Wikileaks Info Cherry-Picked by Corporate Media to Bolster Case Against Iran
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Indeed, if one amended the above opening paragraph to say, ‘the U.S. launched an invasion of said nefarious Middle Eastern country,’ this tale would obviously be the story of Curveball, the famously fraudulent defector source who provided details of Iraq’s alleged biological weapons program to German intelligence, which passed it on to their U.S. counterparts.
Curveball’s information made its way into 112 reports from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency between January 2000 and September 2001. Eventually, Curveball’s story wound up in the controversial October 2002 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate, which omitted early warnings about Curveball’s reliability. The NIE was created to pass to Congress ahead of a vote to authorize force against Iraq, which Congress did. The false accusation about mobile biological weapons labs eventually made into President George W. Bush’s 2003 State of the Union address and, just nine days later, in Secretary of State Colin Powell’s address to the U.N. Security Council. Exactly six weeks after that, the U.S. launched its invasion of Iraq.
And now this drama is replaying with Iran at center stage. Given the intelligence debacle in the run up to the Iraq war, many observers are urging a more cautious reading of the intelligence reports contained in the WikiLeaks dump.
“The documents released by WikiLeaks are U.S. government documents produced by intelligence agencies and others and, as such, should not be accepted as confirming anything other than that the U.S. is producing information about Iran’s perceived role in Iraq,” said Joost Hiltermann, the deputy director of the International Crisis Group’s Middle East Program.
“It won’t take much to convince me, based on research in Iraq, that Iran has been playing a certain role in Iraq involving weapons supplies, armed attacks, war by proxy, and what have you,” Hiltermann continued. “But this is not the same as accepting intelligence documents produced by a party to the conflict between the U.S. and Iran hook, line, and sinker as incontrovertible proof that Iran has been doing x, y, and z.”
University of Minnesota professor William Beeman wrote on his blog that the documents do not constitute proof, but rather only give “verbatim internal reports” instead of broader accusations previously made by senior military officials in Iraq. The older allegations seem to have been based on the reports, but Beeman notes that “the evidence is no more compelling for its repetition.”
And at the Foreign Policy Journal website, Jeremy Hammond, in the course of picking apart the Times piece for inconsistencies, notes that the claim that some revelations were “broadly consistent” with other classified documents and official accounts—all of which would also come through the lens of the U.S. government.
“As for being ‘broadly consistent’ with public accounts by military officials, this is a meaningless statement from which no conclusions about the accuracy of the reports may be drawn,” continues Hammond. “After all, the infamous documents purporting to show that Iraq under Saddam Hussein had sought to purchase yellowcake uranium from Niger were ‘broadly consistent’ with public claims about Iraq’s possession and pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), but they were fabrications nevertheless.”
And therein lies the call for more caution in reading single-source U.S. government (in this case, military/ intelligence) reports—mistakes have been made before, and they left Iraq in a bloody shambles. Skepticism would be especially well-founded for the New York Times piece on Iran’s ties to the Shia insurgency in Iraq. Consider this sampling of Times articles on the subject, along with the bylines:
- “Iran Aiding Shiite Attacks Inside Iraq, General Says,” June 23, 2006, by Michael R. Gordon