Barbara Leonard

Supreme Court Rules that Inmate with Above-the-Cutoff IQ Can Still Be Too Impaired to Execute

WASHINGTON (CN) - By creating an IQ cutoff at 70, Florida "creates an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability will be executed," the U.S. Supreme Court ruled Tuesday.
     "Intellectual disability is a condition, not a number," Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote for the divided court. "Courts must recognize, as does the medical community, that the IQ test is imprecise."
     The explosive finding comes in the case of Freddie Lee Hall, who has been in prison since his 1981 conviction on the murder three years earlier of Karol Hurst, a pregnant, 21-year-old newlywed.
     He was sentenced and resentenced to death, even after the trial court found him mentally retarded as a mitigating factor.
     Those findings by the sentencing court noted that Hall had been raised "under the most horrible family circumstances imaginable."
     He had been the 16th of 17 children born to a woman who once tied him in a sack, swung him over a fire and beat him, the court found.
     Hall's mother also buried him as a boy in the sand up to his neck to "strengthen his legs;" and she beat him while he was tied naked to a ceiling beam.
     In addition to regularly locking Hall in a smokehouse, the mother held a gun on Hall while poking him with sticks, and starved him to prepare for "the famine."
     The Florida Supreme Court nevertheless affirmed that the Hall's "serious mental difficulties" did not render him incompetent at the resentencing hearings. That ruling noted Hall "is probably somewhat retarded."
     Hall tried again when the U.S. Supreme Court prohibited states from executing the mentally impaired with the 2002 case Atkins v. Virginia.
     Though that decision deemed such executions cruel and unusual, the court tasked the states with developing a means of enforcing the new restriction.
     Hall presented evidence of literacy problems and three IQ tests on which he scored a 73, an 80 and a 71.
     Since Florida law defines intellectual disability to require an IQ test score of 70 or less, however, the court determined that Hall could not establish mental retardation.
     The divided Florida Supreme Court affirmed denial in 2012, finding "that there is competent, substantial evidence to support the court's finding that Hall is not mentally retarded."
     Justice James Perry complained in dissent that application of Florida's IQ standard here "reaches an absurd result."
     "Hall is a poster child for mental retardation claims because the record here clearly demonstrates that Hall is mentally retarded," Perry wrote. "The fact that our statutory standard does not agree only serves to illustrate a flaw in the statute."
     Perry quoted previous findings of Hall's IQ of 60, brain damage, chronic psychosis, speech impediment, learning disability, functional illiteracy and the short-term memory of a first grader.
     The U.S. Supreme Court granted Hall a writ of certiorari late last year and found Florida's rule unconstitutional, 5-4, Tuesday.
     "No legitimate penological purpose is served by executing a person with intellectual disability," the 22-page opinion states. "To do so contravenes the Eighth Amendment, for to impose the harshest of punishments on an intellectually disabled person violates his or her inherent dignity as a human being."
     Florida's statute does not comport with Atkins because "the Florida Supreme Court has interpreted the provisions more narrowly," the ruling states.
     Pursuant to the mandatory cutoff for those with test scores higher than 70, "sentencing courts cannot consider even substantial and weighty evidence of intellectual disability as measured and made manifest by the defendant's failure or inability to adapt to his social and cultural environment, including medical histories, behavioral records, school tests and reports, and testimony regarding past behavior and family circumstances," Kennedy wrote. "This is so even though the medical community accepts that all of this evidence can be probative of intellectual disability, including for individuals who have an IQ test score above 70.
     "Florida's rule disregards established medical practice in two interrelated ways," Kennedy continued. "It takes an IQ score as final and conclusive evidence of a defendant's intellectual capacity, when experts in the field would consider other evidence. It also relies on a purportedly scientific measurement of the defendant's abilities, his IQ score, while refusing to recognize that the score is, on its own terms, imprecise."
     Even the professionals who design, administer and interpret the exams have long said "that IQ test scores should be read not as a single fixed number but as a range," according to the ruling.
     Most states comply with Atkins by taking the "standard error of measurement" or SEM, of an IQ test into account, the court found.
     "Every state legislature to have considered the issue after Atkins - save Virginia's - and whose law has been interpreted by its courts has taken a position contrary to that of Florida," Kennedy emphasized. "Indeed, the Florida Legislature, which passed the relevant legislation prior to Atkins, might well have believed that its law would not create a fixed cutoff at 70. The staff analysis accompanying the 2001 bill states that it 'does not contain a set IQ level ... Two standard deviations from these tests is approximately a 70 IQ, although it can be extended up to 75.' But the Florida Supreme Court interpreted the law to require a bright-line cutoff at 70, and the court is bound by that interpretation
     "The rejection of the strict 70 cutoff in the vast majority of states and the 'consistency in the trend,' toward recognizing the SEM provide strong evidence of consensus that our society does not regard this strict cutoff as proper or humane."
     States moreover do not have "complete autonomy" in defining intellectual disability as that would make Atkins "a nullity," Kennedy added.
     "By failing to take into account the SEM and setting a strict cutoff at 70, Florida 'goes against the unanimous professional consensus,'" Kennedy wrote, quoting a brief from the American Physicians Association. "Neither Florida nor its amici point to a single medical professional who supports this cutoff. The DSM-5 repudiates it: 'IQ test scores are approximations of conceptual functioning but may be insufficient to assess reasoning in real-life situations and mastery of practical tasks.' This statement well captures the court's independent assessment that an individual with an IQ test score 'between 70 and 75 or lower,' may show intellectual disability by presenting additional evidence regarding difficulties in adaptive functioning."
     Kennedy concluded with a call for Hall to present evidence of deficits in adaptive functioning over his lifetime.
     "The death penalty is the gravest sentence our society may impose," he wrote. "Persons facing that most severe sanction must have a fair opportunity to show that the Constitution prohibits their execution. Florida's law contravenes our nation's commitment to dignity and its duty to teach human decency as the mark of a civilized world. The states are laboratories for experimentation, but those experiments may not deny the basic dignity the Constitution protects."

In Another Blow to Separation of Church and State, Supreme Court Rules Town Can Begin Meetings with a Prayer

WASHINGTON (CN) - Town officials from upstate New York did not improperly favor Christianity by starting meetings with a short prayer, the Supreme Court ruled Monday.
     The case stems from the decision by officials in Greece, N.Y., to replace a moment of silence with a short prayer when open monthly Town Board meetings.
     Town Supervisor John Auberger, who typically would call the monthly meeting to order, added the invocation in 1999. At each meeting, he would have the town clerk call the roll of board members, lead the assemblage in the Pledge of Allegiance, and then would invite the "chaplain of the month" to offer a prayer.
     Two Greece residents, Susan Galloway and Linda Stephens, criticized the practice in 2007, saying the prayers aligned the town with Christianity since Christian clergy members most often were invited to participate. They also said the prayers that were offered were sectarian rather than secular.
     After the town responded that anyone could volunteer to deliver the invocation, a Wiccan priestess, a lay Jewish man and the chairman of the local Baha'i congregation were invited to offer a prayer.
     Up until then, though, the majority of prayer-givers were Christian clergy members whose names were on an internally developed list gleaned from the Greece Chamber of Commerce's "Community Guide."
     Galloway and Stephens filed a federal complaint in 2008, claiming that the town's "chaplain of the month" list unconstitutionally preferred Christianity over other faiths, and that the prayer practice was impermissibly sectarian.
     Because the prayers were aligned with Christianity, the women said that the practice established a particular religion in violation of the Constitution. And because the language used in the prayers was unique to a specific religious sect, they claimed that it established religion generally.
     U.S. District Judge Charles Siragusa in Rochester ruled for the town after finding no evidence that Town Hall employees had compiled the list of prospective prayer-givers with the intent of excluding representatives of particular faiths. Citing U.S. Supreme Court precedent, Siragusa also held that the establishment clause does not exclude denominational prayers, which can add solemnity to governance.
     In reversing last year, the 2nd Circuit highlighted the claim that Greece's prayer practice had the unintended effect of establishing religion.
     Citing its 1983 decision in Marsh v. Chambers, a five-justice plurality of the Supreme Court, split along the usual party lines, reversed Monday.
     "From the earliest days of the nation, these invocations have been addressed to assemblies comprising many different creeds," according to the lead opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy. "These ceremonial prayers strive for the idea that people of many faiths may be united in a community of tolerance and devotion. Even those who disagree as to religious doctrine may find common ground in the desire to show respect for the divine in all aspects of their lives and being. Our tradition assumes that adult citizens, firm in their own beliefs, can tolerate and perhaps appreciate a ceremonial prayer delivered by a person of a different faith.
     "The prayers delivered in the town of Greece do not fall outside the tradition this court has recognized. A number of the prayers did invoke the name of Jesus, the Heavenly Father, or the Holy Spirit, but they also invoked universal themes, as by celebrating the changing of the seasons or calling for a 'spirit of cooperation' among town leaders."
     While Chief Justice John Roberts joined the opinion in full along with Justice Samuel Alito, Justices Kennedy, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas did not join in a section of the 24-page decision that said Greece's prayer "has a permissible ceremonial purpose."
     In an eight-page opinion concurring in apart and concurring in the judgment, Justice Clarence Thomas reiterated his "view that the establishment clause is 'best understood as a federalism provision.'"
     Scalia joined that opinion, as well as a separate 13-page opinion by Alito.
     "Not only is there no historical support for the proposition that only generic prayer is allowed, but as our country has become more diverse, composing a prayer that is acceptable to all members of the community who hold religious beliefs has become harder and harder," Alito wrote. "It was one thing to compose a prayer that is acceptable to both Christians and Jews; it is much harder to compose a prayer that is also acceptable to followers of Eastern religions that are now well represented in this country. Many local clergy may find the project daunting, if not impossible, and some may feel that they cannot in good faith deliver such a vague prayer.
     "In addition, if a town attempts to go beyond simply recommending that a guest chaplain deliver a prayer that is broadly acceptable to all members of a particular community (and the groups represented in different communities will vary), the town will inevitably encounter sensitive problems. Must a town screen and, if necessary, edit prayers before they are given? If prescreening is not required, must the town review prayers after they are delivered in order to determine if they were sufficiently generic? And if a guest chaplain crosses the line, what must the town do? Must the chaplain be corrected on the spot? Must the town strike this chaplain (and perhaps his or her house of worship) from the approved list?" (Parentheses and emphasis in original.)
     Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a six-page dissent and joined a 25-page dissent by Justice Elena Kagan.
     "I conclude, like Justice Kagan, that the town of Greece failed to make reasonable efforts to include prayer givers of minority faiths, with the result that, although it is a community of several faiths, its prayer givers were almost exclusively persons of a single faith," Breyer wrote.
     Kagan, joined also by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor said Greece's prayer practices violates "that norm of religious equality - the breathtakingly generous constitutional idea that our public institutions belong no less to the Buddhist or Hindu than to the Methodist or Episcopalian."
     "I do not contend that principle translates here into a bright separationist line. To the contrary, I agree with the court's decision in Marsh v. Chambers, upholding the Nebraska Legislature's tradition of beginning each session with a chaplain's prayer. And I believe that pluralism and inclusion in a town hall can satisfy the constitutional requirement of neutrality; such a forum need not become a religion-free zone. But still, the town of Greece should lose this case. The practice at issue here differs from the one sustained in Marshbecause Greece's town meetings involve participation by ordinary citizens, and the invocations given - directly to those citizens - were predominantly sectarian in content. Still more, Greece's board did nothing to recognize religious diversity: In arranging for clergy members to open each meeting, the town never sought (except briefly when this suit was filed) to involve, accommodate, or in any way reach out to adherents of non-Christian religions. So month in and month out for over a decade, prayers steeped in only one faith, addressed toward members of the public, commenced meetings to discuss local affairs and distribute government benefits. In my view, that practice does not square with the First Amendment's promise that every citizen, irrespective of her religion, owns an equal share in her government." 

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