Inspection as Invasion
There is little that those of us who oppose the coming war with Iraq can now do to prevent it. George Bush has staked his credibility on the project; he has mid-term elections to consider, oil supplies to secure and a flagging war on terror to revive. Our voices are as little heeded in the White House as the singing of the birds.
Our role is now, perhaps, confined to the modest but necessary task of demonstrating the withdrawal of our consent, while seeking to undermine the moral confidence which could turn the attack on Iraq into a war against all those states perceived to offend U.S. strategic interests. No task is more urgent than to expose the two astonishing lies contained in George Bush's radio address on Saturday, namely that "the United States does not desire military conflict, because we know the awful nature of war" and "we hope that Iraq complies with the world's demands". Mr. Bush appears to have done everything in his power to prevent Iraq from complying with the world's demands, while ensuring that military conflict becomes inevitable.
On July 4 this year, Kofi Annan, the secretary-general of the United Nations, began negotiating with Iraq over the return of U.N. weapons inspectors. Iraq had resisted UN inspections for three and a half years, but now it felt the screw turning, and appeared to be on the point of capitulation. On July 5, the Pentagon leaked its war plan to the New York Times. The U.S., a Pentagon official revealed, was preparing "a major air campaign and land invasion" to "topple President Saddam Hussein." The talks immediately collapsed.
Ten days ago, they were about to resume. Hans Blix, the head of the U.N. inspections body, was due to meet Iraqi officials in Vienna to discuss the practicalities of re-entering the country. The U.S. Air Force launched bombing raids on Basra, in southern Iraq, destroying a radar system. As the Russian government pointed out, the attack could scarcely have been better designed to scupper the talks. But this time the Iraqis, mindful of the consequences of excluding the inspectors, kept talking. Last Tuesday, they agreed to let the U.N. back in. The State Department immediately announced, with more candor than elegance, that it would "go into thwart mode".
It wasn't bluffing. The following day, it leaked the draft resolution on inspections it was placing before the U.N. Security Council. This resembles nothing so much as a plan for unopposed invasion. The decisions about which sites should be "inspected" would no longer be made by the U.N. alone, but also by "any permanent member of the security council", such as the United States. The people inspecting these sites could also be chosen by the U.S., and they would enjoy "unrestricted rights of entry into and out of Iraq" and "the right to free, unrestricted and immediate movement" within Iraq, "including unrestricted access to presidential sites". They would be permitted to establish "regional bases and operating bases throughout Iraq", where they would be "accompanied ... by sufficient U.S. security forces to protect them". They would have the right to declare exclusion zones, no-fly zones and "ground and air transit corridors". They would be allowed to fly and land as many planes, helicopters and surveillance drones in Iraq as they want, to set up "encrypted communication" networks and to seize "any equipment" they choose to lay hands on.
The resolution, in other words, could not have failed to remind Iraq of the alleged infiltration of the U.N. team in 1996. Both the Iraqi government and the former inspector Scott Ritter maintain that the weapons inspectors were joined that year by CIA covert operations specialists, who used the U.N.'s special access to collect information and encourage the republican guard to launch a coup. On Thursday, Britain and the United States instructed the weapons inspectors not to enter Iraq until the new resolution has been adopted.
As Milan Rai's new book "War Plan Iraq" documents, the U.S. has been undermining disarmament for years. The U.N.'s principal means of persuasion was paragraph 22 of the security council's resolution 687, which promised that economic sanctions would be lifted once Iraq ceased to possess weapons of mass destruction. But in April 1994, Warren Christopher, the U.S. secretary of state, unilaterally withdrew this promise, removing Iraq's main incentive to comply. Three years later his successor, Madeleine Albright, insisted that sanctions would not be lifted while Saddam remained in power.
The U.S. government maintains that Saddam Hussein expelled the U.N. inspectors from Iraq in 1998, but this is not true. On October 30 1998, the U.S. rejected a new U.N. proposal by again refusing to lift the oil embargo if Iraq disarmed. On the following day, the Iraqi government announced that it would cease to cooperate with the inspectors. In fact it permitted them to continue working, and over the next six weeks they completed around 300 operations.
On December 14, Richard Butler, the head of the inspection team, published a curiously contradictory report. The body of the report recorded that over the past month "the majority of the inspections of facilities and sites under the ongoing monitoring system were carried out with Iraq's cooperation", but his well-publicized conclusion was that "no progress" had been made. Russia and China accused Butler of bias. On December 15, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N. warned him that his team should leave Iraq for its own safety. Butler pulled out, and on the following day the U.S. started bombing Iraq.
From that point on, Saddam Hussein refused to allow U.N. inspectors to return. At the end of last year, Jose Bustani, the head of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, proposed a means of resolving the crisis. His organization had not been involved in the messy business of 1998, so he offered to send in his own inspectors, and complete the job the U.N. had almost finished. The U.S. responded by demanding Bustani's dismissal. The other member states agreed to depose him only after the United States threatened to destroy the organization if he stayed. Now Hans Blix, the head of the new U.N. inspectorate, may also be feeling the heat. On Tuesday he insisted that he would take his orders only from the security council. On Thursday, after an hour-long meeting with U.S. officials, he agreed with the Americans that there should be no inspections until a new resolution had been approved.
For the past eight years the U.S., with Britain's help, appears to have been seeking to prevent a resolution of the crisis in Iraq. It is almost as if Iraq has been kept on ice, as a necessary enemy to be warmed up whenever the occasion demands. Today, as the economy slides and Bin Laden's latest mocking message suggests that the war on terrorism has so far failed, an enemy which can be located and bombed is more necessary than ever. A just war can be pursued only when all peaceful means have been exhausted. In this case, the peaceful means have been averted.
George Monbiot is a columnist with the Guardian (UK), and posts his columns on his homepage, Monbiot.com.