Racing the Truth to War

As the debate rages over pre-war intelligence, the work of UNMOVIC, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection team that carried out WMD inspections and reviewed the 12,000 page "Iraq Declaration," is rarely discussed. December 7, 2005 marks the third anniversary of the declaration, and its submission is central to the discussion about how the Bush administration led the country to invade Iraq.

Critics are unearthing, almost on a daily basis, evidence of pre-war intelligence that challenged the existence of WMDs hidden by the administration. But in the months leading up to the war, UNMOVIC was publicly providing daily reports and regular briefings on WMD inspections -- information that was neither fixed nor hidden. The White House Iraq Group (WHIG) that included Dick Cheney, Karl Rove, Karen Hughes and Mary Matalin read these reports and at first shifted their claims to emphasize mobile chemical labs and underground facilities. But as each day passed, and their rationale for war became less and less plausible, the WHIGs realized they were racing the truth to war.

Led by Hans Blix, UNMOVIC was given 45 days after the adoption of Resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002 to resume inspections, but quickly completed their first inspection in 19 days. Hans Blix, an old hand at WMD inspections in Iraq, had a team at the ready. His first stop in Baghdad, after a four year absence, was the Canal Hotel, where he re-opened the dusty offices belonging to UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that had been sealed awaiting the resumption of inspections in 1998.

Resolution 1441 was meant to give Iraq a "final opportunity" to comply with the disarmament foreseen in Resolution 687 in 1991 and Resolution 1284 in 1999. Resolution 1441 called for "immediate, active and unconditional cooperation" and included the ability to make inspections anytime, anywhere, without announcement -- including presidential palaces. The resolution gave UNMOVIC the right to "request names of personnel currently or formerly associated with Iraq's programme for WMD and missiles" and remove them and their families from Iraq for interviews, if necessary.

Their first preliminary assessment of Iraq's 12,000-page Declaration came in a briefing on December 19th to the Security Council. Reaction was mixed. I spoke with Hans Blix in preparation for this article about the 12,000 page declaration and he recounted how the Iraqis complained about "disproving the negative." In retrospect, he suggested 30 days was not nearly enough time for Iraq to fully describe their entire petrol-chemical and industrial infrastructure.

But Hans Blix also had no illusions. As he reported "during the period 1991-98, Iraq submitted many declarations called full, final and complete. Regrettably, much in these declarations proved inaccurate or incomplete or was unsupported or contradicted by evidence." Blix found much of the document a rehash and re-submission of previous materials and lacking the supportive evidence that he and UNMOVIC considered essential to support Iraq declarations that no WMD's existed. While the Iraqis had become fully cooperative with regard to prompt and immediate access to sites -- anywhere at anytime, they were still playing a game of cat and mouse with respect to supporting documents -- the budgets, destruction records, transportation notes and personnel lists that could answer open questions about anthrax programs, VX and other weapons.

The December 19 report to the Security Council mentions an allocation of $32 million. Hans Blix was quick to point out that UNMOVIC had limitless funds, "hundreds of millions if necessary," and was just getting up to speed. Part of the resolution included a seven percent share of funds from the now discredited Oil for Food funds. Biologists, chemists and other inspectors were taking refresher courses and engaging in mock inspections. Airplanes were on the tarmac, and UNMOVIC was ready to hit the ground running.