Is the Real Power in Iran ... Eastasia or Eurasia?

I'm not going to call out Greg Bruno and Jamal Afridi of the Council on Foreign Relations for spinning the upcoming Iranian elections. I don't know the authors, and can't gauge their intent in writing this in a recent backgrounder (also, they're more or less correct):

Officially the highest elected office in the Islamic Republic of Iran's bureaucracy, the president remains subordinate to the Supreme Leader, who serves as the final arbiter on foreign policy, media, nuclear-related decisions, and military and national security.

The president, meanwhile, carries out the "functions of the executive" as outlined in Iran's constitution, duties that range from appointing ambassadors and cabinet ministers to planning and executing the national budget. Article 113 of the constitution stipulates that executive power is subservient to "the office of Leadership" ...

And while Ahmadinejad has repeatedly defended Iran's right to pursue peaceful nuclear technologies, final decisions on uranium enrichment and the overall direction of the program lie with Khamenei.

Again, this isn't directed at the CFR backgrounder per se -- I could have used the Guardian's "How Important is the Iranian President?" to make my point. I just think it's worth noting, again, the perfect fluidity in which the power structures within Iran are described in the mainstream discourse...

When a reformer occupies the office of the president -- as was the case during Mohammad Khatami's term, from 1997-2005 -- then one hears quite a bit about how the Iranian presidency is a toothless office that doesn't direct foreign or military policy. In that period, it was commonly argued that his moderate approach to governance was inconsequential because of the power of Ali Khamenei, the ominously-titled "Supreme Leader." But when a buffoonish hardliner like Ahmadinejad is in office all of that is forgotten, and he, happily playing the role of The Next Hitler™ for many in the West -- easily caricatured as a crazed Holocaust-denier with nuclear ambitions -- has been a convenient foil for his neoconservative counterparts in Israel and the United States.

If it were commonly understood that Ahmadinejad is, in the words of Juan Cole, the equivalent to a Minister of the Interior in many states, it'd be a lot more difficult to portray Iran as a country with expansionist tendencies -- it's still been over 100 years since the state attacked another in conventional terms. 

Which explains why people like Daniel Pipes want Ahmadinejad to come out of the upcoming vote victorious.

Anyway, I just think this is a narrative of which readers should be wary. I don't think it's a stretch to predict that we'll be hearing a lot about the awesome power Ahmadinejad wields if he wins, and how thoroughly subordinated the Iranian presidency is if Mir Hossein Mousavi, who is far more appealing to Western audiences, emerges as the new president.

PS: For a better understanding of Iran's political and social divisions, let me once again recommend Hooman Majd's excellent book, The Ayatollah Begs to Differ: The Paradox of Modern Iran. We ran an excerpt from it a while back, which you can read here.