Petraeus: A Failure by His Own Standards

Fog Facts are facts that are known. They've been published and are easily accessible. They are important enough that they ought to define the political dialogue. Yet somehow they are as unrecognized as if they were top secret. They're lost in the fog.

Gen. Petraeus, for example, arrives with an amazing fog. There are facts in the militaristic mist all around him, that if noticed, should have even Republicans scheduling flights out of Baghdad.

Let's start with his track record.

Our basic Iraq policy has been and continues to be: "We'll stand down when they stand up." That is, when Iraq has an army and a police force that functions and can maintain order on its own.

The American occupation, run by Paul Bremer III under the aegis of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) disbanded the Iraqi army and, through de-Baathification, took apart the police. As a result, there was no security at the same time that several hundred thousand armed men of military age, with no jobs, were unleashed on the country. Chaos ensued. The occupation, though legally and ethically required to maintain order, and the only people around able to do so, decided not to. It was then that the insurgents arose, forming militias and gangs, to step into the vacuum.

The occupation set out to rebuild the Iraqi Army and Police. So they could stand up and we could stand down.

The man who was given the job was that rising star, Gen. David Petraeus.

He failed.

The Iraqi Army cannot resist the insurgency. The Iraqi police cannot keep order. Indeed, it's far worse than that. Both forces are infiltrated. Some divisions are actually filled with militia members, insurgents and gangsters, dressed up in uniforms. With access to intelligence, arms and equipment. They have engaged in murder, torture and intimidation.

How can we expect the man who failed at doing just part of the job -- training those forces -- to succeed now that he has the whole job?

Nonetheless, Petraeus has a great reputation. US News & World Report said he is "one of the most fascinating people in the United States Army. With a Ph.D. from Princeton University, he is often referred to as the military's warrior-scholar." That's pretty much how everyone talks about him.

After he was sent back to the States from Iraq, he updated the U.S. Army's counterinsurgency manual. It's a public document.

It is well-written. Both the prose and the thinking are clear. It ranges widely through time and cites a variety of sources, including Mao and Clausewitz. It's thoughtful and fairly objective. It is the perfect yardstick to evaluate what is going on Iraq and -- by using Gen. Petraeus' own standards, the U.S. military's official standard -- figure how well we can expect what we're doing to work.

Fog Fact: The counterinsurgency manual recommends a force ratio of between 20 and 25 troops per 1,000 in the population.

The math is very simple. The current estimated population of Iraq is 27,500,000.

The proper size of a counterinsurgency force is therefore a minimum of 550,000, more comfortable at 687,500.

Right now, at the peak of the surge, there are about 169,000 coalition troops (92 percent U.S.) in Iraq. That's 381,000 short of the minimum. Or 506,000 short of the more ideal ratio.

Let us emphasize that this is from a public document. It is official army doctrine. It's available on the Net. Why haven't we seen these numbers on CNN or in the New York Times? Why has no one asked Petraeus about the discrepancy between his own theory and the reality?

Alright, so we're 400,000 or so troops short of a full deck. Does that mean the war can't be "won?"

Fog Fact: How a counterinsurgency war (COIN) is won. Patreaus writes in the manual:

COIN is fought among the populace. Counterinsurgents take upon themselves responsibility for the people's well-being in all its manifestations. These include the following: