Barack Obama's Uighur Problem

First, the good news. Adel Abdul Hakim, one of five Uighurs (Muslims from China’s oppressed Xinjiang province), who was released from Guantánamo in May 2006, has had his asylum claim accepted by the Swedish government.

It has been a long journey for Adel. Seized in Pakistan and sold to U.S. forces in December 2001, with 17 of his compatriots, Adel had been living in a run-down hamlet in the Tora Bora mountains, dreaming of rising up against the Chinese government, when the settlement was hit in a U.S. bombing raid. Although it was clear from the very start of their detention that the Uighurs had nothing to do with either al-Qaeda or the Taliban, the Pentagon initially milked them for information about the Chinese government, and then, as a favor to that same government in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, obligingly designated the Uighurs’ separatist group, the East Turkestan Independence Movement (based on the Uighurs’ name for their homeland), as a terrorist organization, and attempted to claim that the Uighurs in Guantánamo were all members.

Even if this had been the case, it was stretching Guantánamo’s rationale to suggest that anyone involved in any independence movement anywhere in the world should be held indefinitely as a “terrorist” on the basis of pragmatic deals struck with foreign governments, but it was not, in fact, clear that any of the men had actually been members of the group. Adel was, initially, one of the lucky ones. While the Pentagon squabbled over the verdicts of different tribunals at Guantánamo (the Combatant Status Review Tribunals, convened in 2004-05 to assess whether the prisoners were correctly designated as “enemy combatants”), secretly reconvening at least two when the tribunal members dared to conclude that their own government had failed to establish an adequate case, Adel and four of his companions managed to avoid the “do-over” tribunals, and were declared to be “not enemy combatants,” although the Pentagon -- ever-inventive and ever-unapologetic -- soon decided to label them “No Longer Enemy Combatants” instead.

Adel and his four compatriots then languished in Guantánamo for nearly two years, while State Department officials scoured the world looking for third countries prepared to risk the wrath of China by accepting them. This was because, in an ironic twist that was lost on the Bush administration, it was decided that they could not be sent home to China, where there were legitimate fears that they would be tortured. The irony, of course, worked on two levels: firstly, because the Bush administration, which had painstakingly shredded almost every law and treaty it had come across, had decided to abide by the prohibition on returning foreign nationals to countries where they faced the risk of torture (as prohibited in the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and in Article 3 of the UN Convention Against Torture); and secondly, because so much of their treatment since they were first seized -- especially at Kandahar, the U.S. prison in Afghanistan that was used to process the majority of the prisoners who ended up in Guantánamo -- was saturated with the kind of abuse that many observers identified as torture.

Eventually, Albania was prevailed upon to accept Adel and his compatriots, and in May 2006, just three days before a U.S. appeals court was scheduled to hear a habeas corpus claim on their behalf, they were hastily bundled out of Guantánamo and deposited in a UN refugee camp in the Albanian capital, Tirana. Although grateful to be freed from Guantánamo, the men had difficulty adjusting to life in Albania, which is a Muslim country, but is also one of the poorest countries in Europe, with little opportunities for work and no other Uighurs to provide them with any kind of support network.