Rice Confirmed

By Sen. Edward M. Kennedy . Posted January 26, 2005.

Editor's Note: Condoleezza Rice was confirmed Wednesday as secretary of state with a vote of 85-13. In a statement from Jan. 25, Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) explains below why he intended to be one of the No votes.

Mr. President, I intend to oppose Condoleezza Rice's nomination. There is no doubt that Dr. Rice has impressive credentials. Her life story is very moving, and she has extensive experience in foreign policy.

In general, I believe the president should be able to choose his Cabinet officials. But this nomination is different, because of the war in Iraq. Dr. Rice was a key member of the national security team that developed and justified the rationale for war, and it's been a catastrophic failure, a continuing quagmire. In these circumstances, she should not be promoted to secretary of state.

There is a critical question about accountability. Dr. Rice was a principal architect and advocate of the decision to go to war in Iraq, at a time when our mission in Afghanistan was not complete and Osama bin Laden was a continuing threat because of our failure to track him down.

In the Armed Services Committee before the war, generals advised against the rush to war. But Dr. Rice and others in the administration pressed forward anyway, despite the clear warnings.

Dr. Rice was the first in the administration to invoke the terrifying image of a nuclear holocaust to justify the need to go to war in Iraq. On Sept. 9, 2002, as Congress was first considering the resolution to authorize the war, Dr. Rice said: " ... We don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud."

In fact, as we now know, there was significant disagreement in the intelligence community about Iraq's nuclear weapons program. But Dr. Rice spoke instead about a consensus in the intelligence community that the infamous aluminum tubes were for the development of nuclear weapons.

On Sept. 8, 2002, she said the aluminum tubes "are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs." On July 30, 2003, she said "the consensus view of the American intelligence agency" is that the tubes "were most likely" for use in nuclear weapons.

Dr. Rice continually spoke of the "contacts between al Qaeda and Iraq" and the "connection" between al Qaeda and Saddam. In fact, as we now know, there was no operational link between Iraq and al Qaeda – as the 9/11 Commission has confirmed.

On the eve of the war, many of us argued that inspectors should be given a chance to do their job and that America should share information to facilitate their work. In a March 6, 2003 letter to Sen. Levin, Dr. Rice assured the Congress that "United Nations inspectors have been briefed on every high or medium priority weapons of mass destruction, missile, and UAV-related site the U.S. [i]ntelligence [c]ommunity has identified."

In fact, we had not done so. Dr. Rice was plain wrong. The Intelligence Committee's report on pre-war intelligence concluded "Public pronouncements by administration officials that the Central Intelligence Agency had shared information on all high and moderate priority suspect sites with United Nations inspectors were factually incorrect."

Had Dr. Rice and others in the administration acknowledged publicly that the U.S. had not shared all information, it might have changed the course of history. The rush to war might have been stopped. We would have stayed focused on real threat, kept faith with our allies, and would be safer today.

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