Throwing Bullets at Failed Policies: U.S. Plans for New Bases in Colombia
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It was a winter day in the Argentine city of Bariloche when 12 South American presidents gathered there on Aug. 28. It was so cold that Venezuela's Hugo Chavez wore a red scarf, and Bolivia's Evo Morales put on a sweater.
The presidents arrived at the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) meeting to discuss a U.S. plan to establish seven new military bases in Colombia. Although officials in Colombia and the U.S. say the bases would be aimed at combating terrorism and the drug trade, U.S. military documents point to other objectives.
Earlier this year, when Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa decided to not renew the U.S. lease on the military base in Manta, Ecuador, the U.S. set its sights on Colombia, a longtime U.S. ally and one of the biggest recipients of U.S. military aid in the world.
Under the agreement the U.S. eventually developed with Colombia, the U.S. would have access to seven military bases for 10 years, stationing up to 1,400 U.S. personnel and private contractors.
One U.S. military document cited by the Associated Press explains that the Palenquero base in Colombia -- which the U.S. plans transform with a $46 million upgrade -- would be a stopping-off point for the U.S. Air Force so that "nearly half the continent can be covered by a C-17 (military transport) without refueling."
Uruguayan analyst Raul Zibechi writes in an article for the Americas Program that the U.S. is shifting away from large, immobile bases to more a more flexible model involving smaller bases. He cites the U.S. Air Force's April 2009 report, "Global en Route Strategy," which "refers to the ability to utilize these installations above all for air transport, making it possible to have control from a distance and act as a dissuasive force, leaving direct intervention only for exceptionally critical situations."
The cooperation of local governments is a key aspect of this plan. Zibechi writes, "This ongoing cooperation is much more important than direct military presence, as current military technology allows troops to concentrate in any given area within a matter of hours."
Considering the regional implications of the expanded U.S. presence, the presidents at the Bariloche meeting agreed that UNASUR countries will "abstain from resorting to the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity" of other South American countries and planned to investigate the military bases agreement further.
Yet what many of the region’s presidents already know is that increased U.S. militarization is unlikely to curb violence in Colombia, because the biggest perpetrators of violence in the country are already allies of the U.S., largely through the multibillion dollar Plan Colombia.
"The largest number of killings of civilians each year in Colombia is not committed by the guerrillas," Latin America political analyst John Lindsay Poland writes in the Americas Program. "A large majority of Colombia's 4.7 million internally displaced people were forced from their homes by paramilitary violence, with more than 11 million acres of land violently stolen.
"The increased U.S. military presence won't contribute anything to returning those lands to their rightful owners, nor to holding the Colombian army accountable for more than 1,700 civilian killings committed since 2002."
U.S. soldiers in Colombia also reportedly committed 37 acts of sexual abuse from 2006 to 2007. Poland writes, "A U.S. soldier and contractor reportedly raped a 12-year-old Colombian girl inside the Tolemaida military base in 2006, dumping her outside the gates in the morning." The two suspects remain free and are back in the U.S. without facing charges.
An increased U.S. military presence in a failed war on drugs is also unlikely to curtail narcotrafficking, as pointed out by Morales at the meeting in Bariloche. Morales spoke of his experiences as a coca grower and union leader facing the brunt of U.S. militarization.