The surging myth: Not even close to 21,000

Posted by Evan Derkacz at 7:43 AM on January 11, 2007.

Bush announced his "plan" to "break the cycle of violence" with 21,000 new troops to be moved into Iraq last night, without proper armor. Because nothing says "breaking the cycle of violence" like heavily armed soldiers!

At present, according to Fred Kaplan, there are 70k combat troops and 60k support troops in Iraq. Slightly greater than a 50-50 split. When new troops enter a battle zone, the ratio tends to be even higher. The AEI's architect of the escalation had called for 35,000 combat troops, and not for a short time, but for the long haul... Below, Barry Lando explains the metrics of 20,000... -- ed.

Because the issue of "surging" is now in the crosshairs, I take the liberty of reposting-in slightly modified form-a piece I sent out December 18th and apologize in advance to any readers who might feel unduly harrassed.

The idea that shipping twenty thousand more American troops to Iraq can make any real difference to what is already a full scale civil war is risible. Congress and others debating the issue should consider some painful military statistics: first of all, according to the Pentagon's own figures, every front line soldier requires at least three other military types to back him up: engineers, electricians, medics, bookkeepers, etc. Which means that 20,000 more troops to Iraq works out to only about 5,000 additional American trainers or soldiers actually pulling the triggers.

There's another jolting irony...

while the conflicts in Iraq (and Afghanistan) have been a recruiting dream come true for radical jihadists, they've created an enlistment nightmare for the American military. Though the U.S. army claimed they had met manpower targets for 2006, they managed to do so only by offering 700 million dollars in retention bonuses; and spending $300 million more for their recruiting drive.

On top of that is the soaring cost to prepare each American soldier: $120,000 for training plus $25,000 for basic equipment. For that amount, the government could instead send each new troop to Harvard for three years.

But, despite the huge sums spent to fill the ranks, the Army has at the same time been obliged to lower its standards. According to a recent Wall Street Journal report, more than ten percent of the recruits last year required "moral waivers" for past drug use and criminal offenses--that came to 8,500 men and women, triple the figure of ten years ago.

The military was also obliged to accept more applicants scoring in the lowest third on the army's aptitude test. if that wasn't enough, word was also passed to hapless drill instructors that just about everyone was to make it through basic. In May 2005, about 18% of Army recruits were selected out before completing initial training. These days, only about 6% get the boot. Magnifying the problem is the serious shortage of sergeants, who have always been vital for leading rank-and-file grunts.

All of this, at a time, when the U.S. troops are being dispatched to what has become an ever more bewildering conflict: attempting to combat local insurgents in an urban environment, at the same time as much of the country is engulfed in a sectarian civil war. In addition, though they lack any real knowledge of the peoples of Iraq, their cultures and language, U.S. troops are somehow supposed to train Iraqi soldiers or engage in grass roots projects intended to foster economic growth and democratic development. Yet, instead of learning about differences between Sunni and Shiites, or acquiring basic language skills, they are just learning to use weapons they should have been issued with months ago.

Incredibly, one of the key factors still limiting the ability of the army to increase its forces in Iraq-- is that they don't have the equipment. This despite the fact that over the past fifteen years, the Pentagon has spent more than 1.7 trillion dollars. Problem is, most of that huge sum went for multi billion dollar weapons systems--aircraft carriers and super sophisticated bombers--the kind of toys that fascinated Donald Rumsfeld, Washington lobbyists and defense contractors--but not the basic weapons and protection---rifles, body armor and Humvees - the American soldier desperately needs to deal with the bloody guerrilla conflict they are confronting in Iraq and Afghanistan--and other countries down the road.

Tagged as: iraq, military, escalation

Barry Lando, a former 60 Minutes producer, is the author of "Web of Deceit: The History of Western Complicity in Iraq from Churchill to Kennedy to George W. Bush." He also blogs at Barrylando.com.