Defeated in Iraq: How America Lost the War

By Suzi Steffen, AlterNet. Posted April 19, 2008.

Jonathan Steele is a senior correspondent and columnist for London's Guardian newspaper. He made eight reporting trips to Iraq between 2003 and 2006. His new book Defeat: Why They Lost Iraq was recently released in the United States. AlterNet caught up with Steele to talk about his book.

Suzi Steffen: When did you first think about the main thesis for this book -- that the invasion and occupation were unacceptable to Iraqis from the beginning?

Jonathan Steele: Before the invasion, I was keen to know what Iraqis actually thought. After all, it's their country; they're the ones being invaded. They're affected most by the continuation or removal of Saddam. So while I was in Amman [in the lead-up to and just after the U.S.-led invasion], I interviewed a lot of Iraqis. There was a community of about 300,000 in Jordan at that stage. And I thought, look, this is a good chance to talk to Iraqis; my colleague in Baghdad had to have a minder and had a much harder time. I spent several hours every day talking to Iraqis. It wasn't just stopping people in the street; I sat down with people in their homes, in cafés and restaurants. I was struck by how divided and conflicted people were about whether they wanted an invasion.

They were against Saddam; after all, that's why they were exiles in Jordan. But in spite of the fact they were against Saddam, many were against the invasion, so I began to get the sense this was a very complicated thing. The sort of line we were getting from Washington and London that people were fed up and would welcome an invasion -- I realized it was much more complex than that. And when I thought about it more, it was obvious really. It shouldn't have come as a surprise. Occupations are going to be unpopular! People don't want foreign troops in their streets and foreign tanks driving around.

Steffen: And after you got to Iraq?

Jonathan Steele: When I arrived in Baghdad just after April 9, some of the obvious questions to ask Iraqis were, "How do you feel about an occupation?" and, "How long do you think it should last, and how long should the British and Americans remain here?" I got the same sense as in Amman that people were very torn about it.

In the book, I quote one of first people I talked to, a Shia geologist in his early 30s who had studied oil and decided when he graduated that he didn't want to work for the regime. There was no private sector in Iraq at that point. He was a man who was a firm opponent of Saddam; he had sacrificed his career and had become a taxi driver. So when I said, "What do you think about this war?" and he said, "Saddam betrayed us," I was absolutely staggered. I said, "What do you mean?" and he said, "He failed to resist and prevent the occupation of Baghdad."

That kind of comment was repeated in different forms constantly as the occupation continued.

Also, people expected great things from Americans, things that were perhaps a bit unrealistic -- electricity and water and jobs immediately. But they had the idea, "It's a superpower; they toppled Saddam in three weeks, how come they can't get the electricity going?"

Encapsulating the mood, about three months after the invasion, a graffito appeared on the plinth of the famously toppled Saddam statue. The graffito said, "All done, go home." I think that summed it up. It's the same sentiment I remember hearing on great march of [Shia] pilgrims through Karbala within three or four weeks of the toppling of the statue -- "Thank you, and now goodbye."

Of course, no date was ever given of when the occupation was going to end. President Bush talked about Mission Accomplished. The Iraqis echoed that and said, "There are no WMD; you've toppled Saddam; why are you still here?"

First there was a sense of confusion -- we want to be rid of Saddam, but we don't want our country invaded -- then a sense of humiliation with foreign tanks in the streets. Then came suspicion: what's the plan, what's the agenda? The United States must have own its intentions that are not necessarily in our best interests. Then it turned into anger at the Humvees with guns pointed at [Iraqis] -- "They say they liberated us, but now they're treating us as an enemy."

Steffen: I interviewed a Marine who was in the initial occupation. He tells the story that at first, people in the suburbs of Baghdad were bringing out plates of figs, saying, "Why weren't you here sooner?" But then, he said, that ended.

Jonathan Steele: And it ended very quickly in the areas west of Baghdad like Fallujah. I think it was just to be expected. The main thing is that the Americans and the British didn't seem to get into the mind of the Iraqis. The default option in any occupation is to say, people don't like us -- but Americans got the default option completely wrong.

Steffen: In the book, you mention that this might be because the U.S. officials were working from the assumption that occupying Iraq would be like occupying Germany or Japan after WWII.

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Suzi Steffen is a freelance writer in Eugene, Ore., and an arts editor at the Eugene Weekly.

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