Ross Tuttle

Officials in Gitmo Trials Not Even Pretending to be Impartial

On March 27th, Lieut. Cmdr. Brian Mizer, defense attorney in the office of military commissions, filed a motion to dismiss charges against his client Salim Hamdan, the alleged chauffeur of Osama bin Laden, who has been detained at Guantánamo since 2002. In his motion, Mizer alleges unlawful interference in the affairs of the defense and prosecution by political appointees within the Pentagon and by the office of Susan Crawford, the convening authority.

Hamdan has been at the center of several pivotal developments within the military commissions process -- most notably as named plaintiff in the Supreme Court case (Hamdan v. Rumsfeld) that upended the previous incarnation of the tribunals. His case is slated to be tried this summer, one of the first under the new system developed by the Military Commissions Act of 2006. But this latest motion could result in yet another stinging setback for an administration desperate for victories in a maligned process that has seen only one case resolved in six years.

Central to Mizer's claim is a piece of evidence suggesting that Crawford's legal adviser, Brig. Gen. Thomas Hartmann, is so ensconced in the prosecution that he has become the de facto chief prosecutor -- a highly improper role according to observers, participants and the Military Commissions Act itself.

"The convening authority is supposed to be this quasi-neutral, quasi-judicial functionary who chooses the jury that hears Hamdan's case and others," says Mizer. "So if that person has become a partisan, you essentially have the prosecutor picking the jury, and that's simply unfair."

In addition to selecting the jury, the convening authority (Crawford) must also review the charges, refer them to trial, approve allocations for expert witnesses and serve as the first stop in the appeals process -- roles that all require neutrality. By extension, the convening authority's adviser (Hartmann) must also be impartial.

Mizer's motion draws heavily on familiar claims made by the former chief prosecutor, Col. Morris Davis, who resigned last October, complaining of the use of coerced testimony and political pressure to try "sexy" cases in the run-up to the 2008 elections. Davis had singled out Crawford, Hartmann and former Pentagon general counsel William Haynes, who has since resigned, for interfering in the process or applying political pressure. Davis, who has also submitted his resignation to the Air Force, has agreed to testify as a witness for the defense at Hamdan's April pretrial hearing.

Mizer's motion also introduces new evidence to corroborate Davis's account -- chiefly an e-mail that deputy chief defense counsel Mike Berrigan inadvertently received on January 29th. The e-mail was titled "9-11 Draft Charges-25 Jan," and it came with an attachment of the draft charges against the six high-value detainees alleged to have participated in the 9/11 plot. That a defense attorney received these charges in draft form two weeks before charges were announced was unusual enough, but the source of the message was even more surprising. It had come from Wendy Kelly, chief of staff in the office of the convening authority.

"What that e-mail shows is who's drafting the charges," says Mizer. "It's not the prosecutor, which is intended to be an independent office according to Congress. It's the convening authority."

Two weeks later, when Hartmann announced the charges, he opened his remarks by stating, "Today, the convening authority for military commissions received sworn charges against six individuals alleged to be responsible for the planning and execution of the attacks upon the United States of America, which occurred on September the 11th, 2001."

"It's an outright fraud," says Mizer. "The convening authority is supposed to receive the charges from the prosecutor and make an independent assessment on whether or not this goes forward. General Hartmann didn't just receive those charges; they'd been circulating in his office a full two weeks before he held that press conference."

After Berrigan received the e-mail with the draft charges, he notified the sender, asking whether she had meant to send it to him. The convening authority's office then asked for the immediate return of the charges. But when Berrigan refused, recognizing that the e-mail could be evidence of unlawful influence, Hartmann sent what Mizer called an implicitly threatening letter to chief defense counsel Steven David.

"He [Hartmann] said something like, 'I went to the ethics advice committee in the Navy, Marine Corps and Army, and they said you had no ethical basis to hold this document,'" recounted Mizer. "It's this implicit threat that what you've done is outside of the scope of ethical conduct of an attorney and you need to turn this over. And then he [Hartmann] said, 'I don't know what state you're licensed in, but I'm sure it's unethical there too.'"

To Mizer, this also qualified as unlawful influence -- in that it was an attempt to "coerce" defense counsel.

According to scholars, unlawful command influence has frequently been called the mortal enemy of military justice. One way to protect against it is to mandate an independent defense and prosecution. Indeed, when two of the Military Commissions Act's authors, John McCain and Lindsey Graham, asked Davis what he would need in order to do his job as chief prosecutor, Davis said unequivocally: independence.

As a result, the authors included in the act relevant language that Davis himself wrote. Section 949b(2)c states, "No person may attempt to coerce or, by any unauthorized means, influence the exercise of professional judgment by trial [prosecution] counsel or defense counsel."

It is this rule that Hartmann appears to be flouting; at times, he seems to be celebrating his prosecutorial participation. During a February 22 NPR interview he boasted, "Colonel Davis was part of the process for two years. In that period he was able to get two cases sworn and charged. In the period of time since he's left, just four months, we've charged ten new cases."

"He's not even concealing the fact ... He's making open comparisons to his role and that of the chief prosecutor," says Mizer.

According to legal experts, therein lies the problem. Hartmann likely feels no compunction to conceal his role of "supervising the prosecution" because his appointing orders, signed in October 2007 by Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England, authorize him to do so. Despite language in that document requesting that he maintain the ability to "objectively and independently provide cogent legal advice" to the convening authority, the order leaves room for selective interpretation -- and to some, the dual orders are actually irreconcilable.

"This arrangement is rife with conflicts of interest," says Eugene Fidell, who teaches military law at Yale Law School and Washington College of Law. According to Fidell, the Military Commissions Act stresses the "exercise of professional judgment," but such neutrality would be eviscerated if England "can insert the legal adviser as a substantive supervisor to the ... chief prosecutor."

"It makes for an un-impartial convening authority and an un-independent prosecutor," says Fidell. "I rather doubt that's what Congress had in mind."

To Fidell, the problems are structural, and the revelations in Mizer's motion bear that out. "The convening authority performs a quasi-judicial function," he says. "And the convening authority and legal adviser are apparently reviewing charges before they're filed? That's not how judges work."

The prosecution has until April 11th to respond to the motion, though it has already signaled opposition. If Mizer is unsuccessful at getting a dismissal, he will then seek to have Crawford and Hartmann disqualified from further participation in the Hamdan case.

"I think he [Hartmann] has a misconception of what the role of legal adviser is in the military commissions process -- someone that's supposed to neutrally evaluate the evidence and decide if someone is supposed to go face trial in front of military commission," says Mizer. "Our motion is that he's become the de facto chief prosecutor and that he has to be recused."

Gitmo Trials Rigged from the Start

Secret evidence. Denial of habeas corpus. Evidence obtained by waterboarding. Indefinite detention. The litany of complaints about the legal treatment of prisoners at Guantánamo Bay is long, disturbing and by now familiar. Nonetheless, a new wave of shock and criticism greeted the Pentagon's announcement on February 11 that it was charging six Guantánamo detainees, including alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, with war crimes -- and seeking the death penalty for all of them.

As the murky, quasi-legal staging of the Bush Administration's military commissions unfolds, a key official has told The Nation that the trials are rigged from the start. According to Col. Morris Davis, former chief prosecutor for Guantánamo's military commissions, the process has been manipulated by Administration appointees in an attempt to foreclose the possibility of acquittal.

Colonel Davis's criticism of the commissions has been escalating since he resigned this past October, telling the
Washington Post that he had been pressured by politically appointed senior defense officials to pursue cases deemed "sexy" and of "high-interest" (such as the 9/11 cases now being pursued) in the run-up to the 2008 elections. Davis, once a staunch defender of the commissions process, elaborated on his reasons in a December 10, 2007, Los Angeles Times op-ed. "I concluded that full, fair and open trials were not possible under the current system," he wrote. "I felt that the system had become deeply politicized and that I could no longer do my job effectively."

Then, in an interview with The Nation in February after the six Guantánamo detainees were charged, Davis offered the most damning evidence of the military commissions' bias -- a revelation that speaks to fundamental flaws in the Bush Administration's conduct of statecraft: its contempt for the rule of law and its pursuit of political objectives above all else.

When asked if he thought the men at Guantánamo could receive a fair trial, Davis provided the following account of an August 2005 meeting he had with Pentagon general counsel William Haynes -- the man who now oversees the tribunal process for the Defense Department. "[Haynes] said these trials will be the Nuremberg of our time," recalled Davis, referring to the Nazi tribunals in 1945, considered the model of procedural rights in the prosecution of war crimes. In response, Davis said he noted that at Nuremberg there had been some acquittals, something that had lent great credibility to the proceedings.

"I said to him that if we come up short and there are some acquittals in our cases, it will at least validate the process," Davis continued. "At which point, [Haynes's] eyes got wide and he said, 'Wait a minute, we can't have acquittals. If we've been holding these guys for so long, how can we explain letting them get off? We can't have acquittals, we've got to have convictions.'"

Davis submitted his resignation on October 4, 2007, just hours after he was informed that Haynes had been put above him in the commissions' chain of command. "Everyone has opinions," Davis says. "But when he was put above me, his opinions became orders."

(Reached for comment, Defense Department spokesperson Cynthia Smith said, "The Department of Defense disputes the assertions made by Colonel Davis in this statement regarding acquittals.")

"That he said there can be no acquittals will stain the entire [tribunal] process," says Scott Horton, who teaches law at Columbia University Law School and who has written extensively about Haynes's conflicts with the Judge Advocate General's (JAG) corps, the judicial arm of the Armed Forces, which is charged with implementing the military commissions. According to Horton, Haynes tried to cut the JAG corps out of internal debates over the detention and prosecution of detainees, knowing it was critical of the Administration's views. In private memos and in public Senate testimony, high-ranking officers of the corps have repeatedly expressed concerns about the Administration's advocacy of "extreme interrogation techniques."

"The JAG corps consists of a group of rigorous professionals, but Haynes never trusted them to do their job," says Horton. "His clashes have always had the same subtext -- they want to be independent, he wants them to do political dirty-work."

Haynes, a political appointee and chief legal adviser to Defense secretaries Donald Rumsfeld and Robert Gates, was nominated in 2006 by the Bush Administration for a lifetime seat as a judge in the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. But his nomination never got out of committee, primarily because of the opposition of Republican Senator (and former military lawyer) Lindsey Graham and other members alarmed over Haynes's role in writing or supervising the writing of Pentagon memos advocating the use of harsh interrogation techniques the Geneva Conventions classify as torture.

Currently, in his capacity as Pentagon general counsel, Haynes oversees both the prosecution and the defense for the commissions. "You would think a person in that position wouldn't be favoring one side," says Colonel Davis.

Told of Davis's story about Haynes, Clive Stafford Smith, a defense attorney who has represented more than seventy Guantánamo clients, said, "Hearing it makes me think I'm back in Mississippi representing a black man in front of an all-white jury."

He adds, "It confirms what people close to the system have always said," noting that when three prosecutors -- Maj. Robert Preston, Capt. John Carr and Capt. Carrie Wolf -- requested to be transferred out of the Office of Military Commissions in 2004, they claimed they'd been told the process was rigged. In an e-mail to his supervisors, Preston had said that there was thin evidence against the accused. "But they were told by the chief prosecutor at the time that they didn't need evidence to get convictions," says Stafford Smith.

At the time, the military wrote it off as "miscommunication" and "personality conflicts." And then there were changes in personnel. "They told us that the system had been cleaned up … but I guess the more things change, the more they stay the same," says Stafford Smith.

The terrible irony is that even if acquittals were possible, the government has declared that it can continue to detain anyone deemed an "enemy combatant" for the duration of hostilities--no matter the outcome of a trial. And most of the 275 men held at Guantánamo are classified as "enemy combatants" while the hostilities in the "war on terror" could be never-ending.

Says ACLU staff attorney Ben Wizner, "The trial doesn't make a difference. They can hold you there forever until they decide to let you out." The one person to be released from Guantánamo through the judicial process, Australian David Hicks, pleaded guilty. As Wizner wrote in the Los Angeles Times in April 2007, "In an ordinary justice system, the accused must be acquitted to be released. In Guantánamo, the accused must plead guilty to be released."

Still, the trials serve a purpose for the government, in providing the semblance of a legitimate judicial process. According to defense attorneys involved -- and many of the former prosecutors, like Davis -- the process is political, not legal.

"If someone was acquitted, then it would suggest we did the wrong thing in the first place. That can't happen," says Horton sardonically. "When the government decides to clear someone, it calls the person 'no-longer an enemy combatant' instead of just saying they made a mistake."

He adds, "For people like Haynes, justice is meant to serve the party."

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