Why Iraq Is Getting Worse

A cloud of steam rises above the crowd in the 120-degree heat. As their leader approaches the podium, the thousands who have assembled meet him with pledges of their fealty.

"We are all Badr Brigade!" they shout, a reference to the paramilitary organization of the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC), which held this rally on July 19, in honor of Ayatollah Bakr al-Hakim, the party's founding leader, who was assassinated here four years ago. His nephew, Amar al-Hakim, now holds the position.

I was one of the millions who attended al-Hakim's funeral four years ago, some of whom walked the 100 miles from Baghdad to Najaf to show their sorrow. It was largely a peaceful affair.

But now, as Iraq devolves further into civil war inside civil war inside occupation, the commemoration of al-Hakim's death, which prompted mourning from Shiites across the country, has taken on a largely political feel. The Badr Brigade is at war with Sunni guerillas and other Shiite militias, and largely considered by its opponents to be the tool of corrupt, exiled elites who have allied themselves with the occupation in order to carve up Iraq.

The country's disintegration is obvious in Najaf, one of the seven of the nine southern provinces in which SIIC controls the municipal government. Here, things are run as a police state: I accepted an invitation by SIIC to travel to Najaf from Baghdad because it was the only way to safely negotiate the dangerous road between the two cities.

Despite the assurances of SIIC officials that Najaf was safe, we were given strict orders not to leave our hotel--at which Iraqi military and police loyal to the party had been posted--unless we were with them. When I left the tour for a pre-arranged meeting with the spokesman from Tayyera Sadrieen, another Shiite political party led by Moqtada al-Sadr, it nearly provoked an armed confrontation.

During the interview, Tayyera Sadrieen's spokesman, Saleh al-Obaidi, laid out why supporters of his party and its paramilitary, the Jeish al-Mehdi (JAM), had clashed with Badr loyalists across the country and, increasingly, in southern Iraq's poorest provinces of Misan and Muthanna, which are inaccessible to western journalists. In August, two of SIIC's governors there were assassinated by the JAM.

"The Sadrieen in general focus on the people. The southern governorates are suffering more than Baghdad maybe, concerning the services and the economic situation," al-Obaidi says. "There were no tensions for 15 or 16 months [after the invasion], but, at the same time, there were no services and no help from the governors of these provinces, so the people started to demonstrate and look and ask for something better. Unfortunately, the reaction from many governors was severe--they used guns and campaigns of detention against the people."

Fighting escalated at the end of August in Karbala, when JAM fighters attempted to take over a Badr-controlled Shiite shrine during a religious festival. After clashes that left more than 50 dead, Sadr ordered his militia to "suspend" operations for six months, though it is unclear to what extent Sadr controls the men fighting under his name, and the announcement mirrored one Sadr made two years ago.

In Basra, the only place in Iraq that is actually exporting oil and therefore producing revenue, a three-way battle is taking place between SIIC, the JAM and Fadhila, a Sadrist offshoot with support in the city. The British military withdrew its troops at the end of August, leaving only about 5,000 troops stationed at the airport. Corruption and a deadly power struggle have left Basra in a state of decline. Fadhila and SIIC, the two most powerful parties in Basra's provincial council, continue to fight over the governor's seat, which has brought governance to a halt, while the JAM and gangs that increasingly fought British troops have taken over the streets.