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Washington in Libya: A Case Study in How Not to End Violence in a War-Torn Land

Sending more armed men is not the solution.
 
 
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Is the U.S. secretly training Libyan militiamen in the Canary Islands? And if not, are they planning to?

That’s what I asked a spokesman for U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). “I am surprised by your mentioning the Canary Islands,” he responded by email.  “I have not heard this before, and wonder where you heard this.”

As it happens, mention of this shadowy mission on the Spanish archipelago off the northwest coast of Africa was revealed in an official briefing prepared for AFRICOM chief General David Rodriguez in the fall of 2013.  In the months since, the plan may have been permanently shelved in favor of a training mission carried out entirely in Bulgaria.  The document nonetheless highlights the U.S. military’s penchant for simple solutions to complex problems -- with a well-documented potential for  blowback in Africa and beyond.  It also raises serious questions about the recurring methods employed by the U.S. to stop the violence its actions helped spark in the first place.   

Ever since the U.S. helped oust dictator Muammar Gaddafi, with air and missile strikes against regime targets and major logistical and surveillance support to coalition partners, Libya has been sliding into increasing chaos.  Militias, some of them jihadist, have sprung up across the country,  carving out fiefdoms while carrying out increasing numbers of assassinations and other types of attacks. The solution seized upon by the U.S. and its allies in response to the devolving situation there: introduce yet another armed group into a country already rife with them.    

The Rise of the Militias

After Gaddafi’s fall in 2011, a wide range of militias came to  dominateLibya’s largest cities, filling a security vacuum left by the collapse of the old regime and providing a  challenge to the new central government.  In Benghazi alone, an array of these  armed groups arose.  And on September 11, 2012, that city, considered the cradle of the Libyan revolution, experienced attacks by members of the anti-Western Ansar al-Sharia, as well as other militias on the American mission and a nearby CIA facility.  During those assaults, which killed Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other Americans, local armed groups  called on for help or which might have intervened to save lives reportedly  stood aside.

Over the year that followed, the influence of the militias only continued to grow nationwide, as did the chaos that accompanied them.  In late 2013, following deadly  attacks on civilians, some of these forces were chased from Libyan cities by protesters and armed bands, ceding power to what the New York Times  called “an even more fractious collection of armed groups, including militias representing tribal and clan allegiances that tear at the tenuous [Libyan] sense of common citizenship.”  With the situation deteriorating, the humanitarian group Human Rights Watch documented dozens of assassinations of judges, prosecutors, and members of the state’s already weakened security forces by unidentified assailants.  

The American solution to all of this violence: more armed men.

Fighting Fire with Fire

In November 2013, U.S. Special Operations Command chief Admiral William McRaven  told an audience at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library that the United States would aid Libya by training 5,000 to 7,000 conventional troops as well as counterterrorism forces there.  “As we go forward to try and find a good way to build up the Libyan security forces so they are not run by militias, we are going to have to assume some risks,” he said.

Not long after, the Washington Post  reported a request by  recently oustedLibyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan that the U.S. train his country’s security forces.  In January, the Pentagon’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency, which  coordinates sales and transfers of military equipment abroad, formally notified Congress of a Libyan request for a $600 million training package.  Its goal: to create a 6,000 to 8,000-man “general purpose force,” or GPF.  

 
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