Home
Archive
Columnists
Video
Blogs
Discuss
About
Search
Donate
Advertise
Advertisement
Advertisement
Advertisement
Advertisement
Register to Vote: Rock the Vote, powered by Working Assets Wireless
Advertisement
  • AlterNetYour turn

Support AlterNet
Do you value the information you're getting from AlterNet? Please show your support with a tax-deductible donation.


Feedback
Tell us how we're doing.

Corporate Accountability and WorkPlace

Ask Dr. Dollar: Do We Have to Bail Out Big Firms Like Bear Stearns?

By Arthur MacEwan, Dollars and Sense. Posted May 21, 2008.


When large financial firms like Bear Stearns fail, the impacts can be very far reaching.
Advertisement

Dear Dr. Dollar,

Who cares if Bear Stearns fails? Or the Carlyle Group? Or Merrill Lynch? Or one of the other big financial companies? They've made their profits. So what's the problem? -- Julia Willebrand, New York, N.Y.

When Bear Stearns, the large New York investment bank, closed its doors in March, some people lost money. Even with the bailout of Bear Stearns engineered by the Federal Reserve, the stockholders of the company paid dearly.

Of course long-term holders of Bear Stearns stock didn't lose so much relative to what they had invested, perhaps years ago. But they lost a lot relative to what they thought they had one year ago. Then the stock was selling for about seventeen times what they ended up getting when, under the tutelage of the Fed, JPMorgan Chase bought Bear Stearns at $10 a share. Recent buyers of Bear Stearns stock, however, were big losers; if they bought a year ago at $170 a share, they ended up taking losses of 94%. Life is tough.

Then there are the employees of Bear Stearns. Hundreds of people are losing their jobs. And right now is not a good time to be looking for work in the financial industry!

But what about the rest of us? It turns out that the rest of us get hurt too when a large financial firm -- or, for that matter, any large firm -- goes under. We see the bad impacts of a firm's failure most clearly in a small town where a single employer plays a major role. When the firm fails, people lose their jobs. The fall in their incomes means they buy less, and other firms and other workers in the town feel the pinch. The impact spreads.

When large financial firms like Bear Stearns fail, the impacts can be very far reaching. These firms have extensive financial connections to other firms, which in turn are dependent on payments of obligations from the failing firms to meet their own obligations. If firm A fails, it doesn't meet its payments to firm B, which then can't meet is obligations to firm C, and so on. Any one of these firms that is close to the edge can be pushed over it by this failure of payments.

But the problem goes beyond these very tangible connections. The financial industry works on confidence. People loan money and buy stocks and bonds based on their confidence that these investments will pay off -- that the firms to which they provide the money will return their money at a profit. When a large financial firm fails, they start to get worried; they lose their confidence. Not only do they fear the consequences of that firm's failure spreading (from A to B to C). They also worry that the same underlying problems that affected that company will affect others and ultimately their investments. Losing confidence, they are reluctant to supply money.

Loss of confidence is especially understandable when the causes of the problems that afflicted Bear Stearns are so well known and widespread. An era of excessively risky investments -- with the sub-prime mortgage mess as the most visible part of the crisis -- is now readily apparent.

But loans make the world go round. Without ready access to loans, firms are forced to cut back their investments and home-buyers find it more difficult -- or more expensive -- to obtain credit for their purchases. Even the student loan market is being affected by the current lack of credit -- this "credit crunch." How many students from middle- and low-income families will not go to college next fall because they cannot get the funds?

So the rest of us can pay a dear price when a large financial firm fails. This is the rationale that the Fed offered when it stepped in to arrange for Bear Stearns to avoid actual failure. Its obligations will be taken over by JPMorgan Chase. But the takeover affects confidence roughly like a failure.

Even when the threat to the rest of us is real, this doesn't mean there has to be a bailout -- or even a partial bailout as took place with Bear Stearns. For example, early this year, the British government nationalized Northern Rock bank when it could not meet its obligations. The government will run the bank, providing extra funds to the extent needed, and, when it is solvent again, will sell it off to private interests. The original stockholders will get money from the sale of the bank, but only after the government gets all of its money back.

Equally important, because the government, operating through the Fed, has to step in when financial firms fail, the government also has to set rules by which those firms operate. Increasingly, regulations have been removed from the financial sector and new sorts of financial firms have been created to avoid existing regulations. But the financial sector is too important, and too volatile, to be left on its own.

Digg!

See more stories tagged with: bear stearns, bailout, fed, regulation

This issue's Dr. Dollar, Arthur MacEwan, teaches economics at UMass-Boston and is a Dollars & Sense associate.



Advertisement

 

Comments Turn comments off sitewide Give us feedback »
Comments closed.
The comments for this story have been closed. Thank you to everyone who participated.
View:
The Current Financial Instability has its Roots in the Dismantling of Capital Controls in the 1970s.
Posted by: yellow on May 21, 2008 1:23 PM   
Current rating: Not yet rated    [1 = poor; 5 = excellent]
Two major events facilitated the evasion and ultimate undermining of the global capital controls that created nearly three decades of stable growth in the post-WWII world economy. The first was the 1963 Interest Equalization Tax proposed by JFK. The tax, which passed the following year, was intended to control US balance of payments deficits by stemming capital flight. It levied a tax on the purchase of foreign securities by Americans from foreigners. The tax amounted to 15% of the total value of equities and 2.75% to 15% of the value of debt obligations (such as bonds) not maturing within three years. The idea was to prevent the massive sale of higher interest foreign bonds in the US market which would lower the selling price of US Treasury bonds worsening on budget deficits or cause a competitive rise in domestic US interest rates that would depress the growth of the US economy. This law eventually spurred the flow of US dollars to offshore accounts seeking higher returns primarily in Europe. By 1980, net Eurocurrency deposits amounted to half a trillion dollars up from about $10 billion in the mid-1960s. This led in great measure to the closing of the gold window in 1971 due to growing pressures on European Central Banks to sell off increasingly inflated stocks of US dollars for gold beginning in the late 1960s.

The 1974 oil price shocks sent billions of OPEC "petro-dollars" into western banks. These were loaned primarily to third world governments in Asia and Latin America who then faced enormous debt crises in the early 1980s with the world recession.


The global recession of the early 1980s, which saw competitive interest rate hikes world wide to stem capital flight in the face of 21% short term rates set in the US by the Federal Reserve Bank to combat inflation, shifted investment from the increasingly stagnant productive economy stymied by overcapacity to the financial sector. The gradual dismantling of capital controls saw a sudden increase in massive cross border capital flows. Such flows were stimulated by the frequent fluctuations of exchange rates, interest rates, equity and bond prices and the emergence of a range of financial innovations like "derivatives." In 1973, cross border foreign exchange trades ranged from $10 billion to $20 billion a day. This represented a 2/1 ratio of foreign exchange trade to the volume of world trade in goods and services. By 1995, daily foreign exchange transactions exceeded $1.2 trillion, a 70/1 ratio with the global trade in goods and services. Cross border sales of US Treasury Bonds increased from $30 billion with the upturn of the business cycle in early 1983 to half a trillion in 1993. International bank lending increased from just over a quarter trillion in 1975 to over $4 trillion in 1994. By the mid-1990s, cross border sales and purchases of bonds and equities between foreigners and US residents exceeded the value of the entire US GDP by 35%!!

Much of this heightened global financial activity was stimulated by interest and exchange rate instability once prevented by capital controls. In the first 25 years after WWII, real interest rates were a low average of 2%. After the Volcker/Reagan recession of 1970-82, real interest rates climbed to an average of 5.1% in most industrial economies. The epoch of financial speculation and the global casino economy was built not on low interest rate inducing bubbles but on the decline of middle class incomes and the real economy upon which it was based. Steadily declining working class incomes and tax cuts for the rich fueled financial speculation at the expense of real investment in production which has declined to nothing. Only a program of progressive taxation and public investment can restore stability and redirect the financial system toward the real economy instead of destabilizing speculation. Consumer debt driven growth has ceased to sustain stagnant late US capitalism.

[« Reply to this comment] [Post a new comment »] [Rate this comment: 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5]

» Yellow, where did you get this piece? Posted by: ReallyBearish
» Then use the KISS principle: Posted by: ReallyBearish
If a Company is "too large" to be allowed to Fail
Posted by: Phred42 on May 22, 2008 5:35 AM   
Current rating: Not yet rated    [1 = poor; 5 = excellent]
Then the Company is Too Large and should be broken up.

If they can't be allowed to fail then it is not it's not Free Market Capitalism. It has become something else and it's dangerous and evil and anti-American.

[« Reply to this comment] [Post a new comment »] [Rate this comment: 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5]

It is a global system of the same type that is causing problems locally
Posted by: nightgaunt on May 22, 2008 11:56 AM   
Current rating: Not yet rated    [1 = poor; 5 = excellent]
The present system writ large to drain the wealth from the masses and concentrate it among the few ultra-wealthy is what is going on.
Reallybearish,some things can't be reduced to the level of 5th grader and still make the necessary point. Redaction leads to loss of information. Shortened attention spans is part of the way to 'dumb us down' so we will be eager for the sound bit over a longer but more informative answer.

[« Reply to this comment] [Post a new comment »] [Rate this comment: 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5]

Market Opportunity
Posted by: Artkansas on May 22, 2008 1:48 PM   
Current rating: 4    [1 = poor; 5 = excellent]
I suspect that were Bear Stearns to go under, it would be only a matter of minutes until its competitors were on the scene divying up its markets and providing similar services. Propping up businesses is foolish.

[« Reply to this comment] [Post a new comment »] [Rate this comment: 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5]

4change now
Posted by: 4changenow on May 22, 2008 8:18 PM   
Current rating: Not yet rated    [1 = poor; 5 = excellent]
"They also worry that the same underlying problems that affected that company will affect others and ultimately their investments. Losing confidence, THEY are reluctant to supply money."

WHO IS "THEY"?

[« Reply to this comment] [Post a new comment »] [Rate this comment: 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5]

Of Course...
Posted by: bobtr900 on May 25, 2008 3:55 PM   
Current rating: Not yet rated    [1 = poor; 5 = excellent]
...we have to bail out Bear Stearns. Bear Stearns says so and Baby Bush says so. They all rationalize it one way or another.

Ford said he wqas going to pardon Nixon for the good of the country. I thinkit was Ford, Nixon and the Rethug party who made out on that one.

[« Reply to this comment] [Post a new comment »] [Rate this comment: 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5]

The problem with economists (even supposedly liberal ones)
Posted by: CounterCorp on May 26, 2008 6:46 PM   
Current rating: Not yet rated    [1 = poor; 5 = excellent]
... is that they tend to see everything through the prism of orthodox economics. And the problem with orthodox economics is that it is precisely what has gotten us where we are today. Modern economics is accepted as if it were a physical science, akin to physics or chemistry, instead of a social science such as anthropology or psychiatry. And its theories are treated as if they were immutable and undeniably true.

The fact is, as this article itself makes clear, economics is largely about human psychology, perception, and dynamic and often irrational behavior. We're constantly told that markets set prices based on the "law" of supply and demand, but in fact we all know from experience that human culture, perception, and psychology, plays a much larger role in the economy than any mythical and iron-clad "laws" of economic theory.

Take for example the author's claim that people lost money when the Bear Stearns pyramid scheme was revealed as such. People don't actually "lose" any real money when the values for stocks, houses, or other commodities they own are inflated and then fall back down again, because it wasn't real wealth to begin with and they never really "had" it.

The best analogy is gambling, because this precisely what speculation is. Suppose I bet $100 that my favorite soccer team will win a certain game. If they win, I stand to collect $500. If the two teams tie, I get to keep my $100, and if my team loses, I lose my $100.

Now suppose my team is winning up until the last five seconds, when the other team scores a goal and ties the game. Did I actually "lose" $400? After all, I was entitled to collect $500 if my team won, and until the other team tied the game, I was winning and was going to get that $500. However, the extra $400 that was going to come my way was not my money, I didn't have it before I made the bet, and I didn't have it afterwards, either.

Thus, I didn't really lose that money in the same way I would have lost my $100 if my team had lose the game (or someone had mugged me on the way home). All I ever had was a chance to make $400 — and then only in very specific circumstances. It was by no means certain or "owed" to me; it was a fleeting opportunity that I had did not create (or, for that matter, ruin) through my efforts, or have any control over whatsoever.

Similarly, the "credit" that the author describes shouldn't really exist in the first place. When wealthy speculators extend credit to each other without any reasonable knowledge of the debtor's ability to pay it back — especially when getting paid back depends on the debtor making money on an equally speculative gamble that he/she did not create or cannot control, then credit becomes over-leveraged and ultimately unstable.

That is not an economy — that is a casino. And we should not want to perpetuate the "casino-fication" of our economy by bailing out (or relying on) what amount to professional gamblers who borrow money — or who "double down" on or roll over speculative gains that only exist as long as there is a perception that they will make more money — and then gamble it away. That's just a sophisticated Ponzi scheme, which transfer rather than actually "create" wealth, and are illegal ...

[« Reply to this comment] [Post a new comment »] [Rate this comment: 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5]