Experts: Bush Is No Middle East Peace-Maker

This month, the U.S. Institute for Peace released "Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: American Leadership in the Middle East," a report that examined U.S. peace-making efforts over the past four decades.

The study group, headed by Daniel Kurtzer (former U.S. ambassador to Egypt and Israel), met during 2006-2007 and interviewed over 100 officials and experts from seven countries and three international organizations.

The main body of the report is a concise and precise look at successes and failures, and strengths and weaknesses of the past three administrations' efforts at Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. It concludes by detailing ten lessons learned and outlining recommendations based on those lessons to guide the next administration.

The examination of Washington's peacemaking efforts during the past three administrations begins with a largely positive assessment of "Bush 41," crediting President George H.W. Bush for "having the clearest sense of strategy," which he pursued "in a highly disciplined, effective and committed manner."

Bush and secretary of state James Baker are praised for understanding and taking advantage of the opportunities that flowed from the end of the Cold War and the end of the first Gulf War, and moving aggressively, with balanced pressure, to convene the Madrid peace conference. On the other hand, the major weakness of "Bush 41," pointed to in the report, was his "failure to build a strong coalition at home to support [his] strategy." It was the combination of this failure, and the distraction of his re-election effort in 1992 that caused the Bush administration to lose focus on its peacemaking efforts.

In spite of this, the report notes that the Clinton administration "inherited an ideal strategic environment for peacemaking." Noting that President Bill Clinton more effectively built a domestic support base for his peacemaking efforts, he was, however, "less disciplined and less strategic than his predecessor."

Specifically, the report noted that the Clinton team "failed to understand and deal with key asymmetries in the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. While the U.S. paid attention to Israeli security requirements, less attention was devoted to Palestinian political requirements. The U.S. did not find a way to compensate for Palestinian political weakness. This was the first time in history a people under occupation was expected to negotiate its own way out of occupation while at the same time creating a viable, democratic and independent state."

The report notes that Clinton did not personally become directly involved in negotiations until late in his second term, and did not put forward his own peace plan until his last month in office. This was, of course, too late to make a difference.

It is George W. Bush's administration that receives the greatest criticism, the authors noting that "his approach to the conflict lacked both commitment and a sense of strategic purpose." This, they suggest, was due to the fact that too many of the president's advisers dismissed the importance of Middle East peace, placing greater emphasis on their "regime change" and democratization agendas.

When Bush did become involved, however, it was mostly at the rhetorical level, with little or no follow through. Plans were announced and mediators were dispatched in succession, ignored and undercut, and then dropped. To some degree, this contributed to a widespread belief that the administration's efforts lacked seriousness.

The result of this mismanagement and/or neglect has negatively affected not only Israelis and Palestinians but also the U.S. diplomacy in the broader region, and public attitudes towards the U.S. itself. This, the authors lament, makes it imperative for the next administration to early and aggressively reengage Middle East peacemaking.