Speculating Banks Still Rule -- Ten Ways Dems and Dodd Are Failing on Financial Reform
As we wind up for another dramatic bipartisan squabble over all the crap Wall Street flung at us, things are getting back to normal – for the wealthy. The top 25 hedge fund managers made a record $25.3 billion dollars in 2009. And despite all those dramatic congressional hearings, average compensation of Wall Street bankers rose by 27 percent in 2009. Meanwhile, banks are hiding their debt with the same old balance sheet magic they've been deploying for years and posting record new trading revenues—putting the economy at risk while creating no perceptible economic benefits.On the other side of humanity, more sobering numbers include a record 2.8 million properties in foreclosure for 2009, a 21 percent increase over 2008's astonishingly high figure, with another 4.5 million foreclosures projected for 2010. Federal mortgage modification plans have not stemmed this tide, because lenders aren't required to particiapte; and lenders, in the words of Herman Melville's Bartleby, "would prefer not to" renegotiate a mortgage for which they'd then have to book a loss. As foreclosures continued to climb, so did bankruptcies, rising 35 percent in 2009 over 2008 levels.
Meanwhile, banks are using other federal funds to bolster speculative operations. The biggest banks, such as Bank of America, J.P. Morgan Chase and Wells Fargo, are on a dangerous cycle of higher trading profits and mounting losses in their consumer businesses. In other words, banking businesses that are tied to the real economy are dying, but raw gambling disguised as finance is doing fine. Wall Street is making money by rolling the dice – again. All this risky activity seems to be going unnoticed in
Today's juvenile partisan antics guarantee no meaningful reform bill will be produced, and mock our own history of bipartisan bank reform. In 1932, Senate investigations into the behavior of banks that precipitated the 1929 stock market crash were commissioned by a Republican Congress under Republican President Herbert Hoover. They continued under Democrat President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and substantive reform was passed, including the Glass-Steagall Act that decisively separated speculative from consumer oriented banks. Equivalent investigations this year are a joke.
Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd's financial "reform" proposal (Barney Frank's wasn't much better) won't change the nature of anything Wall Street does. Dodd's needless watering down of a proposal to create a new Consumer Financial Protection Agency has been well-documented, so here is a list of 10 other problems Dodd's bill will not fix:
1) It won't make the biggest most "systemically important" banks (read: systemically destructive) any smaller. It won't even reduce the size of banks like Bank of America and Wells Fargo that are operating with more more than 10 percent of U.S. insured deposits -- a limit currently imposed by law. Instead, it will add another 10 percent liability cap that banks can ignore, allow the Fed to keep selectively merging banks, and then create a new council to determine still more concentration limits that can subsequently be ignored. Regulators had plenty of power going into the crisis. Congress needs to force them to exercise it, and force a breakup of the biggest banks, now. Those that failed the economy last time around cannot be expected to get it right next time with an expanded set of powers.
2) It won't reduce the economic danger from rampant, overleveraged trading activities. The bill would restrict certain banks from having proprietary trading operations (trading with their own capital) under the "Volcker rule," but it's full of problematic exemptions:
a) Banks that claim they trade on behalf of their customers (which they all say they do) escape the rule.b) Banks that trade for "market-making" purposes (i.e. Goldman Sachs betting against its own clients) are home-free. c) Banks aren't required to itemize their trading operations to regulators, so they get to decide what they consider trading for their customers and what they consider proprietary. I wonder how that will work out.
3) It won't change the nature, transparency, size, complexity or usage of the most heinous derivatives. Why?Because the derivatives that are not standardized or over-the-counter (OTC) will not be required to be traded on regulated exchanges, though they may have to show up on trading depositories (private entities, whose boards are comprised of bankers).
4) It won't prevent the creation of new toxic assets. It will require issuers of these assets to retain 5 percent of any package they sell off to investors (keeping some skin in the game), but there is no way to monitor which 5 percent is kept, and even that rule has a bunch of embedded exemptions.
5) It won't contain the risk to the shadow banking system from hedge funds, private equity firms and venture capital funds. Venture capital and private equity advisers still won't have to register or report to the SEC, though hedge funds with over $100 million in assets will. There's also no statutory definition of what actually constitutes a hedge fund, and the bill doesn't close the tax loophole that allows fund managers to be taxed at the lower capital-gains tax rate of 15 percent, rather than the higher income tax rate of 34 percent. If it sounds crazy to you that the richest people in
Ostensibly, this confirms that regulators don't understand how these banks operate now. But these living wills won't help shut down big banks. They conduct millions of dollars worth of trading operations, including complex derivatives trades, every single day. The living will would be out of date hours after it was authored.None of this is reform. We're actually better off with no legislation than we are with this vapid 1,336-page opus—the false sense of security it creates will only encourage greater risk-taking. If the Dodd bill passes in its current version, we absolutely, unequivocally will see another system-wide crash that will invoke greater hardships on the country than the last collapse.