Bush Won't Let Facts Stand in the Way of Regime Change in Iran

Listen to this interview.

James Harris: This is Truthdig. James Harris sitting down with Scott Ritter, former chief weapons inspector in Iraq. And today we're talking about the latest report from the National Intelligence Estimate. The report says that Iran is not, as of mid-July, in the nuclear weapons business. Scott Ritter -- I think, wisely -- told me to look at this report with caution and that this means nothing to the White House, that they [members of the Bush team] are about regime change. Please explain.

Scott Ritter: Well, I think it's important to assess patterns of behavior. When we take a look at the Bush administration and how it has sought to implement its policies of regional transformation in the Middle East, inclusive, these policies include the notion of regime change, removing unpopular regimes, regimes that the United States unilaterally declares incompatible with its vision, removing them from power. This includes Saddam Hussein and the theocracy in Tehran. They have demonstrated a tendency to exaggerate threats in the form of weapons of mass destruction to exploit the ignorance of the American public and the fear that is derived from this ignorance. They did so with Iraq. They made a case for war based upon weapons of mass destruction that they fail to back up with anything other than rhetoric. I can say, as a former weapons inspector who ran the intelligence programs from '91 to '98, that we had fundamentally disarmed Iraq, so for the president to say that there's this new weapons capability, he would have to demonstrate some new information, and he failed to do so. And that's why I said, unless he provides this new data, that there isn't the WMD threat that he said. The same thing can be said about Iran.

Harris: Why should we be cautious about what President Bush is telling us right now?

Ritter: Here's a president who has said Iran is a threat, a threat in the form of a nuclear weapons program. But for some time now I have been saying, "Where's the beef, Mr. President? ... "

Harris: Hmm.

Ritter: " ... I hear the rhetoric, but your pattern of behavior leads me to believe that you might be exaggerating the threat, fabricating the threat, misrepresenting data to achieve your policy objective of regime change, trying to exploit the ignorance of the American public and the fear derived from this ignorance." Now we have a National Intelligence Estimate that is released that says, "Time out. There hasn't been a nuclear weapons program in Iran since 2003." Now I need to make a point here: I continue to say that there's never been a nuclear weapons program in Iran. And the National Intelligence Estimate doesn't provide any evidence to sustain its assertion that there was a nuclear program. But be that as it may, they're saying that the concept of Iran today pursuing nuclear weapons is a fallacy. There's no data to promote this. Now, if we lived in world where government functioned the way it's supposed to when it comes to policy -- that is, you get your intelligence, you look at it, you examine it, you assess it, and you say, "OK, how do we now interact with the target, the nation, in this case, Iran?" -- that's normal. That's cause-and-effect relationship.

Harris: Sure.

Ritter: But what we have is, the administration has already made up its mind about what it wants to do with Iran and had been fabricating a case based upon a nuclear weapons program that the U.S. intelligence community now says doesn't exist today. Do you think there will be a change in policy? And the answer, of course, is no, because they've got the cart before the horse. They put the policy out in front. Inconveniently, the intelligence community didn't back them on the nuclear weapons issue.

Harris: But you say Iran's status as a terrorist organization also plays into this. How so?