Sex, Beer, Heroin and Cocaine: How Prosecutors Pay Off Criminal Snitches

In Chicago during the late 1980s, the U.S. attorney was prosecuting a ruthless, religiously inspired gang called the El Rukns. Federal prosecutors were so dependent on incarcerated gang leaders to make their case that six informants were permitted to make a hedonistic mockery of the criminal justice system. Henry Leon Harris was one of several who had sex with a visiting wife or girlfriend in the U.S. Attorney's offices — while guarded by Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms agents. Harry Evans used heroin delivered by his mother, but wasn't penalized when he failed a drug test. Other snitches received money, beer and cigarettes or stole confidential prosecution documents. A prosecution paralegal engaged in phone sex with Eugene Hunter, a confessed murderer, and one informant called his supplier from a prison phone to complain about receiving low-quality cocaine. For a time, prosecutors covered it all up, but eventually dozens of verdicts were overturned.

The details of the El Rukn case may be extraordinary, but the gist of the story isn't. All too often, prosecutors aid and abet the crimes of their informants. And that's just one disheartening outcome of American law enforcement's bungled dealings with snitches. The use of criminal informants leaves innocents behind bars, puts informants at mortal risk, renders justice opaque and actually leads to more crimes. In Snitching: Criminal Informants and the Erosion of American Justice, Alexandra Natapoff, a professor at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles, describes the shortcomings of how cops and prosecutors employ snitches and offers ideas for reform.

To Natapoff, the secretive, sloppy, unaccountable use of snitches ranks among the chief flaws of America's notoriously fallible criminal justice system. Questionable actions begin during the recruitment process, when police flip alleged criminals into informants without even charging them and, crucially, without a lawyer present. Even after counsel shows up, all incentives favor a deal that involves an agreement to snitch. The government ignores or reduces potential sentences, trading charges for information. The higher a defendant resides within a criminal organization, the more leverage he has and the more lenient a prosecutor might be, violating the "worse the crime, worse the punishment" principle of blind justice. Such practices have become so endemic, Natapoff argues, that decision-makers are desensitized to the profound compromises they're making with criminals, including cold-blooded killers.

As a law enforcement handler deepens his relationship with a snitch, he becomes reliant on the informant and sometimes bends the rules. Handlers may grant informants power over the direction of investigations or personally intervene when a snitch is at risk of jail time for unrelated crimes. One active informant in San Francisco sold AK-47s that killed a cop; others participated in the murder of civil rights workers and worked as professional hit men for years at a time — while under law enforcement supervision. The Department of Justice estimates that 10 percent of the FBI informant pool has engaged in unauthorized crimes, despite government knowledge.

Cops frequently use informants to gather incriminating information, skirting the need for warrants or avoiding privacy laws by having informants record investigative targets, sometimes in their own homes. Investigators take advantage of unsophisticated defendants, flinging them into perilous circumstances to snare bigger criminal fish. Last year, as ABC News reported, 23-year-old college graduate Rachel Hoffman was caught with a small amount of drugs. Without informing her lawyer or family, investigators employed Hoffman as part of a guns-and-drugs sting operation. The targets of the sting killed her.