The Prince of Darkness Explains Iraq

By David Corn, AlterNet. Posted May 10, 2002.

It was late. The sidewalks were empty. Four blocks away, the dome of the Capitol shined brightly. In front of me stood the Prince of Darkness. With his dark eyes locked upon me, he was demanding information.

"Why do you liberals keep defending Saddam Hussein?"

Richard Perle, an assistant Secretary of Defense under Ronald Reagan, who earned that comic-book-villain nickname by being the most hawkish of the hawks, was continuing a debate we had just finished in a television studio.

His query was a telling one, in an anthropological way, for it provided insight into the thought patterns of the neocon tribe that has been beating the drums for war in the land of Mesopotamia.

I had expressed doubt about the necessity of invading Iraq and the ability of the Bush Administration to cajole any other Arab nation to endorse this crusade. And that, in Perle's mind, was equivalent to defending a thuggish dictator who has used chemical weapons against his own citizens.

Couldn't he see that opposing war was not the same as supporting Saddam? Apparently not. The fact that he was entrapped in a bipolar, Cold War-like perspective, was unsettling, for Perle now heads the Defense Policy Board, a group of outside-the-Pentagon military intellectuals that advise the Department of Defense. His prejudices and biases carry beyond the talk-show circuit.

Gamely, I tried to educate the man. Before taking the country to war, I said, President Bush was obligated to present a solid case to the American public, and so far Bush and his crew have only asserted that Saddam poses a threat. They have not proven that Saddam's supposed pursuit of weapons of mass destruction has made him a clear and present danger to the United States.

Before the United States attacks another nation -- and, intentionally or not, kills civilians -- an administration should show why such a drastic step cannot be avoided. This ought to be done to win public support -- at home and abroad -- and to persuade Congress, which would have to authorize the assault.

"What evidence do you need?" Perle asked with a grin.

Something is better than nothing, I said, and all we have gotten so far is nothing. What about intelligence reports? Electronic intercepts? Overhead satellite photographs? During the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy released reconnaissance shots that showed Soviet missiles were being deployed in Cuba.

"Only trained photo-interpreters could tell what they meant." Perle replied.

That's true. But 40 years ago, the world of photo-interpretation was much smaller than it is now. If the United States were to release similar photos to demonstrate Iraq was close to obtaining nuclear weapons, there would be experts outside the U.S. government -- in the private sector and in other governments -- who could confirm or dispute the administration's reading of the data. But it need not be photos. The President could share whatever information he bases his call-to-war upon.

Perle moved closer and said, "Trust me."

Sorry, I answered, I don't think we should head to war merely on the say-so of a few government officials. Besides, I added politely, why trust you? Why not trust Scott Ritter?

Ritter was the chief UN weapons inspector in Iraq who quit the program in 1998 because he felt the Clinton administration was not being sufficiently forceful in its dealings with Saddam. At the time, he was hailed by conservatives.

These days, Ritter can often be spotted on television explaining that Iraq poses no threat to the United States at this time and that there is no justification for a U.S. attack.

Ritter, Perle huffed, is "unstable."

Low blow, I said.

Perle claimed he does not call everyone with whom he disagrees "unstable." But, he said, this was an appropriate term for a fellow who had changed his position 180 degrees.

What about Norman Podhoretz? I shot back, attempting an inside joke. Podhoretz, a founding father of Perle's neoconservative posse, had been a liberal before turning (famously and infamously) into a conservative.

"He explained it," Perle said, referring to the Pod's extensive writings. But, I retorted, so too did Ritter, who wrote the book "Endgame," published in 1999, which covered his adventures in Iraq and his short-of-war recommendations for US policy. With that, we said good night, and Perle entered the car waiting for him.

Stalemate? I doubt much convincing had occurred during this exchange. I certainly did not believe "trust me" was appropriate justification for war. And Perle never acknowledged there was anything problematic in such an approach to governing.

On the way home, I recalled the other dollop of insider wisdom he attempted to impart to me that night. When we first walked out of the studio, Perle sharply said, "Why do you think we need anyone else?" He was replying to my on-air skepticism regarding Bush's effort to win Arab backing for a military move against Iraq.

I noted there were widespread media reports saying an attack would require up to 250,000 troops. These soldiers could not all be air-dropped into Iraq. They would have to come from somewhere, such as Saudi Arabia. And a military action of this size would need extensive logistical support nearby.

Forget the 250,000 figure, Perle said: "The Army guys don't know anything. They said we needed 500,000 troops in 1991 [for the Gulf War]. Did we need that many to win? No."

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