Chopper Down In the New Vietnam

The killing of 18 US troops and wounding of 20 others in Iraq on November 2 brings to mind the successful attack by Viet Cong guerrillas on US forces in Pleiku, Vietnam on February 7, 1965.

The Johnson administration immediately seized on that attack, in which nine US troops were killed and 128 wounded, to start bombing North Vietnam and to send 3,500 Marines to South Vietnam. Unlike the US advisory forces already in country, the Marines had orders to engage in combat, marking the beginning of the Americanization of the war. By 1968 US forces had grown to over 536,000.

From the outset, my colleagues in CIA were highly skeptical that even with a half-million troops the US could prevail in Vietnam. They were quick to remind anyone who would listen of the candid observation made by General Philippe LeClerc, who was sent to Vietnam shortly after WW-II. The French general reported that, mainly because of the strong commitment of the Vietnamese nationalists/communists and their proven proficiency in guerrilla war, a renewed French campaign would require 500,000 men and that, even then, France could not win.

Civilian Whiz Kids vs. Military Professionals

In 1965, similar warnings were blissfully ignored by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and the civilian whiz kids with whom he had surrounded himself. Then as now, the advice of our professional military was dismissed.

While today’s civilian leaders at the Defense Department hobbled through what passed for post-war planning for Iraq early this year, Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki warned the Senate Armed Services Committee that post-war Iraq would require “something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers.” He was immediately ridiculed by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz for having exaggerated the requirement. This evokes vivid memories of how McNamara and his civilian whiz kids dissed our professional military—and at such a high eventual price.

The poet George Santayana warned, “Those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it.” What is increasingly clear is that neither the present-day Pentagon whiz kids nor their patron, Vice President Dick Cheney, have learned much from history. They encourage President Bush to insist, “We are not leaving;” and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld to protest that this war is “winnable.” But most of those with a modicum of experience in guerrilla warfare and the Middle East are persuaded that the war is not winnable and that the only thing in doubt is the timing of the US departure.

After many weeks of refusing to admit the word “guerrilla” into evidence, Rumsfeld seems to have made his peace with it. Yet, when asked yesterday on TV who are the guerrillas, he foundered, admitting in so many words that he hasn’t a clue. I was actually embarrassed for him. A terrific debater and otherwise reasonably smart man, Rumsfeld was reduced to telling us once again that Iraq is the size of California and bemoaning the deficiencies in “situational awareness” and lack of “perfect visibility” into who are those who are killing our troops.

At least yesterday we were spared the usual claims that we are “moving forward” and will prevail “at the end of the day.” Apparently even Rumsfeld could see how incongruous such banalities would have sounded after such a disastrous week.

Recent sloganeering is eerily reminiscent of a comparable stage in our involvement in Vietnam. We would have to “stay the course.” We could not “cut and run”—though that is precisely what we ended up doing in 1975 after 58,000 US troops and 3 million Vietnamese had been killed. Why did we leave? Because Congress, at last, came to realize that the war was unwinnable.