How America Failed Darfur

By Steven Fake and Kevin Funk, Black Rose Books. Posted November 12, 2008.

Editor's note: The following is an excerpt from The Scramble for Africa: Darfur -- Intervention and the USA by Steven Fake and Kevin Funk. Originally published by Foreign Policy in Focus.

Just as the Clinton administration mostly continued its hostility towards Khartoum for the rest of its term, the presidency of George W. Bush did not give any initial indications of a dramatic change in policy. Just six weeks after the September 11 attacks, and subsequent to the declaration of the "War on Terror," the Bush administration developed a list of countries to target in a five-year plan: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, Libya, Somalia, and Sudan. Yet it was also largely because of September 11 that relations between Washington and Khartoum began to strike a more conciliatory note. Following the attacks, Sudan began increasing its sharing of "counterterror" intelligence with the U.S. Though Sudan had been attempting to curry favor with Washington by passing along intelligence for several years prior, it was only upon the commencement of the "Age of Terror" that the U.S. government fully appreciated the benefits of this unsavory alliance. Accordingly, Washington began to warm to Bashir's regime, with Khartoum moving to stop militants from entering Iraq to fight against U.S. forces, and granting U.S. officials access to detained Al-Qaida suspects. The CIA has collaborated with Khartoum's Mukhabarat intelligence service to spy on Iraqi rebel movements, and reportedly there are daily liaison visits between the two intelligence agencies.

New Ally

In turn the State Department has praised Khartoum for taking "significant steps to cooperate in the war on terrorism;" the Sudanese intelligence official Major General Salah Abdallah Gosh, who is accused of planning and participating in attacks against Darfurian civilians, and whom the United Nations has singled out as a figure who should be sanctioned, was brought to visit the White House in April 2005 after being flown to Washington on a CIA jet. Such has been the level of cooperation that Sudanese government officials had reportedly been invited to Bush's 2004 State of the Union address, though they were later told not to attend due to the increasing attention being paid to the conflict in Darfur. Additionally, Sudan has made significant neoliberal economic reforms, and has accordingly received high praise from the IMF.

Protecting its new ally, the Bush administration rejected the Sudan Peace Act working its way through Congress in 2001, which would have financed support for anti-Khartoum forces, instead signing into law a watered down version the following year. According to John Prendergast of the International Crisis Group, Khartoum's current intelligence-sharing with Washington as part of the "War on Terror" has greatly dulled whatever appetite the U.S. may have had for confrontation with Sudan. "When the two objectives [of intelligence-sharing versus a supposed desire to end the Darfur conflict] go head to head, counterterror wins every time," as Prendergast comments, perhaps explaining why Washington lobbied to remove "one of the chief architects" of the Darfur crimes (Gen. Gosh) from inclusion on a list of 17 individuals to face international sanctions drafted by a UN panel. Or why it successfully protected "top Sudanese commanders" from UN Security Council sanctions.

Words vs. Actions

This cooperation aside, Washington has been a very vocal critic of Sudan, standing virtually alone amongst major powers in declaring literal "genocide" in Darfur, regularly denouncing Khartoum for its role in the conflict, and lending verbal support to campaigners calling for "humanitarian intervention" in Sudan. In the unequivocal phrasing of the White House, Sudan "continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the U.S." Yet whatever rhetorical and propaganda value such statements may carry for Washington, the International Crisis Group correctly summarizes the operative factors behind U.S. and international policies vis-à-vis the conflict: "The sad reality is that Darfur simply does not matter enough, and Sudan matters too much, for the international community to do more to stop the atrocities" -- though one may be inclined to wonder if humanitarian considerations matter even one iota, at least if nations are to be judged by their deeds rather than their noble rhetoric.

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Steve Fake and Kevin Funk are contributors to Foreign Policy In Focus. They are social justice activists and authors of the book Scramble for Africa: Darfur-Intervention and the U.S.A.

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