Obama's Pakistan Strategy Is Not Working

Among the many lessons the United States may have gleaned from the story of failed Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad, the one that may be hardest to absorb, is that America's Pakistan problem is getting worse, not better, on President Obama's watch. Since he took office in January 2009, there is seemingly nothing the administration hasn't tried in its effort to contain the threat of terrorism coming from Pakistan. It has tried anger, kindness, money and love. Its desperation is palpable, with Hillary Clinton once again left to be the bad cop, sternly warning Pakistan of "severe consequences" if a successful attack is ever traced to it.

Pakistanis may be forgiven for being unmoved. They have stared severe consequences in the face for nearly four years. The terror campaign of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) -- the group implicated in Shahzad's training, according to U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder -- hit high gear in 2007. Since then, the economy has tanked, long overdue reforms have slowed (but, thankfully, not stopped) and social tensions have grown. Worst of all, TTP and associated terrorist groups have killed some 10,000 Pakistani citizens and soldiers. If anyone is more desperate for answers in Pakistan than Hillary Clinton and the U.S. government, it is ordinary Pakistanis.

Drones from the sky and Pakistan artillery from below are fulfilling their mission to "disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al-Qaeda." But they are also creating a new, more decentralized and dispersed terrorist threat. Civilian deaths -- "collateral damage" from U.S. drones and Pakistani military operations -- are feeding into a narrative that pins the primary responsibility for Pakistan's troubles on America. That logic may be a fallacy, and Faisal Shahzad might be leading investigators astray. Emerging details about Shahzad's radicalization, however, are revealing.

According to reports, his rage was sparked in part by civilian deaths from U.S. drone attacks. "They shouldn't be shooting people from the sky. You know, they should come down and fight," Shahzad told his Connecticut neighbor Dennis Flanner about a year ago. By the fall, Shahzad had quit his job and flown to Pakistan, where, during his five-month visit, there were thirty-one U.S. drone attacks, almost all targeted at the North Waziristan sanctuary of the TTP, Al-Qaeda and the Haqqani network. Interestingly, a drone strike on February 2 -- the day before Shahzad arrived back in the States -- was the only recent attack that has caused a large number of nonmilitant, and possibly civilian casualties, according to the New America Foundation database.

Although by the end of 2009 the accuracy of the drones had been much improved, it has made little difference to mainstream opinion in Pakistan. There is frustration and anger and helplessness at being squeezed between the brutality of Al-Qaeda and Taliban terrorists and the clumsiness of Pakistani and U.S. efforts to eliminate those terrorists.

Administration officials and U.S. military commanders have for several years been pressing Pakistan to expand its operations into the North Waziristan region. If rumors of Shahzad having been trained in North Waziristan turn out to be true, it will matter little that he was one of the worst-trained terrorists on record. Pakistan will experience unprecedented pressure to scrap agreements with militant groups in the area and launch new military operations there -- with potentially deadly consequences. Pakistani military boots-on-the-ground there, however, are even more reviled than U.S. drone attacks. Military operations by Pakistan reportedly take a much larger toll on civilian life and property than the drones. They also exact much less damage on terrorists than the drones.