Humanitarian hubris?

Posted by Joshua Holland at 9:11 AM on April 6, 2006.

I don't have time for a long post this morning, but I just have to pen a few sentences responding to Pascal Zachary's "Good Guys' Guide To Overthrowing Governments," an argument for progressive humanitarian intervention.

Zachary seems to be unfamiliar with the fifty years of progressive thinking on this difficult question, and has come up with a framework for intervention over a chat in Zimbabwe.

The result is that, like 99 percent of those who call themselves "liberal interventionists," he's advocating what amounts to progressive cover for imperial hubris.

Again, I'm limited by time, so let me point out the two truly fatal flaws in his argument. First, he suggests that it is the United States that should lead the way in intervening. By not even mentioning multilateralism, the implication is we should do it alone if need be. Under international law only the United Nations Security Council can authorize such an action, and for a host of very good reasons, not least of which is the temptation for powerful states to use humanitarian excuses to topple ideological opponents.

Second, and just as bad, he suggests an ad hoc approach on when to intervene, and he gives us some subjective criteria to guide us. There are some terrible governments that we need to endure, he says, and others that clearly need to go. This invites a domestic debate about each and every potential intervention. When the left wins the debate, Sudan's government will go, when the right wins, it'll be Hugo Chavez. This is a recipe for disaster.

Theoretically, I'm a liberal interventionist myself. That is, I agree with the principle that national sovereignty shouldn't give governments impunity to commit crimes against humanity. I agree, in principle, in using force to prevent that from happening.

Where I break with most interventionists is that I don't believe the institutions needed to apply those principles are mature enough to fulfill that mandate (and the current administration is doing everything in its power to weaken them). I'm talking about the ICC, of course, but I'm also talking about the UN. The UN is the only body that can confer broad multilateral legitimacy on a humanitarian intervention, but its hands are inevitably tied. Sudan has deals with China, Pakistan is our ally and Russia has a relationship with some of the worst regimes in Central Asia and Eastern Europe. We need to reform the Security Council so that the five Permanent Members can't veto intervention in a place like Sudan. We need to create institutions that don't yet exist, like a United Nations rapid response force.

The international community needs to devote more resources to post-conflict reconstruction. We need to do more towards conflict prevention so that we don't need to intervene in the first place. Saying let's topple this or that government is fine and dandy but it's morally unconscionable if peace-building and nation-building don't follow, and historically they have not (or at least have not done so adequately).

Until humanity gets its act together, humanitarian intervention will be done on a piecemeal basis, it'll be done badly, or it won't be done at all in places like Sudan where it's a no-brainer. And, until then, I'll be a liberal interventionist who looks quite like an isolationist on the surface.

Let me now leave you with a more credible Good Guys Guide to Overthrowing Governments: the executive summary of the UN Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty's landmark report, "The Responsibility to Protect" (PDF):

THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT:

CORE PRINCIPLES

(1) Basic Principles

A. State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself. B. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.

(2) Foundations

The foundations of the responsibility to protect, as a guiding principle for the international community of states, lie in: A. obligations inherent in the concept of sovereignty; B. the responsibility of the Security Council, under Article 24 of the UN Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security; C. specific legal obligations under human rights and human protection declarations, covenants and treaties, international humanitarian law and national law; D. the developing practice of states, regional organizations and the Security Council itself.

(3) Elements

The responsibility to protect embraces three specific responsibilities: A. The responsibility to prevent: to address both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting populations at risk. B. The responsibility to react: to respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention. C. The responsibility to rebuild: to provide, particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert.

(4) Priorities

A. Prevention is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect: prevention options should always be exhausted before intervention is contemplated, and more commitment and resources must be devoted to it. B. The exercise of the responsibility to both prevent and react should always involve less intrusive and coercive measures being considered before more coercive and intrusive ones are applied.

(1) The Just Cause Threshold

Military intervention for human protection purposes is an exceptional and extraordinary measure. To be warranted, there must be serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur, of the following kind: A. large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or B. large scale 'ethnic cleansing', actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.

(2) The Precautionary Principles

A. Right intention: The primary purpose of the intervention, whatever other motives intervening states may have, must be to halt or avert human suffering. Right intention is better assured with multilateral operations, clearly supported by regional opinion and the victims concerned. B. Last resort: Military intervention can only be justified when every non-military option for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing lesser measures would not have succeeded. C. Proportional means: The scale, duration and intensity of the planned military intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the defined human protection objective. D. Reasonable prospects: There must be a reasonable chance of success in halting or averting the suffering which has justified the intervention, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction.

(3) Right Authority

A. There is no better or more appropriate body than the United Nations Security Council to authorize military intervention for human protection purposes. The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority, but to make the Security Council work better than it has. B. Security Council authorization should in all cases be sought prior to any military intervention action being carried out. Those calling for an intervention should formally request such authorization, or have the Council raise the matter on its own initiative, or have the Secretary-General raise it under Article 99 of the UN Charter. C. The Security Council should deal promptly with any request for authority to intervene where there are allegations of large scale loss of human life or ethnic cleansing. It should in this context seek adequate verification of facts or conditions on the ground that might support a military intervention. D. The Permanent Five members of the Security Council should agree not to apply their veto power, in matters where their vital state interests are not involved, to obstruct the passage of resolutions authorizing military intervention for human protection purposes for which there is otherwise majority support. E. If the Security Council rejects a proposal or fails to deal with it in a reasonable time, alternative options are: I. consideration of the matter by the General Assembly in Emergency Special Session under the "Uniting for Peace" procedure; and II. action within area of jurisdiction by regional or sub-regional organizations under Chapter VIII of the Charter, subject to their seeking subsequent authorization from the Security Council.

F. The Security Council should take into account in all its deliberations that, if it fails to discharge its responsibility to protect in conscience-shocking situations crying out for action, concerned states may not rule out other means to meet the gravity and urgency of that situation - and that the stature and credibility of the United Nations may suffer thereby.

(4) Operational Principles

A. Clear objectives; clear and unambiguous mandate at all times; and resources to match. B. Common military approach among involved partners; unity of command; clear and unequivocal communications and chain of command. C. Acceptance of limitations, incrementalism and gradualism in the application of force, the objective being protection of a population, not defeat of a state. D. Rules of engagement which fit the operational concept; are precise; reflect the principle of proportionality; and involve total adherence to international humanitarian law. E. Acceptance that force protection cannot become the principal objective. F. Maximum possible coordination with humanitarian organizations.

Joshua Holland is a staff writer at Alternet and a regular contributor to The Gadflyer.