Dugin made his name by espousing Russian nationalist and traditionalist – including antisemitic – themes, and publishing extensively on the centrality of Russia in world civilisation. So, this endorsement should be a warning of the disruptive nature of the Trump White House. It implies that Dugin believes Trump’s policies support Russian interests.
Dugin began his career as an anti-communist activist in the 1980s. This was less because of an ideological antipathy for communism than his rejection of the internationalism that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union espoused. He also criticised the party for breaking from traditional – especially religious – values.
Dugin proposes what he calls a “fourth political theory”. The first three, he claims, are Marxism, fascism and liberalism – all of which he thinks contain elements of error, especially their rejection of tradition and the subordination of culture to scientific thought.
Dugin’s fourth political theory takes pieces from all three and discards the elements with which Dugin disagrees, especially the dwindling importance of traditional family and culture. The culmination is a melange of ideas that sometimes appear Marxist and sometimes fascist, but which always centre on the criticality of traditional Russian culture.
His founding philosophy is traditionalism, which he views as a strength of Russia. Thus, he has become a strong supporter of the country’s president, Vladimir Putin, who emphasises traditional Russian values. Dugin and Putin align in their criticism of liberalist anti-religious individualism, which they claim destroys the values and culture on which society is based.
Dugin has value for Putin because he advances the president’s objectives. Putin’s security goals are in part founded on the principle that political unity is strength and political division is weakness. If Russia can maintain political unity by whatever means necessary, it retains its perception of strength. And if a state opposed to Russia is divided internally, it can be portrayed as weak.
The Russian government claims complete political unity inside Russia. Its spokespeople reinforce that claim by declaring, for example, the Russian electorate was so unified behind Putin that the 2024 Russian presidential election could have been skipped as an unnecessary expense. They also push a strained claim that the Russian population is unanimously behind the Ukraine war.
Dugin energises voters behind Putin, basing his support on the philosophy of Russian greatness and cultural superiority, and the perception of Russian unity. His influence has been felt throughout the Russian government and society. He publishes prolifically, and lectures at universities and government agencies about the harms of western liberalism. He also served as an advisor to Sergey Naryshkin, currently director of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) of the Russian Federation.
Dugin’s views support an expansionist Russia, especially in the direction of Ukraine. He questions the existence of Ukraine and promotes Russia’s war there wholeheartedly. But his support for the war led to an attempt on his life. On August 20 2022, a bomb exploded in a car owned by Dugin, killing his daughter, Darya, who was driving it back from a festival of Russian traditional art.
Divide and conquer
Russia applies the same principle of “unity equals strength” to its adversaries, but in reverse. Many Russian political thinkers try to emphasise political divisions in unfriendly states. They work hard to broaden existing disagreements and support disruptive political parties and groups.
Such operations give the Russian government the ability to denigrate the foreign powers that Russia considers adversaries by making them look weak in the eyes of their own people – and more importantly, in the eyes of the Russian population.
Dugin lays a philosophical foundation for foreign parties that oppose the European Union and western liberalism, and that disrupt political unity. His views have been adopted by far-right political groups such as the German National Democratic Party, the British National Party, Golden Dawn in Greece, Jobbik in Hungary, and the National Front in France.
Dugin’s interview in which he endorsed Trump’s policies is likely to have been directly authorised by the Kremlin. He pushes a Kremlin-sponsored endorsement of Trump’s divisive – and thus weakening – effect on US politics.
But Dugin’s extreme Russian nationalist rhetoric at times clashes with Putin’s attempts to include all peoples of Russia in a strong unified state, rather than only ethnic Russians. As it is a multi-ethnic state, Russian ethnic nationalism can obstruct Putin’s attempts at portraying strength through unity. The label “Putin’s brain” is only accurate sometimes.
The Russian government uses Dugin when he is useful and separates itself from him when his extremism is inconvenient. Dugin is a tool who says many of the right things and facilitates Kremlin goals. His endorsement of Trump should be seen in its context: Russia attempting to strengthen itself at the expense of the US.
Kevin Riehle, Lecturer in Intelligence and Security Studies, Brunel University of London
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.