The state of the insurgency …

The International Crisis Group released a read-worthy report about the state of the Iraq insurgency last week (PDF). Here's a taste from the executive summary:

In Iraq, the U.S. fights an enemy it hardly knows. Its descriptions have relied on gross approximations and crude categories (Saddamists, Islamo-fascists and the like) that bear only passing resemblance to reality. This report, based on close analysis of the insurgents' own discourse, reveals relatively few groups, less divided between nationalists and foreign jihadis than assumed, whose strategy and tactics have evolved (in response to U.S. actions and to maximise acceptance by Sunni Arabs), and whose confidence in defeating the occupation is rising.

The analyses of our strategic class will always be our deadly Achilles' heel. Our leaders are fighting a jihad as well; they're religion is Americanism, and they'll jury rig any reality to fit their chosen narrative: the American Way versus anti-Americanism, be it from Islamofascists, Saddam's dead-enders, or quasi-socialist leaders in Latin America. It was the same way during the Cold War: if Kissinger saw two dogs humping he'd interpret it as a Russkie plot to take over the world. So we supported the wrong guys for the wrong reasons and got bogged down on the wrong side of nationalist struggles.

An anti-insurgency approach primarily focused on reducing the insurgents' perceived legitimacy - rather than achieving their military destruction, decapitation and dislocation - is far more likely to succeed.

I'm not sure how you delegitimize the insurgency without doing the one thing the administration refuses to do: set a timetable for withdrawal. I recently highlighted a poll conducted among Iraqis by UMD's Program on International Policy Attitudes that found that 70 percent of Iraqis -- and a majorities of Shi'ites, Sunnis and even Kurds - wanted the fledgling Iraqi government to request a timetable for the withdrawal of American forces. Three quarters of the Iraqis surveyed believed that the U.S. wouldn't honor such a request. As I noted at the time, that's the difference between being viewed as occupiers or as liberators.

Anyway, I encourage you to read the report. Here are some highlights from ICG's conclusions:

• The insurgency increasingly is dominated by a few large groups with sophisticated communications. It no longer is a scattered, erratic, chaotic phenomenon. Groups are well organised, produce regular publications, react rapidly to political developments and appear surprisingly centralised.
• There has been gradual convergence around more unified practices and discourse, and predominantly Sunni Arab identity. A year ago groups appeared divided over practices and ideology but most debates have been settled through convergence around Sunni Islamic jurisprudence and Sunni Arab grievances. For now virtually all adhere publicly to a blend of Salafism and patriotism, diluting distinctions between foreign jihadis and Iraqi combatants - though that unity is unlikely to outlast the occupation.
• Despite recurring contrary reports, there is little sign of willingness by any significant insurgent element to join the political process or negotiate with the U.S. While covert talks cannot be excluded, the publicly accessible discourse remains uniformly and relentlessly hostile to the occupation and its "collaborators".
• The groups appear acutely aware of public opinion and increasingly mindful of their image. Fearful of a backlash, they systematically and promptly respond to accusations of moral corruption or blind violence, reject accusations of a sectarian campaign and publicise efforts to protect civilians or compensate their losses. Some gruesome and locally controversial practices - beheading hostages, attacking people going to the polls - have been abandoned. The groups underscore the enemy's brutality and paint the U.S. and its Iraqi allies in the worst possible light: waging dirty war in coordination with sectarian militias, engaging in torture, fostering the country's division and being impervious to civilian losses.
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