One Year Later: Unintended Consequences of 9/11 and the War on Terrorism

When President Bush initiated the bombing of Afghanistan on Oct. 7, 2001, the perils of the "war on terrorism" pivoted on three historical trends: the fear of a major refugee crisis and war casualties, destabilization of nearby countries, and mounting anger among Muslims toward the United States. The ways these dangers would manifest were and still are difficult to foresee, because such consequences are often unintentional and become visible only after many years.

However, in retrospect, what was obviously missing in early analyses were the consequences -- many of them intentional -- for our own homeland. The war on terrorism overall must be counted as a very partial success, with exceptionally high costs. Those costs are largely ignored but colossal, in federal dollars spent, state and local budgets exhausted, the financial markets worldwide spooked, private security and insurance costs mounting, and the political costs for other issues that are buried by the rally-‘round-the-flag mindset prevailing for the last year.

The war on terrorism has had milder impacts than expected on two counts. First, the refugee crisis never became extremely acute, thanks to heroic efforts by relief workers from around the world. The number of Afghan refugees remains very high, however, and as attention to their plight fades, so will their chances of repatriation and some measure of security. In July, the International Rescue Committee reported from its northern Afghanistan office (which helps support 800,000 people) that "in warlord-controlled Mazar-e-Sharif . . . factional clashes, looting and a significant increase in attacks, including sexual violence," were a rising threat.

Second, the casualties from the war in Afghanistan, while sadly excessive especially among civilian populations erroneously bombed by U.S. aircraft (3,500 fatalities or more), are fewer than what could easily have been. This is due in part to the strategy of the Taliban to self-collapse and blend back into Afghan and Pakistani society, perhaps to rise again after the Yankees leave.

Regional Instability

The mass grave recently discovered in Dasht-e Leili, the prison massacre last year in Mazar-e-Sharif, the mishaps killing civilians -- these are precisely the kinds of things that happen in wartime, and are one reason why pursuing objectives by warfare needs to be approached with exceptional caution. Naturally, the effort to rebuild Afghanistan is falling short, both in dollars (donors have failed to deliver what they’d promised, a pattern repeated from Bosnia, etc.) and in political soundness. The reputation of Afghanistan as an international aid drain, assassination capital and heroin exporter seems to be on its way to complete rehabilitation.

The stability of Afghanistan, which will not be discernable for many years, is part of a messy picture for the stability of the region. The truly chilling scare of a near war between Pakistan and India last winter resulted from Islamic terrorist acts in India and Kashmir, possibly with the knowledge of General Musharraf, the Pakistani strongman and new friend of George W. Bush. While it doesn’t take much to set India and Pakistan on edge, this latest imbroglio (with the threat of nuclear weapons -- possibly a deterrent -- mixed into the fray) was indisputably a result of the regional tensions wrought by the war in Afghanistan and Bush’s embrace of Musharraf. While the Pakistani regime does not seem as vulnerable to Islamic insurgency as it did last autumn, the inability of Musharraf to control al-Qaeda, the Kashmir militants or the border with Afghanistan is scarcely the mark of competence. In the meantime, Musharraf consolidated his power and blunted a return to democracy, also done with the approval of the White House.