The Arms Control Shell Game

When President Bush arrived in Moscow last Thursday, he ushered in a dangerous new era of false arms control.

Typically, nations seek arms control agreements as a means to increase the security of the signatory nations. Sadly, this latest agreement is a cynical shell game designed to cover the perilous and aggressive new nuclear posture of the Bush administration. It also sets a new, destabilizing precedent for the future and threatens to undo decades of progress in nuclear disarmament.

The Bush administration is pursuing a nuclear strategy detailed in the "Nuclear Posture Review" that was leaked to the media in April. In essence, the strategy targets nations perceived as capable of developing weapons of mass destruction. The idea is that the threat of a preemptive first strike from the United States will deter other nations from seeking a nuclear capability as well as preserve the US ability to militarily intervene at will around the world.

In a dramatic break from past strategy, the review makes clear that the United States will consider using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear adversaries, and even lists seven nations as preliminary targets.

This strategy requires the development of new capabilities and the preservation of others. The first challenge, as the Pentagon sees it, is finding a way to destroy hardened underground "enemy" facilities. Their solution is to develop a "super" warhead known as the "robust earth penetrator" whose function is to burrow underground prior to detonating.

The second challenge is to overcome the stigma of a nuclear first strike. The Bush administration's solution to this problem is to seek to develop lower-yield nuclear weapons, with less explosive power than the city-leveling capability of nuclear weapons of the past. Earlier this month, the Bush administration sought congressional approval of funds for both of these projects. While Congress resisted funding development of these new weapons, lawmakers did agree to fund research toward their development.

In order to deliver the earth-penetrating, low-yield warhead of the future, the United States will need to retain the most accurate weapons available. The answer to this is the Trident missile, the most accurate weapon in our arsenal. Tridents will be completely untouched by the Bush/Putin agreement.

So, under this new agreement, the United States will de-activate a large number of less accurate, strategically irrelevant weapons while simultaneously pursuing a new generation of highly destabilizing offensive nuclear weapons. Or as a Bush administration official candidly put it: "What we have now agreed to do under the treaty is what we wanted to do anyway."

If the weapons being de-activated were being destroyed, there would be room for at least some celebration. The agreement that President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed, however, will not require the destruction of a single weapon. The treaty will also give both parties the opportunity to announce that they are withdrawing from it on three months notice. The short amount of notice coupled with the idea of storing weapons is sure to rattle the Russian military. From its perspective, it will be more desirable to store the weapons, in case the United States announces that it will withdraw from the treaty. This in turn means the worst of all scenarios -- more Russian nuclear weapons stored rather than destroyed. The theft of even one of these weapons represents probably our single greatest security threat.

Finally, the timing of this trip to Moscow is a transparent exercise in "issue management," also known as spin. May 26 marked the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty -- the landmark nuclear disarmament treaty that the Bush administration has unilaterally abandoned.