in interwar Europe, a dusty relic from a previous age where “evil” was identified and annihilated.

So what is fascism in the present? How can it help explain contemporary technological, social and political dynamics? Two recent books attempt to diagnose these conditions: End Times Fascism And the Fight for the Living World by writer Naomi Klein and filmmaker Astra Taylor, and The Nerd Reich: Silicon Valley Fascism and the War on Democracy by journalist Gil Durán.

End times fascism

For Klein and Taylor, what we see now is not a repetition but an evolution. Fascist ideologies have been injected into a broader apocalyptic vision.

“End times fascism is a fascism embedded in an understanding that something immense is ending, and it responds to this discomfiting truth with unabashed cruelty,” they write.

In this vision, it is taken for granted that our economic, institutional and environmental systems are collapsing. Financial inequality is surging, with unaffordable houses and skyrocketing cost-of-living. Ecologies are crumbling, with earth systems hitting planetary limits. And that’s just a few of these stacked crises.

But an apocalyptic mindset, grounded in fundamentalist religion, stresses that crisis is not to be fixed, but fast tracked. Dysfunction and disorder are necessary to arrive at something more glorious, the labour pains to a great rebirth. Here, apocalyptic religion and political fascism agree: the current world is corrupt and cannot be saved; it must be burned to the ground and remade from scratch – or escaped altogether, for a greater paradise.

For its proponents, the end times are here — and only by embracing and accelerating this winner-takes-all transition will the chosen elite assure they can survive and even thrive.

Klein and Taylor follow this thread across three core sections.

Messianic Dreams traces the birth and rise of the Zionist dream, through to its present vision of genocidal reset in Gaza – where the glorious next stage of one society is built on the ashes of another. The authors explain these moves are not just about “righteous revenge” or “national security”, but have a distinct cosmological goal: to “move us all significantly closer to the prophesied end of times.”

Escape to the Cloud unpacks big tech’s fervent faith in AI superintelligence and the double-edged utopia or dystopia it would usher in. Here, claims of existential risk resulting from “the singularity” – where AI becomes sentient and human/machine norms break down – are essentially self-serving, directing investment and attention to tech development. They prop up the power of the already powerful.

(These claims of existential risk, which have been around for a long time, have been big news recently, with warnings from everyone from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to former AI staff and the “Godfather of AI”.)

And Prepper Nation steps through the push to bunker the United States against future threats and deport the alien others who are corrupting its purity. Here, elites ride out the apocalypse by establishing their own tech infrastructures, ethnostates, finance streams, and even their own (literal) bunkers.

For Klein and Taylor, fighting end times fascism starts with fighting its core premise that the world is doomed: a sinking ship beyond saving. They locate hope in embracing “hereness” and “staying”, rather than leaving. Their plea is to embrace our broken reality and engage in the slow, messy work of improving it – rather than abandoning it (and democracy) to a scorched earth authoritarian order.

Zohran Mamdani – the progressive mayor of New York City, who pulled off a remarkable grassroots campaign and embraces the city’s diverse foods, festivals and communities – is held up as a champion of this “here and now” mentality.

End Times Fascism is a thoughtful and engaging read that deftly weaves journalism into a cohesive premise about our current political condition.

The authors deserve particular praise for making careful distinctions between the distorted versions of Judeo–Christianity weaponised by fascist entrepreneurs – a blend of Holy war and culture war fought by the Chosen – and mainstream understandings of doctrine.

Indeed, as the book explains, it was longstanding Christian injunctions to love thy neighbour – including the migrant – that partially motivated Minnesota’s antifascist pushback to ICE deportations. Churches and faith organisations took part in protests, set up community kitchens and offered aid. Far-right fundamentalists, by contrast, cherry-pick the Bible passages they like, while ignoring core injunctions to “act justly, walk humbly, and love mercy” (Micah 6:8): to embrace the stranger, rather than expel them as Other.

Yet if the book represents the best of popular journalism, it also comes with its limitations. Klein and Taylor are resolutely focused on people, places and events, rather than attempting to unpack their ideologies in a more systemic way. The result is that end times fascism becomes linked to the actions of egotistical and powerful men, from politicians to tech titans. US President Donald Trump in particular is the common thread, appearing over and over again throughout.

So when Klein and Taylor suggest, at the end of the book, that end times fascism is not about Trump, and will continue when these men disappear, their claim runs against the book’s premise. Place powerful elites to one side, and end times fascism becomes difficult to envision. What does it look like when it moves off the front page and out of elite hands in everyday contexts?

Nerd Reich

In Nerd Reich, reporter Gil Durán, a longtime San Francisco resident, looks to Silicon Valley. He focuses on how “the world’s richest men are building a new political order.” Durán’s primary antagonist is Peter Thiel (who also appears in End Times Fascism), the billionaire co-founder of PayPal and Palantir: “a man fusing business, politics and religion into one terrifying bundle of power”.

For Durán and others, Thiel is the lynchpin for a new breed of Silicon Valley-driven fascism, whether concretely (through donations) or ideologically (through his books and speeches). Thiel has increasingly moved beyond the tech world to offer political diagnoses and future visions that find sympathetic ears in elite circles.

Where do these ideas come from? Durán suggests they can be traced back to the Sovereign Individual, a 1997 book of future predictions based on the transition to the information age, by former Times (UK) editor William Rees-Mogg and financial advisor James Dale Davidson. Strangely, Durán never really carries out a close reading of this book he regards as an ur-text. Instead, he chooses to highlight some key claims and its general reception.

Durán’s circle of rich fascists ranges from technologists to politicians. It includes well-known figures like Elon Musk, Vice President JD Vance and OpenAI CEO Sam Altman. But it also features lesser-known figures, like cryptocurrency entrepreneur Balaji Srinivasan, who wants Silicon Valley to carry out an “ultimate exit” from the US altogether, and venture capitalist Marc Andreessen, who elevates the acceleration of “techno-capital” and denigrates democracy.

Each of them, in their own way, has leveraged wealth from the finance and tech industry to grab political and social influence and push forward their vision of society and the state.

What exactly is fascist about these individuals and their ideas? For Durán, tech fascism “bundles powerful technologies” like AI, crypto and social media “towards authoritarian goals” that benefit a “small, interconnected group of oligarchs”. They wish to privatise what is public and “eliminate democracy”, he writes.

And yet the book lacks a deeper or more systemic unpacking of tech fascism. What are its core values? How do these technologies actually carry out authoritarian goals? And what might this mean beyond power games in a US bubble?

The closest we get to answers is two breezy paragraphs on page 240. They tell us tech fascism “updates this ideology for the AI age” by controlling “reality through algorithms” and launching the “next generation of killer robot drones”. And it’s all driven by a venture capital system that has “run out of unicorns and must now hunt Antichrists to meet its unquenchable thirst for acceleration”.

The strength and weakness of Nerd Reich, then, rests on its journalistic approach. Drawing on a decade of newsroom experience, Durán weaves in insider knowledge of Silicon Valley.

He provides a play-by-play of San Francisco City Council election manipulation, for instance, where a flood of Big Tech money aimed to flip local politics from progressive to conservative. And he serves it all up with visceral language — like “an image dripping in fascist cosplay” — that leaves no doubt as to how he views these men and their manoeuvrings.

The downside of this approach is that chapters fragment into dozens of “human interest” style vignettes, with only a gossamer-thin thread to connect them.

The reader wades through a whirlwind tour of names, dates and places. Garry Tan, CEO of venture capital incubator Y Combinator. Sam Bankman-Fried and his fraudulent FTX cryptocurrency exchange. Michelle Stephens and her Acts 17 organisation, which hosts events hoping to bridge technology and Christianity. Bryan Johnson, who believes he can live forever via products like his own bespoke “snake oil” elixir. And Curtis Yarvin, the political blogger whose illiberal ideas have found traction in Washington.

In each case, we get titbits without a deeper throughline. How exactly does a long backstory on Yarvin — including his love life and use of psychedelics — shed light on his increasingly influential ideas about remaking the state as a startup? The reader must draw their own conclusions.

Technofascism and everyday people

In both these books, the lens could be described as the Big Man – the powerful politician, swaggering tech founder, or deep-pocketed venture capitalist who can leverage their immense resources to transform their visions into fascistic realities. This cast of strong antagonists lends itself to strong storytelling — concrete people who can be pointed to and called out.

But this focus on unsavoury elites leaves some key questions unanswered. Where did these fascist energies originate? How have they been updated? What are the grievances and desires at the heart of this ideology? And how are these values packaged, narrated and circulated in ways that make them compelling to everyday people?

Today, we are surrounded by platforms, models and algorithms that hold up a vision of reason and rationality. Yet politically, we see a return to myth, bigotry and barbarism. These twin forces are not a paradox but a program. Technofascism leverages advanced technology to bolster authoritarian ideals and regressive values that carve up the world along bloodlines, gender lines and borderlines.

But how do these twin forces prop each other up? What role does the “techno” in technofascism play? I see three core functions.

Technology augments, providing a practical outworking of fascist visions by operationalising difference and domination. Palantir’s data-driven deportation partnership with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is a perfect recent example of transforming fascist ideals into a concrete program of platforms, software and servers that can be leased and run.

Secondly, technology alienates. It creates a vacuum of meaning that is filled by powerful mythologies that address grievances and reimpose order on the world. Meta-narratives like the Great Replacement Theory, suggesting non-white immigrants are replacing white populations, translate complex crises into tangible figures. Anti-immigration marches in Australia were a recent troubling example. They transformed a complex set of pressures — from rising costs of living to climate anxieties — into a powerful myth with a single scapegoat: the migrant.

Finally, technology manipulates. It creates environments that leverage desire while cultivating fascist ideologies over time. Manosphere influencers translate misogyny, insecurity and xenophobia into viral packages of content. Ex-radicals describe a pipeline effect where media played a key role in nudging them towards more right-wing stances. Eventually, they arrived at violent, dehumanising visions that can only be described as fascist.

Together, these books shed light on the fascistic energies that increasingly seem to permeate our present moment. This is not a problem for other places and times, but one that confronts us here and now.

As one scholar stressed after three decades of researching authoritarian personalities: “I study normal folks, not Nazis.” Grasping the core logic of this fascist phenomenon is the first step in combating and countering it.The Conversation

Luke Munn, Research Fellow, Digital Cultures & Societies, The University of Queensland

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The real reason the Supreme Court blocked Trump and the Postal Service

Mail voting in the 2026 midterm elections will go on as usual – now that the Trump administration’s major efforts to disrupt how Americans vote by mail have been blocked by the U.S. Supreme Court.

The U.S. Postal Service had recently implemented new rules placing unprecedented restrictions on the practice of mail voting in federal elections. State officials and voting rights organizations immediately challenged these rules, arguing that the executive agency has no authority under the U.S. Constitution to unilaterally regulate election practices.

On Sept. 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court signaled agreement with these claims, voting 7-2 to uphold a preliminary injunction blocking enforcement of the new rules that will likely remain in place through the November midterm elections.

The controversy began in March 2026, when President Donald Trump issued an executive order designed to ensure “integrity in federal elections.” The executive order — among other things — mandates that the U.S. Postal Service, or USPS, implement uniform ballot and envelope requirements for mail and absentee ballots used in federal elections.

The order also required states to provide the Postal Service, 60 days prior to Election Day, with lists of all voters eligible to vote by mail or absentee. If a ballot sent via mail didn’t comply with the USPS’ requirements, or was sent by somebody not on a state-provided list, the order instructed the USPS to not deliver the ballot, effectively canceling that vote.

Two lawsuits challenging the executive order were immediately filed in federal court, one by state officials and the other by voting rights organizations.

Their arguments were straightforward: The president does not possess unilateral authority to alter the methods of voting in federal elections. Rather, the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution vests the authority to regulate the “time, place, and manner” of federal elections in the states and, if it chooses to act, Congress.Federal judge rules against administration

The two lawsuits were heard by the same federal district court judge in Boston, who ultimately agreed with the plaintiffs and issued injunctions against the federal government. Those injunctions forbade the president and all relevant federal officials and agencies, including the USPS, from carrying out any aspects of the executive order regarding mail and absentee voting.

The lawsuit led by state officials ultimately made its way to the Supreme Court, which on Aug. 24 voted 6-3 along ideological lines in favor of the Trump administration. The court did not decide on the constitutional issues raised in the case but instead found that the states lacked the injury necessary to have standing to bring the case. The court reasoned that because the USPS had yet to implement the executive order, the states were not yet affected by it.

At the same time, the USPS began writing the rules and processes governing how it would carry out the executive order. These steps blatantly violated the remaining injunction in the voting rights organizations’ lawsuit. But the district court judge ended up dissolving that injunction on Aug. 26 in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in the other case.

That same day, the USPS officially published its new rules for mail ballots.

Widespread confusion

The USPS rules contained three key provisions.

First, states must design their ballot envelopes in accordance with USPS requirements, and the envelopes must be submitted to the USPS for final approval. Second, state and local election officials must input voters qualified to vote by mail or absentee into a USPS-run electronic portal at least 30 days before the date of a federal election. Lastly, any mailed ballot that does not adhere to the design requirements, or that is sent by somebody not on the USPS’ electronic portal, “will not be accepted” by the USPS.

These rules led to widespread confusion among election officials, who remained uncertain about how to apply them to the 2026 midterm elections. For one, the rules laid out no clear deadline for USPS approval of envelope designs. Moreover, the electronic portal’s 30-day deadline conflicted with state voter registration deadlines, with all states allowing individuals to register to vote at some point within 30 days of Election Day, and many far later.

Election officials were also left wondering how to adhere to these rules under such short notice. Some states, such as North Carolina, have already distributed mail ballots to voters. Election officials in Utah were meanwhile considering setting up their own distribution centers to bypass the USPS rules.

Following the USPS rules’ enactment, the plaintiffs from the original two lawsuits renewed their constitutional challenge, arguing that they now had standing to sue.

On Sept. 4, the federal district court issued a new preliminary injunction pausing the implementation or enforcement of the USPS rules. The court, in short, found that the USPS likely infringed upon Congress’ and the states’ Elections Clause powers.

On Sept. 6, the federal government petitioned to the U.S. Supreme Court seeking a stay – or pause – on the preliminary injunction.

In its petition, the government contended that the USPS rules do not unduly impede states’ administration of elections but rather “impose reasonable preparation requirements for certain election-related mail.” The petition elicited 20 amicus briefs, largely in opposition to the USPS, including one signed by seven Republican chief election officials detailing the impracticality of the USPS rules.

On Sept. 14, the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately voted to uphold the preliminary injunction, with Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito dissenting.

In one brief paragraph, the court stated that the federal government “is unlikely to succeed on the merits of its challenge,” suggesting that a supermajority of the court believes the USPS exceeded its constitutional authority. Given that the litigation is still ongoing in district court, though, the Supreme Court did not issue any final decision on the merits of the parties’ claims.

Practically speaking, this ruling likely settles the question of whether the USPS rules will have any impact on the midterm elections in November.

With less than two months until Election Day, and a preliminary injunction remaining in effect with the Supreme Court’s endorsement, the federal government’s hands are tied until the litigation over the issue fully plays out in the federal district court.

By the time that happens, the country may already be looking ahead toward the 2028 presidential election.The Conversation

John J. Martin, Assistant Professor of Law, Quinnipiac University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The one issue single-handedly crushing the GOP's hopes of keeping Congress

In Nate Silver’s forecast model, Democrats are more likely than not to gain control of the US federal Senate at November 3 midterm elections, and strongly favored to gain control of the House of Representatives. Donald Trump’s net approval is close to -20.

If disruption caused by the Iran war continues until the midterm elections, with increased petrol prices and inflation, Republicans are likely to lose control of both the House and the Senate, possibly with huge losses.

However, if the disruption eases again and petrol prices fall back, I believe Republicans will do better than they are now and would be favourites to retain control of the Senate.

I can say this because Trump’s net approval and the generic ballot were better for Republicans in early September, before the current fighting began.

Trump’s ratings

In analyst Nate Silver’s aggregate of US national polls, Trump’s net approval is -19.7. Currently, 58.2% disapprove of his performance and 38.5% approve.

Trump’s net approval was -20.4 in my August 12 article. It had improved to -18.7 on September 4 before falling back.

Trump’s net approval is below what any past president since Harry Truman had at this point in their term, with Trump’s first term the closest at -13.1.

On four issues tracked by Silver, Trump’s net approval is -12.2 on immigration, -26.1 on trade, -30.8 on the economy and -46.4 on inflation. Since my August 12 article, Trump’s net approval on trade and inflation have dropped 2–4 points, while his net approval on immigration has been relatively stable. His ratings on the economy had improved before another slump.

Silver also has an aggregate of US support for the Iran war. Currently, 55.7% are opposed to the Iran war while 35.6% support it, for a net support of -20.1, down slightly from -19.6 in my August 12 article.

Midterm elections on November 3

All 435 federal House of Representatives seats and 35 of the 100 senators will be up for election at November 3 midterm elections.

In 2024 elections, Republicans won the House by 220–215 over Democrats and the Senate by 53–47. Owing to Vice President JD Vance’s potential tie-breaking vote, Democrats need at least a four-seat gain to win Senate control.

I previously wrote that, owing to Republican gerrymandering, Democrats need at least a four-point margin in the generic ballot to have a good chance to win the House majority. The Senate is more skewed to Republicans as every state has two senators. Democrats need a double-digit margin in the generic ballot to win the Senate on a uniform swing.

In Silver’s midterm election forecast model, the generic ballot gives Democrats a 50.8–42.7 lead over Republicans, an 8.2-point margin (8.1 points in my August 12 article). Democrats’ lead had dropped to 7.4 points on September 4.

Polls that screen for likely voters usually give Democrats larger leads than polls that ask registered voters. Democrats are more likely to vote at lower turnout elections like the midterms than Republicans, when Trump is not on the ballot.

Silver’s model gives Democrats a 57% chance to win the Senate and an 86% chance to win the House, the same chances as on August 12. Democratic chances to win the Senate had fallen to a low of 50% on September 7, and their chances of winning the House had dropped to 81% on September 3.

While uniform swing indicates that Democrats need a double-digit margin in the generic ballot to win control of the Senate, Silver’s model has Democrats as the favourites to win with a 6–7 point margin in the generic ballot. In the House, Democrats are favourites if they win by 3–4 points.

Democrats have effectively gained a House seat in Missouri after courts annulled a Republican gerrymander. That gerrymander had given Republicans a 7–1 advantage from Missouri’s eight House districts, but Republicans now only have a 6–2 advantage.

Democrats have leads of one to four points in Senate contests in Texas, Ohio and Alaska and are tied at 45.8% each with Republicans in Iowa. Trump won all these states by double-digit margins in 2024. This explains why Democrats are the slight favourites to gain control of the Senate.

In Democratic-held Michigan, left-wing Democrat Abdul El-Sayed trailed Republican Mike Rogers by 1.6 points in my August 12 article, but he now leads by 2.9 points.

The two key items that could go wrong for Democrats are a markedly improved economy by November for most Americans – not just the stock market – and a systematic error in which Republicans overperform the polls.

Economic data

The US August jobs report (released September 4) was good news for Trump. In the establishment survey, 162,000 jobs were added, and June and July numbers were revised up a combined 55,000, turning July from 23,000 jobs lost to 21,000 gained.

In the household survey, the unemployment rate was unchanged since July at 4.1%, but both the participation rate and employment population ratio were up 0.2%, to 61.6% and 59.1% respectively. In July, the employment population ratio had dropped to its lowest since September 2021.

While August was an improvement, the US employment population ratio is still far lower than in Australia, where it was 63.9% in July.

In the August inflation report (released last Friday), overall inflation increased 0.4% and core inflation increased 0.3%, compared with 0.1% and 0.2% increases respectively in July. Annual inflation rates were respectively 3.4% and 2.4%.

Real hourly wages decreased 0.1% in August, but real weekly wages were up 0.2% owing to an increase in weekly hours. In the last year, real hourly wages are down 0.3%, but real weekly wages are up 0.3%.

July was the first month since January where personal income exceeded expenditure, mainly due to a drop in expenditure. The personal savings rate increased 0.3% since June to 3.0% after falling in every month from February to June.

The benchmark US S&P stock market index was up 0.9% in last Friday’s session, breaking a run of four straight losing sessions. The S&P is down 1.8% from its August 13 peak, but up 10.2% from its peak in the week before the Iran war began in late February. It’s up 16.2% from its worst point in the Iran war in late March.The Conversation

Adrian Beaumont, Election Analyst (Psephologist) at The Conversation; and Honorary Associate, School of Mathematics and Statistics, The University of Melbourne

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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