Time for a Reality Check in Iraq

The foreign ministers of the five permanent members of the Security Council met in Geneva, and unsurprisingly, did not come to agreement over the future of Iraq. But the sound of silence is often significant in diplomacy. There was little of the name-calling and public vituperation that marked such negotiations over the war last year, nor were there any peremptory demands from Washington for an immediate vote and resolution.

Contrary to appearances, significant efforts are underway behind the scenes to find a workable compromise -- a solution that will help get the Americans out of the hole they have dug for themselves, without pulling the UN and the rest of the world into the sinkhole with them. George W. Bush will address the UN General Assembly on Sept. 23. While there is some pressure inside the administration to get a Security Council resolution first, the consensus is that his speech will be aimed at the opposition, to soften up the ground for a favorable vote.

But the real opposition is in Washington, where some of the hardliners are still seething over the decision to go back to the UN. The prospects for a workable solution for Iraq depend as much on how the debate inside the administration is resolved as they do on negotiations within the UN.

Ideologues have a difficult time grappling with reality. It is often complicated, requires compromise, and entails making difficult choices. Given the current state of affairs in Iraq, there are no easy or perfect solutions. As the apocryphal lost traveler in the West of Ireland was told, “If I was you, I wouldn’t start from here!” So while the U.S. should not have gone into Iraq, its invasion has created a different reality that requires a pragmatic rather than an ideological strategy.

For weeks, the Bush administration was holding out for a Security Council mandate to legitimize the U.S. occupation -- a wildly optimistic expectation that reflected its alarming disconnect from reality. Donald Rumsfeld was fondly indulging his fantasy of tens of thousands of Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi troops under U.S. command, but enlisted by a UN resolution. By recruiting native foot-soldiers of the former British Raj to replace American GIs, Rumsfeld hoped to preserve his reputation, which he had staked on the effectiveness of a relatively small U.S. force to both invade and occupy Iraq.

At the Geneva summit and in talks in New York, there were reassuring signs that the Bush administration may be ready to relinquish such neoconservative fantasies. It is in no one's interests, including the long-suffering Iraqis, for the country to disintegrate into chaos. The reality check which compelled the Bush administration to return to the UN has also pushed the French, Russians and Germans a long way toward a compromise. The French and Russians (much mollified by a hint of continuing contracts for TotalFinaElf and Lukoil) are pursuing a reasonable course that will give everyone -- except the die-hard hawks in the Bush administration -- what they want. It's the same type of pragmatism that impelled the Arab League to abandon its own version of political puritanism and give qualified recognition to the Iraqi Governing Council.

The most effective solution would be the institution of some form of UN surveillance and monitoring of the political transition, accompanied by a U.S.- or NATO-led military operation. No one who remembers the tendency of UN peacekeepers to surrender at the first militia road block -- be it in Cambodia, Bosnia or Sierra Leone -- could seriously expect the UN to ensure security in Iraq. The bloodthirsty militias operating are armed well-enough. We don't need to add the arms of UN peacekeepers to their arsenal. Military security is simply not the organization's métier.