The following is excerpted from  The Reproach of Hunger: Food, Justice, and Money in the Twenty-First Century  by David Rieff.  (David Rieff, 2015): 

Itwasthecrisisthatwasnotsupposedtohappen.Ifyouhadaskedmostmainstreamdevelopmentexpertsintheyear2000tonamethosefactorstheythoughtwouldmost imperiltheireffortstosubstantiallyreducepovertygloballyinthenewmillennium, it is highly unlikely they would have mentioned asudden,radicalspikeinthepriceoftheprincipalagriculturalcommodities,andthestaplefoodsmadefromthem,onwhichthepooroftheworldliterallydependedfortheirsurvival.Whatseemsobviousinhindsight—thatthelongperiodinwhichfoodpriceshadsteadily declined would come toan abrupt end—seemed anythingbutobviousatthetime.AsRajivShah,thethen-administratoroftheUSAgencyforInternationalDevelopmentunderPresidentBarackObama,putit,“bythelate1990s,globalfoodsecurityhadmostlyfallenofftheworld’sagenda.”Thereasonsforthiswerepartlyempirical(evenif,self-evidently,inretrospectnotempiricalenough)andpartlyideological,eveninwhatwassupposedlyapost-ideological age.Theempiricalpartwasbasedonwhatseemedtobeasecularratherthantemporarydeclineinthepriceoffoodstaples,which,by2000,wereatanall-timelow.Theideologicalpartlayinthepresumptionthat,inShah’swords,“thesuccessoftheGreenRevolution[inagriculture]hadhelpedhundredsofmillionsofpeopleinLatinAmericaandAsiaavoidalifeofextremehungerandpoverty.Governments—developedanddevelopingalike—assumedthissuccesswouldspreadandcuttheirinvestmentsinagriculture,allowingthemtoturntheirattentionelsewhere.”

Theycouldnothavebeenmorewrong.Attheendof2006,thepriceofwheat,rice,corn,andsoybeans—thefourfoodstaplesthatnearlythreebillionpeoplewholiveonlessthantwodollarsadayprincipallydependonnotjustasoneelementamongseveraloftheirdiets(asisthecaseintherichworld),butasthefoodstuffstheyalmostexclusivelydependontoavoidgoinghungry—begantorisevertiginouslyonworldmarkets.Bythetimetheypeakedinearly2008,thepriceofcornhadgoneupby31percent,ofriceby74percent,ofsoybeansby87percent,andofwheatby130percent,comparedtowhattheyhadbeeninearly2007atthebeginningofwhatcametobeknownastheglobalfoodcrisis.Inmanypartsofthe globe, the brutal secondary effects on the prices of food availabletoordinarypeopleinthemarketwerealmostimmediate.InEgypt,forexample,thepriceofbreaddoubledinamatterofmonths.InHaiti,thepriceofriceincreasedby50percent,whileinSouthAfrica,thepriceofmaizemealincreasedby28percent.Bysomeesti-mates, taken in aggregate the food bill for the world’spoorrose by 40percent,whilewhatsooncametobeknownastheglobalfoodcrisisadded25percenttothefoodimportbillsofmanypoorcountries.Andinthirtyoftheworst-affectedcountriesacrosstheglobe,fromEthiopiatoUzbekistan,foodriotsbrokeout.

Thesignificanceoftheseriotswassubsequentlysomewhatexaggerated.Aseverycollegestudentlearnsinfreshmanstatistics,correlationisnotcausation. Thesewerespasmodicepisodesofcivilunrest, notinsurrections,letalonerevolutions.Andgiventheenduringlydiresocialandpoliticalconditionsofthepoorinthosecountries,toclaimthatthefoodcrisiswastheprincipalunderlyingcauseoftheconflictsseemstoomuchlikespecialpleading.Butitisundeniablethatthepricespikesgalvanizedthepoorinmanycountriesindifferentregionsoftheworldtoadegreethat,howeverbriefly,seemedtobeagenuineandatleastpotentiallyuncontrollablethreattothestatusquo.

Andtothepoorestoftheglobalpoor,theso-calledbottombillionoftheworld’speoplewhotrytosurviveonlessthanadollaraday,thethreatwasliterallyexistential.Forseveralbillionmore,anyhopeof“foodsecurity,”thetermofartinthedevelopmentworldmeaningthatonecandependongettingenough—aswellastherightthings—toeatthroughouttheyear,seemedtobeevaporatingbeforetheireyes.Anditwasnotonlythosewhohadjoinedinthefood riots,but also the vastly larger number of people who despairedinsilencewhoworriedfortheirsurvivalandtheprospectofanybetterfuturefortheirchildren.Toputitanotherway,whatthefoodcrisismeantforthepoorwastheveryrealprospectofgoinghungry,notbecausetherewouldnotbeenoughfood,butbecausetheywouldnolongerbeabletoaffordtobuyit.Theangerthatthiscrisisproducedisonethathas,acrossthecenturies,proventobethemostdangerousformofangerofall:angerinthebelly.

Intherichworld,thereweremanywhoreasonedthatbecausetheworsteffectsofthecrisiswereoccurringinpartsoftheworldwheretherehadbeenhugepopulationincreases,brutedemographyhadbeenattherootofwhathadtakenplace.Butthiswasafundamentalmisunderstandingofwhathadoccurred;howevercounter-intuitivethethoughtmaybe,itwaswrong.Instead,whathadinfacttakenplacewasnotthe“populationbomb”finallyexploding,tousethephrasecoinedbytheneo-MalthusianAmericanbiologistanddemographerPaulEhrlich,leadinginexorablytofamine.Fordespitethefluctuatingrelationshipbetweenfoodconsumptionand foodproduction,whenthecrisisbegantounfoldin2007therewas(asthereisasofthiswritingin2015)morethanenoughfoodbeingproducedtofeedeveryonealive.Inthetwodecadesprecedingthe2007crisis,globalpopulationincreasedbyanaverageof1.5percentperyear,andfoodproductionroseby2percentoverthesametime.Iftherewasconfusionaboutthisamongthegeneralpublic,itwasinconsiderablemeasure.Thepreponderanceofmediareportsabouthunger,atleastthosetowhichthegeneralpublicintherichworldareexposed,focusonfaminesintheHornofAfricaor,inmoresophisticatednarratives,onhungerinruralIndia.Thisfocusunderstandablygivesthefalseimpressionthatthereareimportantfoodshortages,butinactualitytheproblemisfoodaffordability,notavailability.

But,importantthoughitis,pointingoutwhatthefoodcrisiswasnotdoeslittletoexplainhowandwhytheglobalfoodsystemcouldhaveseizeduptosuchanextentin2007–2008.Nordoesitshedmuchlightonhowevenmostagriculturalexpertsandbothgovernmentalandnongovernmentaldevelopmentagenciesthroughouttheworldcouldhavebeentakenbysurpriseinthisway.Inotherwords,iftheeffectsoftheglobalfoodcrisiswereobvious,itscausesweremuchhardertogetright.Inpartthiswasbecause,ifanything,thereweretoomanycausesthatcouldbecrediblyheldoutashavingcontributedtothedisaster,andfiguringoutwhichhadplayedmajorrolesandwhichhadplayedminoronesprovedtobeenormouslydifficult.

Onekeydriverofthecrisisbeyonddisputewastherisingpriceofoilwhich,beginninginlate2006,hadasecondaryeffectonthepriceofthefertilizersneededforindustrialagriculture.Thistypeoffarminghasincreasinglybecomethenormnotjustintherichworldbutinmuchofthepoorworldaswell,farmoretothedetrimentofitsmassesofsmallholderfarmers.Anotherfactor,seeminglyepisodicratherthansystemic,wasthesevereweatherinmanypartsoftheworldduring2006,rangingfromdroughtinAustralia,the world’ssecond-largestproducerofwheat,toCycloneNargis,whichhitMyanmarhardinthespringof2008anddevastatedthatcountry’sriceproduction. Intherichworld,thepracticeofdivertinggrainfromfeedforlivestocktotheproductionofbiofuels(40percentofUScornnowgoestoethanolproduction)certainlyplayedarole,asdidthevirtualtakeoveroftheworld’scommoditiesmarketsbyspeculatorswhoseentryradicallyincreasedthevolatilityofthesemarkets,causingwildpriceswingsinthecostsoffoodstaples.Inshort,viewedasadiscreteevent,the2007–2008globalfoodcrisishadbeen,astheclichégoes,aperfectstorm.

Butwhilestormsdissipateeventually,inthecrisis’swakein2008,evenafterthepricesofagriculturalstapleshaddeclinedsharply,itsoonbecameclearthatfarfromhavingbeenananomalousevent,thepriceriseswereamoreextremebutstillemblematicmanifestationofwhat,toborrowtheimageofthemoneymanagerBillGrossaboutthepost-2007crashofthefinancialmarkets,waslikely,overthelongterm,tobea“newnormal”ofsecularpriceincreasesofagriculturalstaples.Thissupplantedthe“oldnormal”inthelastquarterofthetwentiethcentury,whichhadbeenaprocessbeginningwiththeestablishmentofpricestabilityandthenofpricedecline.Andwhilehewasadmittedlyextrapolatingfromaveryshortperiod,theseniorWorldBankofficialOtovianoCanutowasreflectingabroadconsensuswhenheobserved that this “new norm of highpricesseemstobeconsolidating[intheseconddecadeofthetwenty-firstcentury].”

Hungerandpovertyareinseparable,anddespitethemanyrealsuccessesinpovertyreductioninmanypartsoftheGlobalSouth,itishighlyunlikelythatthesegainswillbesustainableifrisesinthepriceofstaplefoodssignificantlyoutstriptheriseinincomesofthepoorasaresultofsounddevelopmentpolicies.Thatiswhy,atleastassumingCanuto’snowwidelyacceptedconclusioniscorrect,itisnottoomuchtosaythattheentireglobalfoodsystemisgravelyill,andthatthecentralquestionishowtoreformit,if,indeed,itisnottoolatetodoso.

Butwhilethereiswidedisagreementaboutwhatneedstobedone,thereissurprisinglywideagreementthatmost,ifnotall,oftheassumptionsthatundergirdedthesysteminthelaterpartofthetwentiethcenturyhadeitherbeenwrongtobeginwithorsimplynolongerappliedinthefirstdecadeofthenewcentury,abovealltheconvictionthatfoodpriceswerelikelytocontinuetodecrease.Simplyput,theevidenceforthenewseculartrendtowardhigherfoodpriceshasaccumulatedtothepointthatitnowseemsallbutirrefutable.

Thetrajectoryisclear.Afterhavingfallenin2008,foodpricesroseagain,almostassharply,in2010and2011,thenfellbackandroseoncemoretowardtheendof2012andinto2013,atwhichpointpricesforcornontheworldmarketwerehigherthantheyhadbeenattheheightofthe2007–2008crisis.Thesesubsequentrisesinthecostofcerealgrainsandtherealizationamongdevelopmentspecialiststhatthepricesoffoodstapleshavenotdiminishedallthatmuchsince2007havenotreceivedthesameamountofattentionintheglobalmedia.Thatdoesnotmakethemanylessominous.InMexico,forexample,thepriceoftortillas,themostbasicfoodstuffinthedietsofmostpoorpeople,was69percenthigherin2011thanithadbeenin2006.InIndonesia,theaveragenationalpriceofricereachedarecordinFebruaryof2012.AnditshouldberememberedthatbothMexicoandIndonesiaarewhattheWorldBankcalls“middleincome”countries.InmuchpoorernationslikeGuatemala,Haiti,Niger,Yemen,andAfghanistan,theeffectsofthis“newnormal”ofhighfoodpriceshavebeenmoredamagingstilltothelivesofthepoorandthelifechancesoftheirchildren.

Thatisthebadnews,anditis,indeed,verybadnews.Buteventhemostdyed-in-the-woolpessimistwouldhavetoconcedethatitisbynomeansthewholestory.AstheBritishdevelopmenteconomistCharlesKennyhasargued,thereisnoreasontobelievethatglobalmiseryissointractableaproblemthatitcannotberelieved.Evenifonedoesn’tagreewithKennyandlike-mindedlyoptimistic colleaguesthatthingsaregettingbetterand,barringenvironmentalcatastrophe,willcontinuetoimproveinwaysthatwereallbutunimaginablehalfacenturyago,theyarerighttoinsistthattherehasbeenaconsiderableamountofgoodnewsaswell,aboveallintheextentoftheprogressthathasbeenmadeoverthepastthreedecades.“Thebiggestsuccessindevelopment,”Kennyhaswritten,“hasnotbeenmakingpeoplericherbut,rather,hasbeenmakingthethingsthatreallymatter—thingslikehealthandeducation—cheaperandmorewidelyavailable.”

Overall,thepercentageofthepoorintheglobalpopulationhasdecreasedsteadily,evenifinsomeofthesecountries,notablyIndia,thenumberofthosewhohavenotbenefittedfromthesechangesisfargreaterthanthosewhohave.Therearenowhundredsofmillionsofpeopleincountriesasvariedintheirpoliticalsystems,theconditionoftheireconomies,andtheirapproachestochronichungerasBrazil,China,Mexico,Vietnam,andIndiawhoarenoweatingmoreandusually,thoughnotalways,better(astherapidlyrisingobesityratesinthedevelopingworlddemonstrate)thanpreviousgenera-tionseverdid.WhetherthishasbeentheresultofdevelopmentaidortheeconomicgrowthandprosperitycreatedinmuchofAsiaandpartsofLatinAmericaoverthepastthirtyyearsremainsasubjectofbitterdispute.Thescopeofthistransformation,notsimplythereality,iswhatcannotbedenied—itisunparalleledinhumanhistoryintermsofitseffectsonsomanyoversucharelativelyshortperiodoftime.Bycomparison,thegeneralprosperityeventuallycreatedbytheIndustrialRevolutioninEuropetookfarlongerandaffectedfarfewerpeople.

Ifoneisbeingoptimistic,itispossibletosaythatthe2007–2008crisistaughtusatleasttoasktherightquestionsabouthunger.Butwhethercountries—rich,developing,orpoor—willbeabletocomeupwiththerightanswersisanothermatteraltogether.

Excerpted from The Reproach of Hunger: Food, Justice, and Money in the Twenty-First Century by David Rieff.  Copyright © 2015 by David Rieff.  Reprinted by permission of Simon & Schuster, Inc. All Rights Reserved.