The Iraq Debacle: A Failure to Communicate?

Connect these dots: The CIA, the Pentagon, the war in Iraq, gay sex and former Republican Rep. Randall "Duke" Cunningham.

Don't see it?

Try this:

The Pentagon says it doesn't want gays in its ranks, which Gen. Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, underscored last week when he called "homosexual acts between two individuals ... immoral."

Next: For several years now the Pentagon has been flushing scores of Arabic linguists from its ranks because they are gay.

Next: There is an acute shortage of Arabic linguists in Iraq.

Next: The war has been hobbled by a lack of language abilities in Iraq.

And finally: Cunningham is in jail because he took bribes from a guy who headed a company, MZM, which was hired to fill the linguist gap in Iraq. Two former CIA guys are linked to bribes and MZM, too.

Sordid, yes. But there's an even more stomach-churning back story to this tale: The linguists could hardly speak Arabic.

And you wonder why there's an intelligence gap?

I thought I was hardened to bad news about Iraq until I talked with Dustin Langan, an Arabic linguist sent to Iraq by MZM shortly after the 2003 invasion.

Langan, now 32, gave a recent and little-noticed interview to Radar magazine that described such criminal folly that I had to call him up and hear it -- and more, as it turned out -- for myself.

The bottom line: The U.S is not just sending people to Iraq with under par language training, in most cases they have been schooled for months in a kind of Arabic that few ordinary Iraqis speak.

"There was no accountability" in Iraq, Langan told me by phone from Spain, where he now lives. "There was absolutely no accountability, no oversight there. So you had all kinds of crazy things happening."

Zero Knowledge

Langan worked for MZM and another linguistics contractor for about 11 months between late 2002 and early 2004.

In September 2002, he was hired by REEP Inc., a contractor in Nashua, N.H., to teach a brush-up course to soldiers who had already taken Arabic at the Defense Language Institute (DLI), in some cases years earlier.

Langan had studied Arabic at DLI himself for four months in 1994.

There were 10 soldiers in his class. How many of them, I asked, could speak Arabic to any useful degree after four months?

"There were zero," he said. "We were doing the mama, papa, caca [Spanish for excrement] Arabic. We were just trying to get the basics."

"I could hear [Arabic] well, and I could pronounce well, and I understood how the language worked. But as far as having a conversation? No, I could hear something, but that was about it."

That experience, I told him, mirrored my own many years ago.

A budding military intelligence case officer, I was sent to DLI for a year to study Vietnamese.

In my class of 10, only a couple of us graduated with a pretty good understanding of the difficult, tonal language.

Langan got an early out from the Army. But finding he had a talent for languages, he threw himself into a year of intensive self-instruction in Arabic, followed by courses at the University of Washington.

"Even after that I felt very shaky about it," he said. "And I should have, because it was quite shaky in terms of fluency."

Fast forward to 2002. Langan, working in a Chinese restaurant near Seattle, gets an e-mail "out of the blue" from REEP to give the six-week brush-up course.

No tests, no screening

He had six military students, most of whom had been through DLI's 20-week course. At least one had taken the 63-week course.

Such training is usually only given to intelligence personnel.

They were there "because they still hadn't scored high on the DLPT" (the Defense Language Proficiency Test), Langan said. His job was to put them through a six-week course of all-Arabic-all-the time "iso-immersion," where soldiers speak Arabic in an isolated environment.