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Signs of Life In Iran's Reform Movement
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[Editor's Note: This essay is part of a series of Audits of the Conventional Wisdom, a project of the Center for International Studies at MIT.]
The surprise victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the Iranian Presidential election last June brings up the question of whether the reform movement is dead in Iran. Does Ahmadinejad's success imply that Iranians have economic demands only? Who now are the supporters of reform?
Political reform is defined as constitutionality; monitoring political authorities and making them responsive; strengthening the civil society and its institutions; increasing the socio-political participation of all citizens; fair distribution of wealth, power, and freedom; and respect for humanity.
Looking at the first round of the presidential election, we see that the total votes of all the conservative candidates combined (Mahmud Ahmadinezhad, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, and Ali Larijani) was 11 million, while the total votes for all the reformist candidates (Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Mehdi Karrubi, Mostafa Moin, and Mohsen Mehralizadeh) came to 17 million votes. Therefore, the reformists got 6 million votes more than the conservatives, despite many allegations of election fraud and interference. Also, around 20 million of the eligible voters boycotted the election, believing that it was not going to be free and safe.
In the second round, both Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad entered the competition with promises to improve the economy. The key point is that Ahmadinejad was relatively unknown to the public and without a negative record, while Hashemi-Rafsanjani had a not-so-positive past record, and faced well-organized campaigns against him.
Despite all of its shortcomings, the reform movement has some of its achievements planted so deep into society that they survive; even conservative hardliners adopted reformist slogans during the June elections, proof that change remains underway. As Mohammed Khatami, the reformist president from 1997 to June 2005, said: "A need for reform has been entrenched in the heart of the society and that will help the reform going." But will it keep going, and what will prevent its forward movement?
Obstacles to reform
There are three major obstacles for the reform movement:
1. The political structure of Iran. Iran's constitution is not democratic, because the Supreme Leader has the ultimate power. The president, parliament, the judicial system, the army and police, national television and radio, the Guardian Council, the Expediency Council, the Council of Constitutional Change, and some important economic enterprises, among others, are supervised by the Supreme Leader. Even though the president and parliament are two sections of the power structure that are elected by the people, the formation and authority of both can be strongly controlled by those branches chosen through the Supreme Leader. This came very clear in the 6th Majlis (parliament), which was very limited in law-making and monitoring power. According to the constitution, all bills passed by Majlis have to be approved by the conservative Guardian Council, and in case of any disputes over legislation between the Majlis and the Guardian Council, the Expediency Council makes the final decision.
The formation of the 7th Majlis was not the result of a free election, considering that over 2500 registered candidates were barred from entering the competition.
Islam is recognized by the constitution as the principal religion, with the Shi'a sect being superior to others. There is little freedom of religion, and there are legal barriers for the participation of religious minorities and minority Islamic sects in key positions such as the presidency; the only exception is membership of the parliament, which is specifically mentioned in the constitution. In cases where there are no legal barriers for the participation of religious minorities, still some Shi'a clerics oppose the participation of minorities including Sunni Muslims.
According to the constitution, parliament cannot make any laws that are contrary to Sharia (Islamic law), and the final decision is made by the Guardian Council.
Dr. Fatemeh Haghighatjoo is a visiting scholar at MIT's Center for International Studies. A native of Tehran, she was elected to the Majlis in 2000 and served for four years. This article was translated from Farsi by Negar Mortazavi.
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