Killing of Aid Workers in Afghanistan Exposes the Dangers of Escalation

As the presumptive presidential candidates push plans to dispatch more troops to Afghanistan, the murders of four humanitarian aid workers is a tragic reminder of the futility of chasing military "victory." The Taliban claims credit for gunning down three Western women and their Afghan driver who worked for the International Rescue Committee, a respected New York-based humanitarian organization. Real "victory" in Afghanistan -- which may already be beyond reach -- lies in helping that hapless country reconstruct itself, the goal the slain aid workers risked their lives for.

It's true that more troops are needed to establish security so that civilians and aid workers can go about the business of reconstruction. That has been the case in Afghanistan since 2001. But "security" and "victory" are different objectives -- a distinction our leaders don't seem to grasp. In Afghanistan, the belated American pursuit of victory threatens to vanquish security altogether.

The Bush administration has been rightly criticized for failing to put "boots on the ground" in Afghanistan, a mistake it repeated in Iraq. Generals who advised that a massive army was needed to occupy Iraq were thinking about security. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, with his lean, mean Army and massive air power, was thinking about victory. The "mission accomplished" in Iraq was "victory" -- and everyone knows how enduring that was.

In Afghanistan, the Bush administration bombed the Taliban into the boondocks, announced victory and withdrew to Iraq. It left the International Security Assistance Force, and later NATO, to create an island of security in the capital for the newly installed Karzai government. It left the provinces in the hands of warlords. In the south and east, "defeated" Taliban melted into the civilian population or slipped over the border to regroup in Pakistan. Since the American victory, the Taliban have come back stronger every year, augmented by new recruits inspired by the American invasion of Iraq.

Nevertheless, international NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) went to work with Afghan civilians eager to rebuild the country. This was the moment -- in 2002 -- when boots on the ground, in massive numbers, to provide security would have made all the difference.

Without that security, Afghan and international aid workers became easy targets for harassment, kidnapping and murder. In 2003, 14 were killed by Taliban or al Qaeda operatives. In the first six months of 2004, another 37 were killed, including five staff members of Medecins Sans Frontieres who were ambushed in Badghis Province, an event that caused MSF to cease operations in Afghanistan. The death toll continued. Recently an umbrella organization representing 100 Afghan and international NGOs warned that insecurity might force them to curtail or discontinue their operations. A few days ago, after the murders of the four workers (a fifth was critically wounded), the International Rescue Committee announced the indefinite suspension of its programs in Afghanistan.

The IRC and MSF are not wimpy organizations. Just the opposite. Both specialize in bringing relief to people in the immediate aftermath of conflict or disaster, and both stick around to get needed services up and running on their own. Both work on health care; the IRC also works on water, sanitation, education and much more. (The young IRC women slain by the Taliban were working to bring disabled children into the country's mainstream education system.) The IRC, which has been delivering humanitarian aid for 75 years, had been working in Afghanistan for 20. The shutdown is a measure of the state of things.

It suggests that while putting more boots on the ground in Afghanistan may be urgent, it may also be too late to reverse the effects of years of neglect coupled with the scams of all those private "aid" and "security" contractors who pocketed taxpayer billions intended for Afghan aid and then went on to perfect their rackets in Iraq.