Our $700 Million Embassy in Iraq is a Monument to a Failed War and an Unwanted Occupation

Last Monday U.S. Marines raised the Stars and Stripes over America's $700 million embassy in Baghdad. Opined Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte, America's first ambassador to the new Iraq: "It is from the embassy that you see before you that we will continue the tradition of friendship, cooperation and support begun by the many dedicated Americans who have worked in Iraq since 2003."

Actually, the U.S. has built a fortress. At 104 acres, the complex is just five acres shy of Vatican City's size. The embassy compound, made up of 26 hardened buildings designed to host a thousand employees, sends a very different message than suggested by Negroponte. Washington expects to be Iraq's boss, not its friend.

The best that can be said for the new embassy is that the U.S. has abandoned Saddam Hussein's Republican Palace, first occupied in April 2003. Now Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki will move into the latter.

Embassy construction began in a different era. At the time President George W. Bush and his neoconservative acolytes imagined a permanent occupation, with scores of bases ready for use when (not if) Washington decided to attack Iraq's neighbors. Syria and Iran were the most obvious targets, but U.S. policymakers were nothing if not ambitious after Hussein's ouster. For some avid war advocates, the prospect of creating a de facto protectorate in the Middle East alone justified the invasion.

No surprise, Iraqis recognized that Washington's self-proclaimed altruism was dwarfed by its geopolitical ambition. Most Iraqis were pleased to see Hussein go, but were far less happy when Bush & Co. stayed. Roy Gutman of McClatchy Newspapers writes of an Iraqi journalist who asked: "Why are you here? You overthrew a tyrannical government but then you demolished the security structure, so you had to stay. Was it oil? Did you hope to take charge of the region? What did you have in mind? And what are your plans?"

From the start Washington underestimated the desire of Iraqis to control their own destiny. The U.S. government originally planned to impose a government of exiles. Then the occupation authority intended to create an Iraqi government through caucuses rather than elections. Finally, the Bush administration sought to negotiate a security accord and a status of forces agreement authorizing an "enduring" occupation encompassing more than 50 bases. In every case Washington was surprised when the Iraqis said nyet! The Bush administration discovered that what was supposed to be a pliant puppet regime had a will of its own.

Indeed, the spectacle of administration officials enthusiastically patting themselves on their backs for a job well done in Iraq is appalling. Iraq is not safe, but safer -- a vast improvement, but only over the horror into which the country was plunged by the U.S. invasion and occupation. Moreover, observes Gutman, "the country is still hopelessly broken." Economically and politically it remains highly dysfunctional, with uncertain prospects for improvement.

Iraq's endpoint is unlikely to be the liberal, democratic, U.S. ally that the president and his aides originally intended. Newsweek's Larry Kaplow observes that "America's expectations have plunged," with the more realistic analysts talking about "Iraqi good enough." He explains: "Officials on the ground now envision an Iraq roughly like other nondemocratic states in the Middle East. The government will no doubt be repressive -- not as bad as when Saddam Hussein was in charge, but even now Iraq's jails hold thousands of prisoners who have been held for months without hearing the charges against them. Corruption is rampant, in part because the state isn't strong enough to haul the biggest wrongdoers into court without touching off a rebellion."