Media White Wash: U.S.-Backed "Dirty Brigade" Operating in Iraq

Posted by Joshua Holland, AlterNet at 11:13 AM on June 30, 2009.

So, there is an "elite" group of commandos known by the Iraqi public as the "dirty brigade." Its commanders claim that the brigade is made up of soldiers embodying the height of professionalism, but they're perceived to be a hand-picked crew, outside the chain of command, that targets the Maliki regime's political enemies. They're trained and equipped by the U.S. 

The story should come as little surprise. During the 2004 campaign, conservatives in the U.S. talked a lot about deploying the "El Salvador model" in Iraq, and in 2007 Pentagon planners in fact acknowledged, as Reuters put it, "that the El Salvador model had influenced planning."

According to folks like Dick Cheney, El Salvador was a heroic struggle by a U.S.-backed government fighting "terrorists" who had killed 75,000 people. But as historian Mark Engler wrote:  

There is a serious problem with this story. The 75,000 people Cheney mentioned were indeed killed by terrorists, but not by the rebel FMLN forces that he intended to condemn. Rather, they were under assault from the very Salvadoran government that the Reagan administration was supporting and from its paramilitary death squads. With a list of opposition politicians having already been executed or exiled, the 1984 elections were little more than a farce designed to give democratic respectability to a regime that was perpetuating some of the worst human rights abuses in the hemisphere.

Again, the story itself shouldn't be a shocker for anyone who's followed the details of the U.S. occupation of Iraq. What I think is noteworthy is how the Ministry of Truth Associated Press (I know, I have to lay off the Orwell references) reported the story. The headline is: "Elite Iraqi troops in forefront after US pullback" -- they're "elite."

The lede:

As Iraqi security services prepare to take back their towns from the Americans on Tuesday, the sharpest arrow in their quiver is an elite, American-trained force with a reputation that leads many Iraqis to call it "the dirty brigade."

 So it has a reputation that leads "many Iraqis" to call it the "dirty brigade." That's followed by several graphs disputing the perceptions of those "many Iraqis" -- none of whom are quoted in the piece. The only Iraqi quoted is ... Kalib Shegati al-Kenani, the Iraqi Army general who heads the brigade.

Its real name is the Counter Terrorism Bureau, and its commander insists it's professional, nonsectarian and not dirty at all.

The only insight we get as to why the force is known as the dirty brigade is this:

Formed soon after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, the force became known as the "Dirty Brigade" because it was secretive and until recently operated outside the Iraqi chain of command, reporting directly to its U.S. handlers.

It was so little known that it even was rumored to be used against the Shiite-dominated government's opponents in the political mainstream -- a charge denied by the Iraqis and the Americans.

So, the reason it's known as the dirty brigade, according to the AP, is that it operated outside the chain of command and reported directly to the Americans. And then -- almost tacked on as an afterthought -- it was "even rumored" to be used against the government's political opponents.

But buried between the lines is some confirmation that those rumors are likely true:

They are thought to have been the main force that assisted the Americans during an offensive in Baghdad's Sadr City quarter last year to rout Shiite militias, and on operations targeting Sunni insurgents.

As Raed Jarrar and I wrote at the time, that "crackdown" was indeed targeted at Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki's political opponents:

The "crackdown" comes on the heels of the approval of a new "provincial law," which will ultimately determine whether Iraq remains a unified state with a strong central government or is divided into sectarian-based regional governates. The measure calls for provincial elections in October, and the winners of those elections will determine the future of the Iraqi state. Control of the country's oil wealth, and how its treasure will be developed, will also be significantly influenced by the outcome of the elections.

It's a relatively straightforward story: Iraq is ablaze today as a result of an attempt to impose Colombian-style democracy on the unstable country: Maliki's goal, shared by the like-minded allies among the Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish communities that dominate his administration, and with at least tacit U.S. approval, is to kill off the opposition and then hold a vote.

Anyway, the rest of the AP story is basically about how great and professional and non-sectarian the force is, complete with this undeniable proof:

A statement in Arabic posted on the U.S. military's Web site acknowledged the public's "misconceptions about this very viable and important unit."

It picks its targets on the basis of rigorous checks, the statement said. "In short," it added, "the CTB's mission is targeting terrorists, not the Iraqi public or political foes."

The whole story appears to be designed to refute the perceptions of "many Iraqis" -- they are, after all, child-like innocents who really don't understand nor appreciate the wonderful gift of democracy that the benevolent Bush administration bestowed upon them. As is the norm, Iraqis who are not affiliated with the U.S.-backed regime are stripped of agency and when their views are represented, they're framed as "rumors" on the street. By and large -- and there have been a few exceptions -- this conflict is reported as an American story set against an exotic and dangerous backdrop known as Iraq.

Most reporting places a disproportionate emphasis on the statements of military officials in Baghdad and American pols in DC, as if the occupiers could possibly be counted on to give credible accounts of the occupation. Yes, U.S. "mistakes" are reported -- especially tax-payer rip-offs by contractors and things that get our troops killed -- as are the perspectives of Iraqis allied with the Iraqi regime.

When Raed Jarrar and I actually spoke to other Iraqis about another story -- not shlumps in a teashop, but influential members of opposition parties, tribal leaders, etc. -- we got an entirely different perspective on the conflict than that which is reported by the "mainstream" media.

Joshua Holland is an editor and senior writer at AlterNet.