The Country That Refuses to Bow Down to Western Bankers
Mario Seccareccia, a professor of economics at the University of Ottawa, has been outspoken in his warnings that austerity policies have the potential to smash economies and spread human misery. In his work supported by the Institute for New Economic Thinking and elsewhere, he has challenged deficit hawks and emphasized the need for strong government investment in things like jobs, education, healthcare, and infrastructure if economies are to prosper. In the following interview, he talks about why what happened to Greece was entirely predictable, why the Greeks were right to reject austerity in the recent election, and what challenges the country faces in forging a sustainable path forward with the left-wing Syriza party at the helm.
Lynn Parramore: You have long been warning of problems in the Eurozone. What do the Greek elections mean to the debate about austerity and how it impacts economies?
Mario Seccareccia: I actually began warning about problems in the Eurozone even before they launched the Euro in 1999! A couple of years after the adoption, in 1992, of the Maastricht Treaty, which was the initial step in the creation the European Economic and Monetary Union or the Eurozone, I happened to be in Paris for the launch of a book that I had co-edited in French titled Les Pièges de l’Austérité (The Austerity Traps) that had been published in November 1993.
During the discussions, a number of us were already raising very serious questions about a treaty which prevented national governments from doing what they needed to do to stabilize their economies — namely engage in needed deficit spending, regardless of the magnitude, during times of recession for the purpose of stabilizing income and employment. Some of us at the book launch warned of problems that could arise from a European supranational currency and a central bank which was not accountable to any national authority and which would push countries merely to become hostages to the whims of the financial markets. Along with many others, I’ve also raised concerns over what economists call “deflationary bias” in the structure of the Eurozone — that is, the tendency for policies to focus on lower inflation instead of more jobs and growth and to prevent greater public spending as a means to achieve growth.
I could see that Greece would be the country that would be hit first by these problems because it is financially the weakest link in the euro chain, and because of the high public debt ratio when it joined the Eurozone in 2002. What is surprising is that it took until 2010 to reach such a crisis even though the warnings had been there for a long time. Even at the start of the global financial crisis in 2008-2009, most European governments started stimulating their economies or bailing out their banks as we saw in Ireland and Spain. But no major cracks appeared until the end of 2009 when the financial markets got spooked because the Greek authorities were found hiding Greek sovereign debt with the aid of advisors of financial institutions.
From 2010 onwards, Greece achieved notoriety because financial markets recognized that the country might decide not to comply with the terms of loan agreements with banks. Eventually in 2012, European leaders held a summit at the French resort of Deauville and agreed that if the private holders of sovereign debt wanted bailouts, they would be held responsible for the losses. Because of these developments since 2010, deficit hawks everywhere vilified Greece for all the supposed terrible consequences of government over-indebtedness, even though the structure of the Eurozone made it impossible for Greece to manage its economy effectively.
Deficit hawks started preaching long-term austerity, and we’ve seen the awful consequences ever since. People have suffered terrible hardship and dislocation, with countries such as Greece and Spain reaching rates of unemployment worse that what happened in the United States in depth of the Great Depression. You’d be hard-pressed to find examples of such a severe collapse historically, with the possible exception of certain Latin American countries, such as Argentina in 2001. Those who predicted that that this austerity policy would eventually lead to an economic turnaround because of the belief in private sector rebound obviously got it wrong. After five years of negative economic growth, the Greek electorate — with incredible courage — told the so-called Troika that they had had enough, especially with these deep cuts in wages, employment, and pension transfers.
LP: How have the news media and the pundits gotten the story of Greece’s economy wrong?
MS: Ever since the end of 2009 when the story of Greece’s sovereign debt crisis began to unfold, austerity-pushing political leaders around the world have been saying that their country must not become the “next Greece.” Together with much of the international media, they have been perpetuating the view that government deficits are bad and that governments must seek balanced budgets, even if it means some necessary “temporary” hardship. Yet, the experience of the 1930s, which is being repeated with such vengeance in the Eurozone since 2010, is that pursuing austerity policies alone without some other outside stimulus, say, from increased net exports, can’t lead to balanced budgets. Instead, it leads to disaster. These policies destabilize the private sector to such an extent that they actually jeopardize chances of any future recovery. Many Greek citizens felt that they had reached this threshold and wanted a reversal of policy.
LP: Tsipras has promised to reverse some tax hikes and cuts to social services, but Greece is still in the Eurozone. Because, as you mention, it doesn’t have control of its own currency, the Greeks will have to negotiate with the so-called Troika of the European Union, IMF and the European Central Bank. Do you think there is a possibility for meaningful changes given this challenge? And how might internal Greek political problems, especially with Tsipras' possible coalition partners, affect the situation?
MS: This is the “million euro” question: how can the Greek state invest in its economy while still remaining in the Eurozone? Syriza faces a huge challenge politically since the pro-austerity parties in Greece, i.e. New Democracy, LAOS, PASOK, Democratic Left, KIDISO, and POTAMI, still constitute a fairly large block of the vote and the majority of the electorate would seemingly still prefer to remain in the Eurozone. Since it doesn’t have a mandate to take Greece out of the Eurozone, what other options are available?
We have seen already how Germany has warned the new Greek government that it must live up to commitments to its creditors, and with Greece's current bailout program ending in February it will have little breathing room. There may well be a willingness to give the Greek government more time to make its debt payments, but the present Troika seems rather uninterested in outright debt cancellation, even if there may be some desire to negotiate some smaller changes, like the creation of a distinct Eurozone-wide public investment fund which might do things like build and repair roads or support clean energy projects and generate sufficient overall growth, especially in the rest of Eurozone, to perhaps spill over into Greece and turn around its current account balance and also raise government revenues.
All of this means negotiations with many partners that will take time for the present coalition government. On the other hand, the Greeks could get some short-term relief with the depreciating euro in terms of increased net exports for all countries of the Eurozone. Also in the short term, there is the European Central Bank’s commitment to do quantitative easing, or pumping new money into the economy. I have argued that quantitative easing doesn’t work to stimulate private sector spending, but it might help backstop what would have been an eventual financial collapse of a number of Eurozone countries. A lot depends on how big the European Central Bank is willing to go with its plans. If the action was bold enough, Greek banks could benefit indirectly and it could give the Greek government some breathing room and prevent a default, assuming its current creditors demand payment. In the medium term, Greece could create some form of parallel currency set at par with the euro, like Argentina did in the early 2000s. The government in Argentina used “patacones” to buy things and pay employees and they became quite acceptable because ultimately regular people could pay taxes with this currency. The Greeks could have a parallel national currency without altogether abandoning the euro.
So these various short-to-medium-term measures may well be available to prevent default, but, at the end, if the Greek government cannot renegotiate its crushing debt burden — without some form of debt forgiveness in however form it will be disguised — you could see a Greek default happen. If it reaches that point, I don’t think there’s anything in the Eurozone treaties that would prevent Greece from retaining the euro. In this case, it will have to learn from the experiences of dollarized countries such as Ecuador that have been surviving under very severe constraints on fiscal policy but without the oil revenues that until recent times have served well to replenish Ecuador’s coffers.
LP: Lots of countries, like Italy, Spain, Portugal, and maybe even France, are getting close to the distressed economic conditions of Greece. How will a Syriza government in Greece impact them? How do you think those governments will relate to Germany after the election?
MS: I believe that this will give a huge boost to those anti-austerity parties, especially in southern Europe, that are in a similar situation to Greece. That’s going to put further pressure on Germany to accommodate. But it will also boost the support of the nationalist right-wing anti-euro parties, as in France. If all these parties manage to achieve power, it may well be either that the Eurozone countries establish ways for countries to have more latitude in taking action to stabilize their economies.
If some of the right-wing parties come to power, such as the National Front in France, it will mean the end of the euro. The withdrawal of a core country such as France from the Eurozone could lead to currency realignments at the regional levels, without any chances for the survival of the entire Euro bloc.
LP: Do you think there are lessons in what has happened in the Eurozone for students of economics and the way the subject is taught?
MS: Yes, indeed. Ever since the establishment of the modern nation-state in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the creation of the euro was perhaps the first significant experiment in modern times in which there was an attempt to separate money from the state, that is, to denationalize currency, as some right-wing ideologues and founders of modern neoliberalism, such as Friedrich von Hayek, had defended. What the Eurozone crisis teaches is that this perception of how the monetary system works is quite wrong, because, in times of crisis, the democratic state must be able to spend money in order to meet its obligations to its citizens. The denationalization or “supra-nationalization” of money with the establishment that happened in the Eurozone took away from elected national governments the capacity to meaningfully manage their economies. Unless governments in the Eurozone are able to renegotiate a significant control and access money from their own central banks, the system will be continually plagued with crisis and will probably collapse.

In Italy, A Bold New Populist Plan Led By a Comedian Fires Up a Country
Comedian Beppe Grillo was surprised himself when his Five Star Movement got 8.7 million votes in the Italian general election of February 24-25th. His movement is now the biggest single party in the chamber of deputies, says The Guardian, which makes him “a kingmaker in a hung parliament.”
Grillo’s is the party of “no.” In a candidacy based on satire, he organized an annual "V‑Day Celebration," the "V" standing for vaffanculo (“f—k off"). He rejects the status quo—all the existing parties and their monopoly control of politics, jobs, and financing—and seeks a referendum on all international treaties, including NATO membership, free trade agreements and the Euro.
"If we get into parliament,” says Grillo, “we would bring the old system down, not because we would enjoy doing so but because the system is rotten." Critics fear, and supporters hope, that if his party succeeds, it could break the Euro system.
But being against everything, says Mike Whitney in Counterpunch, is not a platform:
"To govern, one needs ideas and a strategy for implementing those ideas. Grillo’s team has neither. They are defined more in terms of the things they are against than things they are for. It’s fine to want to “throw the bums out”, but that won’t put people back to work or boost growth or end the slump. Without a coherent plan to govern, M5S could end up in the political trash heap, along with their right-wing predecessors, the Tea Party."
Steve Colatrella, who lives in Italy and also has an article in Counterpunch on the Grillo phenomenon, has a different take on the surprise win. He says Grillo does have a platform of positive proposals. Besides rejecting all the existing parties and treaties, Grillo’s program includes the following:
It is a platform that could actually work. Austerity has been tested for a decade in the Eurozone and has failed, while the proposals in Grillo’s plan have been tested in other countries and have succeeded.
Default: Lessons from Iceland and South America
Default on the public debt has been pulled off quite successfully in Iceland, Argentina, Ecuador, and Russia, among other countries. Whitney cites a clip from Grillo’s blog suggesting that this is also the way out for Italy:
The public debt has not been growing in recent years because of too much expenditure . . . Between 1980 and 2011, spending was lower than the tax revenue by 484 billion (thus we have been really virtuous) but the interest payments (on the debt of 2,141 billion) that we had to pay in that period have made us poor. In the last 20 years, GDP has been growing slowly, while the debt has exploded.
. . . [S]peculators . . . are contributing to price falls so as to bring about higher interest rates. It’s the usurer’s technique. Thus the debt becomes an opportunity to maximize earnings in the market at the expense of the nation. . . . If financial powerbrokers use speculation to increase their earnings and force governments to pay the highest possible interest rates, the result is recession for the State that’s in debt as well as their loss of sovereignty.
. . . There are alternatives. These are being put into effect by some countries in South America and by Iceland. . . . The risk is that we are going to reach default in any case with the devaluation of the debt, and the Nation impoverished and on its knees. [Beppe Grillo blog]
Bank Nationalization: China Shows What Can Be Done
Grillo’s second proposal, nationalizing the banks, has also been tested and proven elsewhere, most notably in China. In an April 2012 article in The American Conservative titled “China’s Rise, America’s Fall,” Ron Unz observes:
During the three decades to 2010, China achieved perhaps the most rapid sustained rate of economic development in the history of the human species, with its real economy growing almost 40-fold between 1978 and 2010. In 1978, America’s economy was 15 times larger, but according to most international estimates, China is now set to surpass America’s total economic output within just another few years.
According to Eamonn Fingleton in In The Jaws of the Dragon (2009), the fountain that feeds this tide is a strong public banking sector:
Capitalism's triumph in China has been proclaimed in countless books in recent years. . . . But . . . the higher reaches of its economy remain comprehensively controlled in a way that is the antithesis of everything we associate with Western capitalism. The key to this control is the Chinese banking system . . . [which is] not only state-owned but, as in other East Asian miracle economies, functions overtly as a major tool of the central government’s industrial policy.
Guaranteed Basic Income—Not Just Welfare
Grillo’s third proposal, a guaranteed basic income, is not just an off-the-wall, utopian idea either. A national dividend has been urged by the “Social Credit” school of monetary reform for nearly a century, and the U.S. Basic Income Guarantee Network has held a dozen annual conferences. They feel that a guaranteed basic income is the key to keeping modern, highly productive economies humming.
In Europe, the proposal is being pursued not just by Grillo’s southern European party but by the sober Swiss of the north. An initiative to establish a new federal law for an unconditional basic income was formally introduced in Switzerland in April 2012. The idea consists of giving to all citizens a monthly income that is neither means-tested nor work-related. Under the Swiss referendum system of direct democracy, if the initiative gathers more than 100,000 signatures before October 2013, the Federal Assembly is required to look into it.
Colatrella does not say where Grillo plans to get the money for Italy’s guaranteed basic income, but in Social Credit theory, it would simply be issued outright by the government; and Grillo, who has an accounting background, evidently agrees with that approach to funding. He said in a presentation available on YouTube:
The Bank of Italy a private join-stock company, ownership comprises 10 insurance companies, 10 foundations, and 10 banks, that are all joint-stock companies . . . They issue the money out of thin air and lend it to us. It’s the State who is supposed to issue it. We need money to work. The State should say: “There’s scarcity of money? I’ll issue some and put it into circulation. Money is plentiful? I’ll withdraw and burn some of it.” . . . Money is needed to keep prices stable and to let us work.
The Key to a Thriving Economy
Major C.H. Douglas, the thought leader of the Social Credit movement, argued that the economy routinely produces more goods and services than consumers have the money to purchase, because workers collectively do not get paid enough to cover the cost of the things they make. This is true because of external costs such as interest paid to banks, and because some portion of the national income is stashed in savings accounts, investment accounts, and under mattresses rather than spent on the GDP.
To fill what Social Crediters call “the gap,” so that “demand” rises to meet “supply,” additional money needs to be gotten into the circulating money supply. Douglas recommended doing it with a national dividend for everyone, an entitlement by “grace” rather than “works,” something that was necessary just to raise purchasing power enough to cover the products on the market.
In the 1930s and 1940s, critics of Social Credit called it “funny money” and said it would merely inflate the money supply. The critics prevailed, and the Social Credit solution has not had much chance to be tested. But the possibilities were demonstrated in New Zealand during the Great Depression, when a state housing project was funded with credit issued by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the nationalized central bank. According to New Zealand commentator Kerry Bolton, this one measure was sufficient to resolve 75% of unemployment in the midst of the Great Depression.
Bolton notes that this was achieved without causing inflation. When new money is used to create new goods and services, supply rises along with demand and prices remain stable; but the “demand” has to come first. No business owner will invest in more capacity or production without first seeing a demand. No demand, no new jobs and no economic expansion.
The Need to Restore Economic Sovereignty
The money for a guaranteed basic income could be created by a nationalized central bank in the same way that the Reserve Bank of New Zealand did it, and that central bank “quantitative easing” (QE) is created out of nothing on a computer screen today. The problem with today’s QE is that it has not gotten money into the pockets of consumers. The money has gotten—and can get—no further than the reserve accounts of banks, as explained here and here. A dividend paid directly to consumers would be “quantitative easing” for the people.
A basic income guarantee paid for with central bank credit would not be “welfare” but would eliminate the need for welfare. It would be social security for all, replacing social security payments, unemployment insurance, and welfare taxes. It could also replace much of the consumer debt that is choking the private economy, growing exponentially at usurious compound interest rates.
As Grillo points out, it is not the cost of government but the cost of money itself that has bankrupted Italy. If the country wishes to free itself from the shackles of debt and restore the prosperity it once had, it will need to take back its monetary sovereignty and issue its own money, either directly or through its own nationalized central bank. If Grillo's party comes to power and follows through with his platform, those shackles on the Italian economy might actually be released.