Failing To Make the Case for War

Wednesday morning, decorated war hero and current Secretary of State Colin Powell -- a man who has fought in or helped lead his military in a half dozen more wars than all the politicians he now works for, combined -- went before the United Nations and global television viewers and delivered what the Bush Administration has withheld for half a year: the firm evidence that, it says, justifies war.

Or not.

Powell's lack of rhetorical grandstanding was welcome, as was the specificity of his charges. That being said, they still fail to justify launching a war.

The first and most obvious problem is that it wouldn't be a launch. It would be a dramatic and gruesome escalation, to be sure, one that even its lead architect has compared, publicly and approvingly, to Hiroshima. But three presidents have been waging continuous war against Iraq's government and its people for a dozen years -- from the Gulf War, to economic sanctions, to the unilaterally imposed no-fly zones, to regular bombings, to covert efforts to overthrow or assassinate Iraq's leaders, to the current, steadily increasing bombing runs and psychological pressure on the Iraqis. Powell's presentation was not a case for war; it was part of the war itself, and should be understood as such.

The problem all along with a level-headed assessment of the Bush Administration's myriad justifications for an overt invasion and "regime change" -- justifications that have been frequently shifting, at times contradictory, and often demonstrably false -- is that they have been in the service of a predetermined conclusion. Regardless of whether a decision to invade had been made, and when, there has never been any question that Bush and his circle of hawks have wanted war, the bigger the better, and that the question in their minds was less whether it was justified than how to sell it to allies and to the public.

The White House's arguments for war all along have been less conclusions based on evidence than evidence based on conclusions -- less like the determination of a judge, and more like the lawyers arguing to the jury. Powell's presentation to the U.N., with its more concrete evidence and its more sober demeanor, should be considered every bit as critically, and skeptically, as those of the more hyperbolic prosecutors preceding him.

And, to quote the late, wondrous Peggy Lee: Is that all there is?

Powell's evidence rests primarily on two assertions: that Iraq's government cooperates with Al-Qaeda, and that it has also sought to hide evidence from U.N. weapons inspectors.

Every word could be true. But it is the words still not present that stand out. There is still absolutely no evidence that the Iraqi government, now or at any foreseeable point in the future, poses a security threat even to its immediate neighbors -- let alone to the United States, halfway around the world. There is no evidence that Iraq, a country whose military is a fifth of its size ten years ago, a country crippled militarily (and in many other ways) by the most rigorous sanctions in world history, a country whose every move is closely monitored, a country which knows that any aggressive twitch would be instantly suicidal, now even possesses the capacity to inflict harm on any other country -- let alone is a threat to do so, and let alone that the United States is among those threatened.

As a subset of those absent allegations, there is no evidence that Iraq possesses even any components of any weapons of mass destruction, let alone fully intact and operational weapons, let alone the means to deliver them outside its borders, let alone halfway around the world.

Powell didn't even try to make such a case; he argued solely that Iraq has repeatedly withheld from inspectors information of undetermined significance. Even if true, this does not justify an invasion; it simply permits that decision, in a legal sense. Under the resolution the U.S. pushed through the Security Council last fall, failure to fully comply gives the United Nations the legal authority to authorize the use of force. It does not prove that war is necessary, or even that it is the best choice. It certainly does not give the United States carte blanche to do whatever the Bushies want.